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ABSTRACT
Columbia Point, Boston's largest and most stigmatized public
housing project, has been a focal point for public and private
investment strategies to create a new mixed-income residential
community. Columbia Point provided attractive housing for 1,500
families or close to 6,000 people for more than 15 years. Pres-
ently, only 350 households remain. Problems in management,
maintenance and lack of concern for low-income housing led to
the rapid deterioration of the project in the 1960s. More than
a dozen redevelopment plans have been proposed which have
spanned four periods of active initiatives by the major actors.
This thesis examines the history of the planning process and
the rationale for the proposed redevelopment plan. The impli-
cation of redevelopment on the low-income population as related
to four main issues is addressed: private redevelopment, mixed-
income housing, demolition and disposition of public housing,
and the proposed physical design.
The study concludes that the events surrounding Columbia Point
and the evidence presented in the plans do not justify the
recent proposals for demolition or disposition, nor is private
redevelopment an appropriate solution to the problem. Signifi-
cant losses will be sustained by the low-income population if
the present plan is implemented. Moreover, mixed-income housing
is overstated as a desirable goal and is fraught with serious
problems.
Recommendations are made to the Boston Housing Authority to
insure that necessary measures are taken so that the low-income
population will benefit from the revitalization of Columbia
Point.
Thesis Advisor: Tunney F. Lee
Title: Associate Professor of Architecture and Urban Planning
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INTRODUCTION
"The real question is not what is
America going to do about Pruitt-
Igoe? The real question is what
is America going to do about its
poor people?"
--A former teyant of
Pruitt-Igoe
INTRODUCTION
Background
The national need for low-income housing has never been so
great while at the same time, public housing, the largest
low-income housing subsidy program, is under attack for its
"failure" to provide decent housing for the poor. The recog-
nition of certain problems with the conventional low-income
public housing program and increasing pressures from the
private sector has resulted in new programs being created,
such as Section 8, rent subsidy, turnkey housing, Section 236,
etc. These are allegedly created to avoid the pitfalls of
public housing. This is perhaps the most vulnerable period
for public housing. The "image" and stereotype of public
housing and the population it serves is so negative, that
there are continuing problems with political and financial
support from government officials, housing experts, and the
public.
While Congress and the Administration are cutting the budget
and diverting funds into other programs, an essential question
arises of what to do with the existing public housing proj-
ects, especially the small percentage of "troubled" projects
in many of our large cities. For many Public Housing Author-
ities (PHAs), the strategy for improving some of their large
projects has gone beyond attempts at modernization, management
reforms, and special programs such as the Target Projects and
Urban Initiatives Programs. The PHAs are increasingly in
favor of private sector revitalization and redevelopment of
public housing. This trend reflects the PHAs' inability to
internally finance major redevelopment, the acceptance of the
desirability of income mix, and the yield to political and
economic pressures from the private interests and local govern-
ments for private solutions in development. The efforts to
abandon public ownership, management, and control over public
housing are political questions which go beyond cost-effective
measures. The motives of those who support private redevelop-
ment must be examined. The playing out of the political
scenario, the struggles of the low-income population, public
housing tenants, housing advocates and their allies, against
the private and public interests for private redevelopment,
will be the decisive factor in determining the future of many
housing projects.
Recent experiments in private redevelopment have resulted in
demolition, disposition and the loss of low-income and public
housing units. The implication of redevelopment on the low-
income population must be closely analyzed to determine who
benefits from this. Redeveloping public housing is often
pursued in the "public interest," but frequently, inadequate
information and research exists to understand the impact of
certain policies on residents of a particular development,
on the city-wide public housing population, and on the low-
income population as a whole.
In Boston, more than 10% of the population lives in public
housing. 65,000 people reside in 22,000 family, elderly and
leased-housing units scattered throughout the city.2 As
changing market pressures affect the stock of low-income hous-
ing, including public housing, the displacement of low-income
residents and "gentrification," found prevalent in private
housing, may become a trend in public housing.
Thesis Objective
This thesis examines the background and rationale for the
private redevelopment of Columbia Point into a mixed-income
residential community. The implications of the proposed rede-
velopment plan on the low-income population are addressed and
recommendations are made to the Boston Housing Authority to
insure that low-income people will benefit from this process.
Columbia Point, the largest public housing project in Boston
and New England, is located on the Columbia Point peninsula
in Dorchester. The project contains a total of 1,504 units
distributed in eleven mid-rise and twelve low-rise buildings
on a 37-acre site. Originally built and fully occupied in
1954, Columbia Point experienced severe problems in management
and maintenance, and today stands 80% vacant with only 350
remaining households. 3 But despite the mothballed units and
vacant buildings, the project sits on an attractive water-
front location overlooking Dorchester Bay and the skyline of
downtown Boston.
Since the late 1960s, the Columbia Point housing project and
the total peninsula became a focal point for redevelopment
efforts from the Mayor's Office, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA), neighboring institutions, businesses, the
Boston Housing Authority (BHA) and other public agencies. The
waterfront location, easy access to downtown Boston, and other
amenities have made the Columbia Point peninsula a prime
target for private redevelopment, if it were not for the
massive, stigmatized housing project.
The City could not proceed with redevelopment of the whole
peninsula without an adequate solution for the public housing
site. The Boston Housing Authority attempted through moderni-
zation and rehabilitation to revitalize part of the housing
stock, but was largely unsuccessful because of limited capa-
city and other problems. The BHA received $8 million in
Target Projects Program (TPP) and Modernization funds, and
$10 million in Urban Initiatives (UI) funds for Columbia
Point, but was unable to significantly upgrade the project.
The Columbia Point tenants, who for more than ten years were
largely ignored in the planning process, formed the Columbia
Point Community Task Force (hereafter referred to as the Task
Force), to represent their interest in redevelopment. After
an extended period of negotiation among the Task Force, the
BHA and the BRA, the three parties entered into an agreement
in 1979 to redevelop the Columbia Point peninsula, including
the housing project, as a mixed-income residential community.4
Public and private funds will be combined and the Task Force
will be a participant in redevelopment with a private de-
veloper.
For the first time in Boston, a major public housing project
will be redeveloped into a mixed-income community, and nation-
ally, Columbia Point has become the Urban Initiatives program
demonstration for revitalizing a "troubled" housing project.
For low-income tenants, the involvement of the tenant organi-
zation in negotiations, and joint participation in redevelop-
ment are seen as significant achievements. Currently the
redevelopment process is underway with the preparation of a
developer's selection kit. It is anticipated that a developer
will be designated in 1981.5
Analysis
This study looks at the redevelopment of Columbia Point within
the context of Boston's need for low-income housing. Both an
examination of the history of the planning process and a
critique of the current redevelopment plan are included. Four
main issues which are central to redeveloping Columbia Point
and to public housing in general are discussed:
1. Mixed-income housing - a proposal for a mixed-income
housing community on a public housing site has certain
implications as to programmatic outcome, and in the
nature of the social environment for low-income residents.
Questions arise concerning the validity of income mix,
including social mix, as a necessary or desirable goal in
redevelopment. Evaluative judgment can be made according
to the method of income mixing.
2. Private redevelopment - contract stipulations and guar-
antees to maintain low-income housing are some of the
constraints which can be placed on a developer. But to
what extent should the private sector be involved in rede-
veloping public housing, and under what conditions? What
are the foreseeable consequences of such involvement?
3. Demolition and disposition - a redevelopment plan propos-
ing demolition and disposition must be evaluated according
to certain criteria which establish long-term benefits
to the low-income population. Demolition and disposition,
and whether replacement housing is provided, will affect
Boston's supply of low-income housing. What conditions
should be followed to insure that the well-being of the
low-income population is taken into account?
4. Physical design - the quality of a new physical environ-
ment must be supportive of the needs of low and moderate-
income households. The proposed "image" of the new
community and the physical plan will be looked at to
assess its appropriateness to Columbia Point.
The study draws upon my first-hand knowledge in the planning
process; from interviews with various actors and housing
experts; and from the use of primary and secondary documents
and other sources.
Organization
The study begins with a brief overview of the population com-
prised primarily of women, children, minorities, the elderly
and the very poor, who are served by public housing. Criti-
cisms which have been made against public housing are examined
as to their validity. One of the manifestations of the urban
crisis is the further impoverishment of the poor and minority
population in the urban housing market. Boston is discussed
as a city with scarce land resources, limited development
opportunity, and achanging housing market brought about by
the increased attractiveness of urban living and changing
lifestyles for middle and upper-income households. This
trend, in conjunction with the City's low-income housing policy
has resulted in public housing becoming a battleground between
the private interests and the poor over scarce resources.
This is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.
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The concept of redeveloping public housing is an alternative
which is growing in popularity as a means for improving
"troubled" housing projects. Chapter 3 contains a discussion
of Pruitt-Igoe and King's Lynne, two precedents in redevelop-
ment, and an examination of the justifications for public and
private redevelopment.
The history of redevelopment efforts at Columbia Point is
traced to identify the significant issues which have emerged
around the control and use of the housing site, and who is to
gain from redevelopment. This is extracted from more than
12 redevelopment plans and four periods of active initiative
from major actors. Private development and private manage-
ment have been represented as the "ideal solution" for
Columbia Point for more than a decade by the City. Tenants
lived in constant fear that the Authority, which was con-
trolled by a five-man Board with four mayoral appointees and
an Administrator also sent over by City Hall and answerable
to that Board, would ultimately create a housing community in
which only very few low-income tenants will remain. Chapters
4 and 5 document the plans and events in some detail to pro-
vide a source of historical record. The history includes
references to past commitments and actions which remain
relevant to the current planning process.
In the latest redevelopment plan we find a proposal for a
social experiment in mixed-income housing, tenant and devel-
oper partnership, the maintenance of a certain number of
low-income units after redevelopment and significant levels
of demolition and disposition. Chapters 5 and 6 include a
presentation of the major actors and their point of view, and
a critique of the current redevelopment plan.
Conclusions from the study are related to recommendations to
the Boston Housing Authority to insure that low-income people
will benefit from the redevelopment of Columbia Point. An
examination of the history of the planning process and the
current plan is intended to contribute to the on-going events
at Columbia Point, and to provide a framework in which to
evaluate the redevelopment of public housing.
The Tenants Policy Council
My interest in this topic is due to my association with the
Tenants Policy Council, beginning in 1978. First as a HUD
Intern and then as an Architecture and Planning Consultant, I
worked with tenants in various developments in planning and
modernization. My involvement at Columbia Point was to pro-
vide assistance to the TPC Board of Directors to: (1) assess
the long-term impact of redevelopment at Columbia Point; (2)
research the questions of demolition and disposition of public
housing and explore the possibilities for replacement of lost
units; and (3) evaluate the proposed site plan as to its
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responsiveness to the needs of the low and moderate-income
populations. These tasks were to lead to my knowledge of and
participation in the planning process during 1979.
This study has been conducted under the auspices of the
Tenants Policy Council, but the statements and conclusions
contained herein are mine, alone. I assume responsibility
for the accuracy of the information.
The Tenants Policy Council originated in 1963 in response to
the Modernization Program. TPC is the recognized elected
city-wide tenant organization representing all tenants living
in Boston's public housing. Elections are held in each de-
velopment every two years to form up to an eight-member Task
Force or Local Tenant Policy Council (LTPC). Two representa-
tives from each development are elected to serve on the TPC
Board of Directors. An Executive Director and staff complete
the structure of the TPC and carry out the decisions of the
Board.
TPC functions as a liaison between tenants and management,
the Boston Housing Authority. Official input is established
by a 1972 Agreement. TPC traditionally has supplied tenant
input at the decision-making levels in matters pertaining to
the living conditions and environment in public housing, and
actively seeks tenant participation. TPC is responsible for
articulating the needs of tenants in individual developments
and advocating the interests of public housing tenants and
prospective tenants. In this context, TPC plays a vital role
in insuring that any redevelopment effort should be in the
interest of all public housing tenants and those who are in
need of public housing.
In an effort to correct the serious housing conditions result-
ing from BHA mismanagement, in 1976, TPC entered as Plaintiff
Intervenors to Perez vs. BHA, a case brought by individual
tenants to alleviate the substandard living conditions in the
BHA developments. This case resulted in a Consent Decree
issued by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1977,
calling for major reforms in every aspect of BHA's operations,
including administration, management, maintenance, security,
tenant selection, legal, planning, development, modernization,
and personnel. In 1979, the Plaintiffs petitioned the Court
for relief and moved for Receivership of the Boston Housing
Authority. In February 1980, the Court issued an order for
Receivership, and Lewis H. Spence was appointed as Receiver
and charged with the reorganization and revitalization of the
Boston Housing Authority.
Addendum
This research was undertaken during 1979 and early 1980 prior
to the Receivership Administration. The research and recom-
mendations remain pertinent to the new Administration.
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CHAPTER 1: THE NATIONAL NEED FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
"You can make do without education,
you can make do without most
things, but everyone has to have
a place to live. Even the poor
have got to live someplace!"
--A public housing tenant
CHAPTER 1
THE NATIONAL NEED FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
INTRODUCTION
As a nation, the problems of affordable housing continue to
grow. In 1975, close to a quarter of all households, 17
million out of 73 million, were paying more than 25% of their
income to cover housing costs. Nine and a half million were
paying 35% or more of their income. 1 Those who suffer from
one or more forms of housing deprivation: physically sub-
standard housing, overcrowded living conditions, a high rent
burden or living in environmentally impacted neighborhoods,
comprise more than one-third of the population.2
The high cost of homeownership is pricing more and more fami-
lies out of the market. In 1979 only 15% of the nation's
households can afford a newly constructed house compared with
one-fourth in 1975 and two-thirds of the households in the
1950s. According to the estimates of the National Association
of Home Builders, for every $100 increase in the cost of hous-
ing, 14,000 families are priced out of the market.3 Housing
needs are therefore reflected in the rental market.
In April 1979, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) estimated 14.8 million lower-income households were in
need of housing assistance. Of these, 10.1 million (68%) were
renter households.4 The problems in the rental housing market
are reaching critical proportions due to the increasing burden
of rents, a rental housing shortage, and the conversion of
rental units into condominiums. 130,000 conversions are pre-
dicted for 1979 compared to 50,000 during 1977.5 HUD's Tenth
Annual Report on the National Housing Goals in 1979 reported
that from 1973 to 1976, about 1.1 million renter-occupied
housing units were removed from the rental market. In March
1979, the national rental vacancy rate of 4.8% was the lowest
ever recorded by the Bureau of Census. 6
The problem is so severe that the Comptroller General of the
United States, in areport to Congress in 1979, declared
rental housing to be a "national problem that needed immediate
attention":
Millions of Americans cannot afford homeownership
and cannot find affordable rental housing. Immedi-
ate national attention is necessary if an adequate
supply of affordable rental housing is to be made
available. . . . The Congress and the Administration 7
should take steps to mitigate this nationwide crisis.
This chapter will look at those who are most affected by the
worsening of the housing crisis: the poor, minority, female-
headed and elderly population, and how this population is
reflected in public housing. An attempt will be made to dis-
pel some of the common indictments of public housing and to
show that it is in the public interest to support and improve
the public housing program.
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LOW-INCOME HOUSING NEEDS
In 1977, the Bureau of Census shows that over 48% (11.9 mil-
lion) of all renters are paying more than 25% of their
income for rent, with 7.4 million paying 35% or more.8 It
was found that the number of renters paying 35% or more had
increased by about 1.9 million (or 35%) during the period
from 1973 to 1977. Of those paying 35% or more, 86% had
annual incomes of less than $7,000, and 57% pay more than
50% of their income for rent.
Within the population as a whole, the Black population show
a greater need for housing assistance. 9 28% of Black fami-
lies compared with 7% of white families live below the poverty
line. In 1976, the median income is $9,240 for Black house-
holds and $15,400 for white households. In comparison to
white households, more Black households in urban areas rent
their housing. 42% of Black households are more likely to
live in multi-family structures and apartments in urban areas,
and in housing built before WWII. In 1976, 10% of the total
population, compared with 21% of the Black population, lived
in housing that was flawed (lacking adequate plumbing, heat-
ing, etc.). Of all rental units, 22% were physically defi-
cient, but 37.7% of units rented to Black households were
deficient. 80% of all households are able to find adequate
housing paying 25% of their income, and 84% can find adequate
housing paying 30% of their income. But only 63% of Black
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households are able to find adequate housing for 25% of their
income, and 70% for 30% of their income. Many have no other
choice but to live in substandard housing.
For female-headed households, housing conditions are also
worse than for the population as a whole. 10 In 1976, 17.8
million or one-quarter of all households were female-headed.
Of this population, 78% were white, 17% Black, 4% Hispanic and
1% other. 14% of all families are headed by women. One-third
of the households have incomes below the poverty line, and
more than half of the women work full or part-time. Female-
headed households are more likely to be renters (53%) than
the general population (35%) and they are more likely to live
in multi-family structures and apartments than in single-
family dwellings. Of the 8 million female-headed households
with family, 15.1% live in substandard housing as compared
with the national rate of 9.7%. The probability of being ill-
housed for a poor, female-headed household is the following:
white .18, Hispanic .26, and Black .28. 80% of all households,
as opposed to 53% of female-headed households, are able to
find adequate housing for 25% of their income. The chances
of being ill-housed also increase with family size. A 1978
HUD-released study concludes that family size, race, and
ethnicity rather than sex alone affect how well poor, female-
headed households live.11
Age-related statistics reveal the conditions of poor elderly
households. 12 The poor elderly males living alone are the
worst housed, with a probability of 27% for white, 43% for
Black and 56% for Hispanic of being ill-housed. 75% of the
women over 65 who are living alone must spend a quarter or
more of their income to afford adequate housing. 31% of
women over 65 who head a multi-person household must spend
a quarter or more of their income to afford adequate housing.
In looking at the housing problems of the poor, female-headed,
elderly and minority households, it was found that housing in
the private market did not meet their needs. Even when in-
come was held constant, housing choices differed according to
certain factors such as race, age, sex, number of children and
the presence of single-parent-headed households. The creation
of housing submarkets restricted access and mobility for
certain groups and concentrated them in characteristically
worse housing than for the population as a whole.
WHO LIVES IN PUBLIC HOUSING
Public housing serves the population in need of housing. From
1955, the tenant composition of public housing changed dra-
matically as families who exceeded the income limits or became
financially better off sought housing in the private market. 13
These families were gradually replaced by the unemployed,
under-employed and fixed-income families consisting mainly of
poor white and Black families and the elderly. Many of them
resorted to public housing because of their inability to find
affordable housing elsewhere.
In 1952, the Black population in public housing was 38%, in
1965, this increased to 51%. 4 In 1978, approximately 63% of
the total population residing in public housing are minorities
(52% Black and 11% Hispanic and other minorities).15 The
population residing in family public housing is astounding:
80% of the households are minority households (66% Black and
14% other). The number of single-parent-headed households
in public housing is also dramatic.16 In 1978, close to 78%
of all families in public housing are single-parent-headed
households, with the overwhelming majority being female-
headed. 78% of white and 81% of Black households are single-
parent-headed.
In observing the recent characteristics of families moving
into public housing, in Table 1, more than half of the fami-
lies were moving in from substandard housing or were previ-
ously without housing. One-third of all minority as compared
with one-fifth of white families, were moving from substandard
housing. Moreover, close to 45% of white families and 36% of
minority families who previously lived in standard housing
were moving into public housing.
Table 1: Previous Housing of All Families who Moved into
Public Housing During the Twelve Months Ending
September 30, 1977.
Previous
Housing
All
Families
White
Families
Black
Families
All Other
Minorities
Number moving in 139,667 61,376 60,720 16,773
Substandard 40,781 12,659 21,880 6,098
Without housing 36,277 17,866 14,301 3,919
Standard 56,060 27,626 22,055 5,991
Now Known 6,549 3,225 2,484 765
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1977 Statistical Yearbook, December 1978, Table 96,
p. 236.
A survey of public housing incomes reveal that public housing
is housing poorer and poorer families. In 1961, the median
family income of public housing residents was 47.1% of all
families, an income gap of $3,330. In 1970, the median for
public housing was 36.9% of all families, an income gap of
$6,231. 17
Employment characteristics of the public housing population
reveal that public housing houses not just the unemployed, but
the working poor. In 1970, 60% of younger households, both
white and non-white, had at least one wage earner, but the
median earning capacity was extremely low. The population
suffers from underemployment as the median income for a wage
earner under 65 with a family was only $2,000 more than a
family with no earners.18 Within the elderly population, one-
fourth of the non-white and one-tenth of the white households
had at least one earner. By 1977, the number of family house-
holds with wage earners dropped: 69% had no earners, 28% one
earner, 3% two earners, and the median income was $3,691.
86% of white families, 73% of Black families, 64% of Spanish-
speaking families and 57% of Native American families received
public assistance or other benefits aside from housing. A
total of 23% received no other benefits except housing.1 9
In examining some of the differences by race, we find the
modal age of white heads-of-households to be over 65, of
Black heads-of-households to be between 25 and 35.20 Of the
households who moved in during the 12 months ending September
1977, a total of 33% were elderly. 49% or close to half of
the white households, and only 21% of the Black households
were elderly.21 Of all households, white households had a
mean of 2.02 persons per household, and Black households had
a mean of 3.48. Minority households had a higher rent pay-
ment and a higher mean income than white households.22 The
white population in public housing contains an increasing
number of elderly. Their housing needs are for small units.
Blacks and other minorities continue to be in greater need
for family housing and larger units. The higher rent payment
and mean income of minority households reflect not only their
family composition but that public housing is a better buy
for their money because of discrimination in the private
market.
The critical need for public housing is also manifested in
the eligibility rate, vacancy rate, the waiting list, and in
the rents for public housing. The present public housing
population comprises only 2.9% of those who are eligible to
participate in the program. Of the more than 1.3 million con-
ventional units or 14,000 public housing developments, HUD
statistics for 1978 report that the national vacancy rate in
public housing is 2.8%, or approximately half the vacancy
rate for private housing. More than 3 million families are
on the waiting list. The average monthly rent of $62 shows
that it is an unequaled buy for people who are in need of the
assistance public housing offers. 23
THE ATTACK ON PUBLIC HOUSING
Subsidies and support for public housing are decreasing at a
time when public housing is serving a poorer constituency.
The 1973 Nixon "moratorium" of massive cuts and other setbacks
to the program continue to this day. We can only account for
the lack of support as stemming from those who would like to
see the dissolution of the program regardless of the needs.
The benefits of the program are clear. In HUD's National
Housing Policy Review, the findings reported that: "the over-
whelming majority of public housing tenants occupy better
housing and are able to purchase more goods than they would
in the absence of the program."24 Henry Aaron from the
Brookings Institute states that: "public housing obviously
raises the living standards of its tenants, if it did not,
they would not have chosen it, or if they had blundered in,
would have moved out. Most tenants probably occupy better
housing than they would occupy if they paid commercial rents." 2 5
Lawrence Friedman finds that: "public housing in the broad
sense, is the only program which might perhaps actually pro-
vide a significant supply of decent homes for people below
the poverty level." 2 6
But despite the demand for public housing by the poor, we
have seen the continued attack on the program by politicians,
housing experts, government officials, and private interest
groups. These attacks do not go unheeded as they have led to
major cuts in budget appropriations to the conventional pro-
gram. As evidenced by Table 2, contract and construction
activity for public housing has been drastically reduced
since 1970.
The criticisms against public housing can be roughly divided
into three categories: (1) the cost effectiveness of public
housing versus other programs in supplying housing for the
Table 2: Low-Income Public Housing - Yearly Trend in Contract and
Construction Activities, 1970-1977.*
Active Housing Units
Calendar
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Placed Under
ACC
101,932
58,228
80,319
33,453
22,438
12,858
4,286
3,440
Placed Under
Construction or
Rehabilitation"
104,410
72,230
44,760
27,807
19,050
15,090
9,907
6,321
Made Available
for Occupancy
73,723
91,539
58,590
52,791
43,928
24,514
6,862
6,229
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1979
Statistical Yearbook, Table 62, p. 204.
*Includes Indian housing.
**Includes construction and rehabilitation under the old leased
housing program.
poor; (2) social criticisms "heaped" upon public housing by
the uninformed to the "housing expert"; and (3) physical flaws
attributed to the buildings' design. Each of these will be
briefly addressed.
Cost Criteria
Opponents of public housing have argued for alternative pro-
grams such as Section 8, rent supplements, and leased-housing,
which rely on the private rental market to provide low-income
housing. The common arguments against the conventional pro-
gram are as follows:
o Public housing provides for government reliance on new
construction as opposed to the improvement of existing
stock through conservation, rehabilitation, or direct
rent subsidies.
o Construction of new low and moderate-income housing has
proved not only inefficient, but also inequitable and
politically explosive.
o The housing allowance and rent subsidy programs are supe-
rior because they affect the demand for housing by in-
ducing landlords to upgrade and rehabilitate existing
stock, and thereby prevent the filtering down and further
deterioration of housing units.
If programs are to be measured by outcomes, it is assumed that
the provision of decent housing for the poor should be based
on supplementing incomes of households to compete in the
urban housing markets, rather than through construction of
new units. Eligible low-income households would then realize
an economic right to an economic commodity. With the conven-
tional program, even with the same eligibility criteria, it
would, by nature, serve a fixed number constrained by the
amount of subsidized units constructed. There would be in-
creased equity in the housing allowance program as the exter-
nal social benefits would rise. This includes the selection
of housing based on factors of human welfare: location;
closeness to work, access to schools, services, transporta-
tion, etc. Problems such as income and racial segregation
would be easier to alleviate as poor families have a greater
chance to disperse into other areas--therefore minimizing
their impact in any one area. Public housing was thought to
concentrate the poor in already impacted areas.
The arguments in favor of rent subsidy programs emerged during
a period of out-migration of middle and upper-class families
to the suburbs. As the cities faced a declining population
between 1960 and 1970, Arthur Solomon noted: "The units
vacated by middle-income whites have been occupied by families
whose rent paying ability is insufficient to command a decent
level of maintenance and repair. At the same time the infla-
tionary costs of operating properties has exacerbated the
problems caused by slack demand."27 Policy-makers, fearful
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of the cities becoming the "isolated preserves for the
elderly, the poor, the blacks and Puerto Ricans, and others
unable to escape to the suburbs," 2 8 and the consequences of
urban disinvestment, recommended that rental assistance pro-
grams to the poor be used to preserve the housing stock.
But this condition is no longer the case as our major cities
are experiencing population changes. The desirability of city
living, changing lifestyles, and the energy crisis, all mean
tremendous pressures on the urban housing markets. Vacancy
rates of 2% or less are now common. Gentrification and re-
cycling of the older stock of housing, and the resulting
displacement of low and moderate-income households are now
common occurrences. Rent subsidies have become costly as
fair market values have continued to climb, and have become
another mechanism for subsidizing landlords with high rental
incomes while there has not been a corresponding improvement
or expansion of the stock because of housing demands.
Tenants are now finding that they are renting the same units
and paying landlords inflated rents guaranteed by the govern-
ment. Furthermore, housing choices for these households have
not changed as the housing crisis deepens. Racial and income
segregation, and other discriminatory practices continue.
The Section 8 program was ambitious in what it purported to
do: redistribute housing resources and upgrade conditions.
Unfortunately, these goals have not been achieved, and criti-
cally needed new housing has not been produced. Additionally,
the Section 8 program has not expanded proportionally to need,
nor has it received significant allocations since the height
of its funding in 1976.
Table 3:
(See Table 3.)
Section 8 Contract Reservation.
Fiscal
Year Actual Reservations
1976 490,581 units
1977 330,977 units
1978 257,517 units
1979 265,822 units
1980 193,000 units (estimate)*
1981 159,000 units (estimate)*
Source: Comptroller General Report to the Congress, "Rental
Housing: A National Problem that Needs Immediate
Attention," General Accounting Office, November 8,
1979, p. 26. and Campaign for Housing, "Report No.
23," December 6, 1979, derived from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) proposed reduction in
the HUD budget request for fiscal 1981.
*Campaign for Housing estimates.
Section 8 is also highly unstable as the nature of the program
easily permits for contraction of the program by simply cutting
the budget or letting attrition take people off the program.
The conventional program is more immune to political manipula-
tion and budget cuts as the costs of construction, operating
subsidies, and other funds must be maintained for the duration
of the ACC. The housing allowance program was found to be
more costly than public housing new construction in a study
performed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and was
found to have minimal effect on the expansion of the low-
income housing supply.2 9 Supporters of the Section 8 program
have been politically short-sighted or naive; the shifting
population trends and tightening of housing markets compounded
with a public more hostile to low-income people have laid the
ground work for a declining commitment to low-income housing.
Therefore, programs which can easily be stripped will be the
first to go.
The rent subsidy program, moreover, demonstrates a simple
solution to the problems of housing the poor which leads to
political defeatism rather than serious attempts to make appro-
priate changes to the public housing program. As explained
by Jewel Bullush and Murray Hausknecht:
In the rent subsidy program we can still see the myth
at work. . . . the program implicitly assumes that
the poor are distinguished from others only by a lack
of money; that their values, aspirations, and styles
of life are not meaningfully different from others;
that once the lack of money has been compensated for
they will merge relatively easily into their surround-
ings. . . . The rent subsidy proposal, therefore, is
quite conventional in its approach, since it concerns
itself with individuals and the deserving poor. It
demonstrates a failure to see public housing in rela-
tion to the poor as members of a community, and to see
the community in terms of its class characteristics.
Thus, the inability to come to terms with the class
dimensions of urban ills leaves the champions of public
housing pursuing traditional paths that lead to defeats
in the political arena, and to a further weakening of
commitment to public housing.3 0
Social Postulates
Perhaps the sharpest criticisms about the public housing pro-
gram are from the subjective indictments of the poor. Some
of the familiar arguments once heard against public housing
run the gamut from: the "deserving" poor and not the "problem"
poor should receive assistance; public housing rewards those
who have failed to achieve; why should Blacks or poor fami-
lies receive new or better housing than hard-working white
middle-class families. Today, more sophisticated attacks are
levelled against public housing, these have evolved from
social and behavioral research and are promulgated by policy
makers, housing experts, politicians, and even liberal pro-
ponents of low-income housing. Their concerns have focused
on resident homogeneity; racial, income and social mix;
density; and the impact of low-income population concentra-
tions on real estate values, adjoining neighborhoods, the
livability of the city, etc. Interestingly, the effects of
these "new" social theories are not so different from the
old familiar racist, anti-poor and anti-welfare arguments.
They have the same result of limiting the access of the poor
and minority households to benefits and services.
Social policies that were once implemented as a means to pro-
vide population groups that have been historically under-
represented and excluded from access to society's resources
have been subtly changed to reinforce discriminatory and
exclusionary policies. The civil rights movement raised
fundamental questions about the right of people of color to
access in all aspects of society by striking at the institu-
tions which enforced segregation and discrimination. Public
housing, once the domain of the white submerged middle-class
and veteran households was opened for occupancy to poor and
minority populations in the 1950s. In other areas of housing,
poor and minority demands brought about policies and court
decisions that addressed abolishing housing and residential
desegregation, exclusionary zoning, and providing fair hous-
ing, and other increases in housing opportunities. But the
expansion of housing opportunities is no longer the trend.
With the increase of minority and the poor population concen-
trated in the urban areas, the original fears of "white
flight" and now the desire of wealthier white households to
relocate in the cities have changed housing policies around to
again restrict access to poor and minority households. Two
examples of recent housing policies come to mind: the concept
of "racial balance" in public housing, and "fair share" dis-
tribution of housing opportunities in metropolitan areas.
In the first example, the struggles to end racial discrimina-
tion and the demise of public housing minimum income regula-
tions meant that poor and minority households could reside in
public housing. Tenants and civil rights leaders moved for
the courts to integrate all-white projects and to insure that
minority people had a right to housing according to need
and locational choice. Today, integration still exists as a
goal to be achieved by eliminating discriminatory practices
against Blacks and other minorities who are eligible for and
in need of housing, as overt discrimination is sustained by
the lack of minority housing opportunities, discriminatory
practices in tenant placement and assignment, the under-
representation of minority households in leased housing and
in elderly housing, and so on. But while certain practices
have successfully opened up housing opportunities for the poor
and minority populations, "racial balancing" has emerged for
entirely different reasons. As the numbers of minority
households served by public housing continues to increase,
housing authorities have become concerned. Large numbers of
minorities in the developments have falsely come to be syn-
onymous with the decline in housing conditions and deterior-
ated living environments. The practice of racial balancing
establishes a ratio of white to minority households in each
development and thereby places a ceiling on the number of
minority households.31 As minority households have come to
represent a majority, and in some cities as high as 90% of
those in need of public housing, restrictions will deny
housing to these families.
In some cities, such as Cambridge, the housing authority has
placed a freeze on the waiting list until marketing techniques
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are implemented so as to attract white applicants to public
housing. Many PHAs also stop filling vacancies until the
numbers of white applicants increase. Often this can result
in placing white households with serious problems, e.g.,
criminal records, a history in mental institutions, or a
history of other problems, into the development, thereby
denying housing to responsible minority households. Often
the result is that white families with problems contribute
to any instability which may already exist in the project.
In St. Louis and other places, white college students and
single adults are encouraged to apply and are admitted to
public housing so as to racially balance the developments.
These policies do not address those who are in need of public
housing, nor do they lessen racial tension. Instead, racial
animosity may increase. In a similar vein, income mix is
encouraged by those who want to break up low-income and
minority developments, to "eliminate the pathologies" found
in these communities. Those who advocate for racial balancing
without addressing housing needs fail to see the problems in
their argument. As discussed by Frances Piven and Richard
Cloward:
Stress on racial integration as a necessary component
of housing programs has drained support for these
programs; as a result of a policy of "either inte-
grated housing or no housing," those most in need of
better shelter have been denied the benefits of
potentially helpful programs, and are in fact paying
the price for goals and ideals that are less important
to the poor than they are to the reformers. 32
The effects of unemployment, poverty and discrimination have
resulted in a disproportionate share of minority and poorer
households who turn to public housing, therefore the composi-
tion of those who resort to public housing will not neces-
sarily reflect the racial make-up of the larger population in
the surrounding area or in the city. There will continue to
be a large percentage of minority and poor households having
the greatest housing need until discrimination is eliminated.
In essence, public housing cannot be "racially balanced" if
private sector housing is "imbalanced" or segregated. Sophis-
ticated and insidious forms of racism continue to emerge which
in reality are no different than the former policies which are
overtly exclusionary and discriminatory.
The policy of "fair share" housing has similar problems in
its effect on the distribution of housing resources. Alloca-
tions for housing assistance such as Section 8, rent subsidies,
and other low-income rental programs are based on a calcula-
tion of need for each town, city or jurisdiction. These are
examined along with the past performance of a community in
meeting low-income housing needs.33 Locations where minority
and poor populations live or are "unduly concentrated" are
noted, and an allocation plan is developed which would award
housing resources to communities, usually in suburban areas,
which have made little progress in the past in meeting housing
needs. Positive outreach goals are then established for these
jurisdictions so as to attract low-income and minority house-
holds and to induce residential mobility from "concentrated"
to "unconcentrated" areas. The result of fulfilling positive
outreach goals would be to redistribute housing assistance to
the suburban and outlying areas; large cuts would then be made
in upgrading or increasing the supply of low-income housing
in the cities.
Planners, policy makers, and others have considered fair
share housing as a simple computational process which would
result in a redistribution of housing resources.34 Some even
feel that the poor are a burden and should be redistributed or
"shared fairly". A prevalent belief is that if minorities
and the poor are over-represented in certain areas in compari-
son to their overall percentage, they should simply be
"spatially deconcentrated" and dispersed. Little thought is
given to the consequences of the continued displacement of
poor and minority households and families from an area, and
the breaking up of social and community ties.
Racial balancing and fair share housing in addition to other
emerging social policies fail to recognize that: (1) the
minority and poor populations have formed as communities and
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have evolved as communities; (2) the communities have his-
torically followed a pattern of movement and forced relocation
in accordance with the economic changes in an area; and (3)
the control over location and mobility are factors of empower-
ment--such that the ability to continue to live in the central
cities, in one's community, or the ability to choose where to
live, are inextricably tied to the fight for jobs, the right
to a quality of life, and other opportunities which have been
denied them.
The original movement for increased housing opportunities has
presently been replaced. Although there appears to be liberal
and enlightened reformation of our housing policies, inequali-
ties in the distribution of housing and other resources to the
poor and minority population continue to be perpetuated.
Design Factors
The majority of public housing constructed in the first 20
years of the program was primarily low-rise garden apartments
and was of considerably higher quality when compared with the
existing private housing. Programmatic changes and population
shifts developing in the late 1950s through the 1960s neces-
sitated massive construction to house the expanding poor popu-
lation in the central cities. They type of housing constructed
was dominated by the monstrous and monolithic high-rise and
high-density settings that public housing is stereotypically
known for.
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Development in the fields of behavioral and environmental
psychology have focused on some of the design consequences
such as: the effect of high-rise living on families, espe-
cially poor families; the interactive qualities of security;
the circulation patterns; open space; and other physical and
psychological factors which can support or inhibit desired
activities. Social research looked at the symbolic relation
of housing to individual and group identity and brought about
the significance of housing type and design as an identifying
element. This has led to increased understanding in designing
low-income housing that can successfully integrate into the
fabric of existing neighborhoods, instead of reproducing
isolated and foreboding housing projects.
The development of improved physical design criteria has also
brought about new approaches to understanding housing as an
integral component of a social and physical environment.
Simply stated, "housing is a web of social services which go
beyond the mere provision of shelter." 35 But in the applica-
tion of this new body of research, designers, planners and
policy makers have tended to be narrow in their approach to
appropriate solutions to housing problems. Often they end
up with proposals addressing single issues such as: density,
security, open space, unit size and layout, and spatial hier-
archies. Thus, they frequently devise rigid design solutions
to be applied everywhere. How often are we made aware of the
45
simplistic arguments of designers who claim that successful
family housing must have the following qualities: it must
approximate single-family homes or townhouses, have a private
front and back entrance, ground-floor access, private yard,
a kitchen overlooking the yard, and so on, without addressing
the contextual setting of the house and the various other
social and environmental factors which impinge on the quality
of life. In criticizing past design and housing policies
Chester Hartman states:
Research into the sociology of housing, while illu-
minating many aspects of the residential process and
some of the broader ramifications of the physical
home itself, . . . has not attempted to study housing
issues in the context of the community. . . . it is
still the house per se that provides the focus for
policy and programs. The underlying assumption is
one of uniformity and importance of certain physical
standards and attributes with regard to housing. The
housing programs and policies which derive from this
concern still focus almost exclusively on changes in
physical features of the dwelling unit, employing
certain fixed standards for what is desirable.
This general assumption of physical determinism--that
physical features of the immediate environment are of
critical importance to human well-being and ought to
be the principal object of planned change--is at the
core of most approaches to housing at the public and
private levels. In sum, public policy and most re-
lated research have approached the environment in
physical terms without adequate study of and concern
for the social and sentimental aspects which may be
of equal or paramount concern to those who are the
subjects of policy and research.36
Whereas certain new design criteria can be used successfully
in the design of new housing developments, especially if
management and services are also addressed, they are not so
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easily adapted to existing developments. Nor should they be.
When it comes to remedying "troubled" developments, one cannot
just assess the workability of the development by comparing
the physical design and layout of the existing housing with
the "ideal" or prototypic model of successful family housing.
First, since they rarely match, this often leads to wasteful
decisions to demolish the development if adaptations cannot
easily be made to transform the existing housing to conform
to these rigidly set criteria, and secondly, physical design
issues in themselves do not determine the livability of an
environment. Often, those who are quick to call for demoli-
tion by citing physical design flaws are usually searching
for justifications for a prior political decision to rid an
area of low-income housing.
A double standard also pervades in the field: the number of
stories from the ground floor; questions of density; the
number of children per acre; the need for private entrances;
and so on, are never the sole stipulations for providing upper-
income housing, whereas they have been rigidly applied to low
and moderate-income housing. Efficient management has always
been an important factor in the operation of market-rate
housing, but it is rarely seen as such for low-income housing.
Failures in low-income housing are more likely to be attribu-
ted to physical design factors than to the quality of housing
services. The inability of many planners and design pro-
fessionals to politically and ideologically support the con-
cept of low-income or public housing has also resulted in
narrow definitions of what kind of housing is to be provided.
Recent research has lent some insight to the myths of certain
conventional and assumed measures of physical determinism in
low and moderate-income housing. A HUD-released study entitled
"Residents' Satisfaction in HUD-Assisted Housing: Design and
Management Factors" have revealed some significant findings. 3 7
Conducted during the period from 1972 to 1977, the study sur-
veyed and evaluated 37 HUD-Assisted housing developments in
ten different states, including New York and California. Ten
public housing developments along with state housing,
corporation-owned and privately-owned developments funded
through 221(d)(3), 221(d)(4) and Section 236 programs were
researched. All developments except one elderly development
were for general occupancy. The developments comprised all
building types: low-rises, mid-rises and high-rises. A total
of 3,900 residents were surveyed. Delving into the multi-
plicity of design and management factors that contributed to
the successful workings of a development, the following find-
ings were made:
Ablend of factors is responsible for creating a
satisfactory living environment, not a single
aspect. . . . the most careful and sensitive atten-
tion to matters of planning and design, for instance,
will have practically no bearing on the final suc-
cess of development, unless attention is also paid to
the other important ingredients, namely the charac-
teristics of the residents themselves, the attitudes
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and performance of management, and the attributgs
of the surrounding neighborhoods or community.3
Density, per se, was not a predictor of resident
satisfaction. . . . We can conclude from the results
of our analysis that both high and low densities
can be satisfactory when a development is adequately
designed and managed. 3
The small size of a development [in numbers of dwel-
ling units] w 4 a weak predictor of resident
satisfaction.
There was no significant difference in general satis-
faction between subsamples of residents living in
high-rise and low-rise developments. . . . This
finding contradicts widely held notions to the
effect that high-rise projects are inherently less
satisfactory for family living. . . . we must con-
clude that well-designed and well-managed high-rise
housing can be as satisfactory as any other well-
designed and well-managed building type. Indeed
in our sample the high-rise residents were more satis-
fied than low-rise residents with privacy from
neighbors, recreation facilities, and parking ar-
rangements.41
The type of site layout was not related to residents'
satisfaction. . . . no particular type of site layout
seems to exist that will be intrinsically better and
that will strongly influence residents satisfaction.
No matter what type of layout is chosen, the specific
detail way in which a variety of important attributes
are hane d is what makes a real difference to
people.
Satisfaction with management was found to be among
the strongest predictor of overall satisfaction. . . .
In practical terms, the key role played by responsive,
fair efficient and effective management in fostering
residents' satisfaction cannot be overemphasized.4 3
In summary, . . . specific aspects of the residents,
the physical environment and of management all con-
tributed to generate residents' satisfaction. Because
of the importance of aspects in these three domains it
is unlikely that successful developments will score
highly on all three. Likewise, it is unlikely that
attempts at improving performance in one domain will
increase residents' satisfaciton i 4attention is not
paid to the other domains as well.
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In dispelling certain fallacious concepts about designing for
low and moderate-income housing communities, the study raises
the often neglected factors of resident satisfaction in
management performance. These factors cannot be overlooked
in the planning for new housing and changes in existing
housing. Some of the newly constituted developments show the
results of accumulated wisdom from past mistakes. Practice
has established that we are able to improve our approach
towards providing better housing. Unfortunately, the science
of intervention into dysfunctional communities has not been
so successful, being narrowly construed with physical deter-
minism as an underlying supposition. The important aspects
of innovative management reforms applicable to low and
moderate-income housing rather than traditional management
practices have not been adopted. Potentials for community
empowerment such as economic development, job training and
placement have usually been pushed aside as an inconsequential
part of social services. The full development of tenant
participation and community organizing has largely been
ignored, thus defeating any attempts at improving the vital
social organization of the community and of sustaining resi-
dent contribution in the upkeep of their environment.
Housing officials, policy makers and planners have instead
resorted to solutions which attempt to solve the housing
problems by getting rid of poor and minority people and
"problem" tenants. This is done by subtle actions, such as
attrition, or drastic actions, such as massive demolition.
Positive actions would be to rehabilitate the housing and
apply creative approaches towards improving the social en-
vironment, but instead, income and racial mix are readily
resorted to--rather than attempts to deal with the existing
populace.
The reality of the situation is that housing problems of the
poor will not go away just by displacement, dispersion,
demolition, or changes in physical design. Housing improve-
ment and community development in all their constituent parts
must take place from the ground up--in the interest of tenants.
Any other approach only reveals the weakness of a commitment
to house the poor.
CONCLUSION
The political arena is dominated by the point of view that
speaks to the failure of public housing. This has lead to the
ideological defeat of the program, despite the research which
reveals the contrary--that public housing actually meets the
needs of the majority of tenants and, when properly designed
and managed, is as satisfactory as, or more satisfactory than,
housing in the open market.45 As evidenced by data from HUD's
Target Projects Program (TPP), it was found that only 5% or
700 projects out of 14,000 projects nationally are "troubled"
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and less than 200 are "critically troubled" developments. 46
Unfortunately, the lack of adequate funding compounded with
mismanagement of the housing authorities in certain cities
has made it difficult for public housing in those cities to
be maintained as standard housing. The creation of slum con-
ditions in comparatively few family developments has fed the
notion that public housing has failed as a national program.
But, despite its problems, public housing has been a mass
housing approach for decent and affordable housing for the
low-income population. Located in 2,700 communities, public
housing shelters an estimated 3.4 million people.47 The
importance of public housing cannot be overemphasized, in
metropolitan areas there exists one public housing unit for
every five poverty-level households.48 This represents a
significant part of any local housing stock; public housing
can no longer be considered as "temporary" housing as it has
become a permanent part of the housing stock.
The current attack on public housing is jeopardizing the pro-
gram by inducing budget cuts, a decrease in new housing starts
and cynicism towards public management and ownership of
housing. Many of the popular arguments against public housing
not only undermine the existing program, but divert attention
away from how society will house the poor. The alternative
programs cannot solve the housing problem for the poor given
the severe private housing shortages found in many of our
major cities. Furthermore, "the housing problem is not going
to be solved by gimmicks, but by spending enough money on
very simple things."4 9
If the evidence points to the importance of management, ser-
vices, reforms in the housing authorities, and development of
the social communities in public housing, one wonders why
opponents usually call for the dissolution of public housing
rather than the application of appropriate measures to alle-
viate and improve conditions.
As enumerated in this chapter, the arguments in themselves do
not justify the dismantling or abandoning of public housing;
instead, public housing should be improved and expanded as a
means for providing housing for the poor. Unfortunately, in
looking at who is served by public housing, one can only con-
clude that the attack on public housing, in all its broad
manifestations, is fundamentally an attack on the low-income
population: the poor, minority, female and elderly popula-
tion, and on their right to decent and affordable housing.
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CHAPTER 2: THE LOCAL NEED FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
. . . [T]he housing problem of
the disadvantaged has gradually
ceased to be of major concern to
those responsible for public
policy. Faced with declining
ratables and rising costs for
municipal services, cities have
used federal renewal funds for
projects that would shore up
local finances."
--William Grigsby1
CHAPTER 2
THE LOCAL NEED FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
INTRODUCTION
It is not only helpful but necessary to understand the redeve-
lopment of Columbia Point within the context of the local need
for public housing, lest a solution for Columbia Point ex-
acerbates rather than alleviate the housing problem.
The present housing shortage in the City of Boston will in-
creasingly affect a larger segment of the population as it
will become more difficult to obtain adequate and affordable
housing and to keep pace with rent increases and the rising
cost of homeownership. The population which continues to be
the most impoverished are the poor and working class house-
holds, especially, the elderly, minority and female-headed
households. While the housing needs of the low-income pop-
ulation may be a familiar story, certain manifestations in
Boston's housing market have heightened the need for a con-
structive solution in assessing the use of our present stock
of public housing.
Boston's housing market is changing due to the growing
numbers of middle and upper-income individuals and families
who are selecting urban sites as their housing choice,
changing life styles, and the increasing numbers of new
households in formation from the post war baby boom.
The anticipated creation of more than 200,000 jobs in the
city by 1985 will also attract new households. Speculation
and real estate activities are at an all time high; rent
levels and property values are up; the tightened mortgage
market has restricted new housing consumers to certain income
groups; and the housing industry is geared towards supplying
market-rate housing for those who can afford it.
Renewed interests in construction of market-rate rental and
sale housing and an upsurge in condominium conversion activi-
ties create increased market pressures not only on the existing
supply of all standard housing, but also on the vast supply
of substandard housing in residential areas which have certain
environmental amenities. Many neighborhoods which have deter-
iorated are now coming back into vogue, and within these neighbor-
hoods, the supply of public housing has not been overlooked as a
potential resource for middle and upper-income housing.
This chapter includes a brief description of Boston's changing
housing market, an examination of Boston's low-income popu-
lation's policy, and a discussion of public housing as a critical
component in solving the housing problem.
BOSTON'S HOUSING MARKET
The population of Boston has stabilized after experiencing
close to 20 years of population decline from 1960 to 1979.
Although the population projected for Boston is estimated to
be between 617,000 to 662,000 through 1985, the number of
households will increase at a faster rate than the population
during the next 20 years. Household formations are at an all
time high as a dramatic increase of persons age 25-35 is pro-
jected for the period from 1970 to 1979.2
If the population remains stable, household formation from
the baby boom will increase households by 40%, and if there
is a modest increase in population, households will increase
by 50% in 1985.3 There is also a need for more units due to
changing lifestyles such as singles living alone, couples
without children, smaller families, and separated or divorced
households. The Boston area is also experiencing an increase
in the elderly population because of longer life spans and
because the elderly are less likely to live with their child-
ren.
From 1970 to 1975 more than 100,000 jobs were created in
Boston, bringing the total employment from 376,604 to 483,671.
An increase of 200,000 jobs is expected from 1970 to 1985.4
This will continue to contribute to the migration of people
from the suburbs and other regions into the city to live and
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work. Many of these new jobs will be professional and white
collar jobs, which will be increasing at a time when indus-
trial and blue-collar jobs are declining in the area.
The influx of middle and upper-income households into the
city will make increasing demands on the limited housing
stock. This group is profiled as follows: the renter profile
for market housing is predominantly young professional couples,
often with two incomes, empty nesters, singles living alone,
and unrelated individuals pooling their rent.5 They create
the greatest demand for one and two bedroom apartments. The
profile of condominium buyers is similar to the top segment
of the renters and includes: young professionals, empty
nesters and first time home buyers with no children or pre-
school children. The demand is high not only for luxury and
market-rate housing in downtown areas and designated new
development sites, but many of the first time home buyers
and young professional couples starting families will desire
larger units and more space and will choose to locate in
attractive residential areas in the city.
In a BRA study, it was reported that the existing residents
are poorer, have more dependents and often less income than
the newcomers. The process of gentrification and recycling
of the housing stock for middle and upper-income households
moving into the city and those starting households will
displace existing homeowners and residents as: "Boston is
on the point of breaking out of the twenty year stigma
against urban living...sudenly urban amenities are being re-
discovered and some trendsetters are finding it smart to be
living in the center city." 6
In order to understand the impact of these changes on the
housing market, we must look at the existing housing
conditions. As of 1978, a third of Boston's housing stock
was in substandard condition.7 The city's vacancy rate in
1970 was 6.4%, and has since dropped below 3.8% in 1979, and
below 2% in 1980. In many neighborhoods, vacancies are al-
most non-existant. In 1979, of the more than 229,000 units
in the city, there were only 2,800 vacant available units for
sale and 10,900 available rental units. 8 But in taking a
closer look at the total available units, only 6,800 units,
less than half, were in standard condition.
When one considers the seriousness of the housing shortage
and the numbers of substandard units, the increased market
demands will have serious impacts on the low-income housing
supply.
Young professionals and wealthier households have the pur-
chasing power and can outbid other segments of the popula-
tion for the available rental and sale housing.
Their demand alone far exceeds the available supply of stand-
ard housing.
Low-income and working-class households, especially families,
will have to compete with a wealthier population group for
not only the limited available stock of standard housing, but
also for the substandard housing. Middle and upper-income
groups also have the financial resources to rehabilitate sub-
standard housing. This, concurrent with the conversion of
rental housing into condominiums, is part of the process
creating a severe housing shortage for the poor. There is a
lack of affordable standard housing to match the housing
needs in terms of unit size, price and tenure of Boston's
population, in particular the low-income population.9
Boston's housing needs as established by the Metropolitan
Area Planning Council (MAPC) as of January 1978, call for a
total of 67,000 family and elderly units to be provided
through new-construction and substantial rehabilitation to
cover increases in the number of new households needing
housing, and to replace units which are lost due to fire,
demolition, conversion, permanent abandonment, etc. 10 But
the prospects of meeting this goal is unlikely with the low
level of present and projected construction activities.
Even if the desired level of rehabilitation and adaptive re-
use of existing structures is achieved, the area would
experience a severe housing shortage unless many new units
are constructed during the comming years.
The housing supply in terms of new construction is unlikely
to keep pace with the demand due to high land costs, a tight
mortgage market, lack of available land and the high cost of
new construction. The BRA estimates that from now until
1985, there will only be a net gain of 6,000 units beyond
what is already scheduled for construction in Boston.1 1
With Boston needing at least 10,000 new units annually, any
unmet need will be reflected in the scarcity of existing
and available housing.
In the production of new housing, the present market will
only support construction of market housing in selected areas
of the city. But as land prices are high and land avail-
ability low in established areas, housing and development
opportunities will take place in the up-and-coming areas in
neighborhoods that are in the process of being revitalized.
Thus new markets are opening up for market-rate housing while
there is a corresponding tightening of the market for other
income groups.
A logical question to ask is, why would middle and upper-
income households choose to locate in deteriorated neighbor-
hoods at all, given all the options?
It becomes clear that to open up a market or to market an
area that suffers from a negative image, the dollar cost to
the housing consumer must be below that of his/her other
options. As the housing shortage is driving up costs for low
income households and also for many middle-income households,
it is creating a shortage of "acceptable" offers. There are
only limited numbers of available units in Beacon Hill, East
Boston, the North End and other attractive parts of the city,
as the turnover rate in those areas is much lower than what
the market can attract. Thus, other options for real
estate speculation and development are resorted to. In a
BRA report it is noted that:
Significant new production, if it comes, will be de-
veloped by new partnerships. New condominium forms,
recycling obsolescing commercial [buildings]...
Because of the high cost of new construction,
necessity will also spur inventiveness and compe-
tition in recycling existing stock... 12
For certain markets to open up for a wealthier clientele and
at the same time be financially feasible and competitive with
other offerings, the City must be an active agent in facil-
itating the transformation of previously deteriorated
neighborhoods into attractive areas for middle and upper-
income groups. The City can lower considerably development
costs in many ways such as: write-downs, urban renewal, land
clearance and tranfers, provide services and develop-
ment incentives, in addition to implementing a set of unstated
revitalization policies. These may include: limiting or
halting further construction of subsidized housing in an
area, especially family housing; inducement of public and
private investment to increase property values in a neighbor-
hood; and through a policy of allowing certain parts of the
city to deteriorate, actions such as public acquistion, land-
banking, demolition or rent decontrol, can prepare for a
change in the resident population.
These actions, on the whole, facilitate the displacement and
relocation of the poor and other low-income residents who by
virtue of limited income, constricted mobility, residential
segregation and discrimination, will be further concentrated
in substandard housing in deteriorated neighborhoods.
The most prominent example of displacement is in the experience
of the South End neighborhood. Ironically, many perceive the
construction of a limited number of subsidized housing in the
area as a satisfactory solution to the widespread urban re-
newal and demolition which had taken place. But in a special
report, the South End Project Area Committee (SEPAC) found
that despite the fact that private investments had revitalize
parts of the South End:
In too few places have low and moderate income people
benefited by private market activity...the South End
has been and continues to be an area of the City with
rising market pressures. This is healthy and desire-
able in terms of bringing a middle-class population
with more buying power back into the South End and
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the City, but it is becoming increasingly more
difficult for low and moderate income and margin-
ally employed people to remain in the area....
The production of over 3,000 low and moderate income
housing units between 1966 and the end of 1974, seems
to have met the need of moderate-income units but
failed to meet the need for low-income housing...
more than 3,000 low-income households are not being
served by low-income housing subsidies. 1 3
Just as the production of new housing will not meet demand,
the rental housing market will not be expanding. Landlords'
perception of inadequate returns on most rental housing, even
independent of rent control, has resulted in no new rental
units being placed on the market, except for units which can
command market or above market rents.
Boston's housing market shows that substantial new units need
to be supplied by direct provision, new construction and
upgrading of existing stock. Housing must be developed for
low-come and disadvantaged households, or the turnover from
housing for the poor to housing for the wealthy will supplant
a basic need for a significant portion of the population.
In looking at the traditional housing resources for the poor,
we find:(1) standard and substandard ownership and rental
housing in the private market,(2) housing in deteriorated
neighborhoods or neighborhoods currently undergoing revit-
alization,(3) community-sponsored and other subsidized
housing, and (4)the stock of public housing. What were once
opportunities for housing the poor: rehabilitation of sub-
standard housing, new construction of subsidized housing,
rental assistance for standard units, and the upgrading of
existing private stock, are now harder to realize. Existing
non-profit and subsidized housing and public housing appear
to be the only stable supply of low-income housing.
LOW-INCOME HOUSING NEEDS
In observing some of the overall housing and population
characteristics, we find the following conditions: Boston has
a high percentage of renters, 74%; a tight housing market
with a vacancy rate below the acceptable 4%; a large low-in-
come population of 72,000 households comprising 31% of all
households; and a housing stock that maintains 75,300 or 33%.
of all households in substandard housing. Close to 75% of the
substandard units are rental units.14
Taking a closer look at the composition of the low-income
population in need of housing assistance, we find that the
majority, 63% or 45,360 are family households: 54% are small
families (4 persons or less), and 12% are large families
(5 persons or more).15 The remaining 37% of low-income
households are elderly and handicapped households. A high
percentage, 84% of low-income families are in the rental mar-
ket. The same cannot be said of the low-income elderly,
(except for the minority elderly), as their rate of home-
ownership is comparable to the city's average.
Large discerpencies in housing characteristics exist between
minority and white households for both family and elderly
households. Minority households comprise 17% of all house-
holds in Boston, but they comprise 40% of the low-income
households. 49% or close to half of the minority population
lives in substandard housing as compared with 13% of the
white population. 16
Of all households in Boston, one in four is a homeowner. This
ratio exists for white low-income households despite their low-
income status. But for low-income Black households, only 7%,
(1,500 households) less than one in fourteen, is a homeowner.
For low-income Hispanic households, there exists a total of
320 owner-occupied units or 5%, with approximately one in
twenty being a homeowner! The elderly low-income households
on the whole have a homeownership rate of 27%, but only 9% of
the minority low-income elderly are homeowners.
Female-heads of households comprise 19% of the low-income
households and are divided into two groups. The elderly
constitute 44% of female heads of households, and account for
72% of the female-headed homeowners. The female-heads of
households with family constitute 56% of all female-heads of
households, but they account for only 12% of the homeowners.
In the city, only 670 low-income female-heads of households
with small families (4 persons or less) are homeowners, and
only 260 female-heads of households with large families (5
persons or more) are homeowners. Low-income minority, female-
headed, and minority elderly households are under-represented
as homeowners and reside in the more unstable market of rental
housing.
Families comprise a majority of the low-income housing need.
Low-income families find it particularly difficult to obtain
adequate housing in the private market because of discrimin-
ation against children, large families, female-headed house-
holds, source of income, and racial and economic discrim-
ination. Large units also tend to be expensive and in short
supply.
In the brief assessment of the housing conditions of the low-
income population, certain very clear patterns emerge show-
ing the housing need for many low-income families, minority
households and female-heads of households.
THE CITY'S HOUSING POLICY
Having assessed some of the low-income housing needs in Boston
by household, population, tenure and housing type, what has
been the City's response to low-income housing? Boston's
housing assistance need as of 1970 was 33,206 units. The
City's effort from 1970 to 1976 resulted in only supplying
2,633 units or 7.9% of the 1970 need. 7 As of 1978, the need
has jumped to a total of 72,000 family and elderly units. It
will be increasingly difficult to meet the needs of the low-
income population unless the City takes a radical departure
from its current policies towards low-income housing.
Taking a look at Boston's Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) is
perhaps the best way to evaluate the City's approach towards
low-income housing. The HAP, a requirement of the Community
Development Block Grant(CDBG) application process, is the
mechanism by which communities with populations over 25
thousand submit a detailed plan to HUD on how the community's
low-income housing needs will be met. HUD recommends that a
goal of 15% of the total need, reflecting proportional need
by family size, tenure and housing type, be established for
each three-year plan.1 8
Boston's Housing Assistance Plan must conform to the Area-wide
Housing Opportunity Plan (AHOP) prepared by the Metropolitan
Area Planning Council for consistency with the area housing
needs. MAPC established the following three-year percentage
goals for Boston:
1. The breakdown by households type should result in
52% of assistance to families: 36% to small families:
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and 16% to large families. Assistance to the
elderly should constitute 48%.
2. Distribution based on tenure requires 79%
assistance to renters, and 21% to homeowner.
3. Housing type to be assisted should be distributed
50% to existing housing and 50% to new or sub-
stantially rehabilitated units. 19
While these figures are similar to the housing needs discussed
in the preceding section, let us now look at the City's pro-
posed HAP. The HAP submitted to HUD in 1979 by the City of
Boston, through the Mayor's Office of Housing, proposed the
following three-year goals covering the period from July 1,
1979 to June 30, 1982:20
1. Of the 1,300 new rental units to be provided, 78%
are proposed for the elderly and handicapped and
only 22% for families. Only 240 small family and
60 large family units are to be provided.
2. Of the total assisted units, 52% instead of 79%
will go to renters, and 48% will go to homeonwers.
Thus the City proposes fulfilling 36% of the need
for homeowners, greater than twice the percentage
recommended by HUD, and only 7% of the need of
renters.
3. Of the housing type to be assisted, the City pro-
poses 85% assistance to existing housing and only
15% for new or substantially rehabilitated units.
Here, again, housing assistance will go dispro-
portionately to homeowners as opposed to renters.
The City's low-income housing policy is directed towards ben-
efiting the small numbers of homeowners, who are predominantly
white and moderate-income, and the elderly population.
Benefits will unlikely reach the low-income households and
the large-population of minority family and elderly house-
holds, female-heads of households, and large families as they
are drastically under-represented as homeowners.
In defense of their lack of assistance to low-income renters
and families, the City states as its goal the "spatial decon-
centration" of housing opportunities: "It is obvious that the
overwhelming need for low-income family housing must now be
addressed on a metropolitan level," i.e., outside of Boston. 21
Some of their proposals include: outreach, counselling, and
referral services to "enable lower-income persons and minor-
ities residing in impacted areas either inside or outside of
the city to obtain assisted housing outside of the impacted
areas," and the City will support BHA in establishing an in-
terjurisdictional Section 8 existing housing program to
provide opportunities for low-income and minorities to lease
units outside of Boston.
The implications of the lack of housing assistance in
"impacted" areas, either for rental assistance, substantial
rehabilitated, or new subsidized housing, will mean that
neighborhoods such as the South End, Roxbury, Jamaica Plain,
and other areas where low-income and minority households re-
side will not be upgraded for existing residents. A "hold"
on increasing the low-income housing supply in these areas
will contribute to the continuing threat of displacement as
low-income families without housing assistance will be unable
to remain in their neighborhoods.
The City's HAP is an unfortunate testament to the City's
policy of getting rid of low-income families and people of
color by denying them the necessary housing assistance. Now
that new jobs are being created in Boston and urban living is
again an attractive option for many people, the City is
assisting in the displacement of the poor. The implication
is that with the continuation of such policies, increased
displacement will occur, and the existing supply of public
and subsidized housing will become that much more valuable
in serving the needs of the poor.
BOSTON'S PUBLIC HOUSING
We cannot understand the effects of redeveloping public
housing without first examining the population who is served
by public housing.
The population in need of low-income housing is reflected in
Boston's public housing. While housing 10% of the City's
population, public housing as of 1978, serves the following
population subgroups to an even greater extent:22
o 20% of Boston's low-income households.
o 26% of Boston's low-income households in need of
housing assistance.
o 22% of Boston's low-income minority family house-
holds.
o 27% of Boston's low-income minority family house-
holds in need of house assistance.
o 13% of elderly low-income households in need of
housing assistance.
o 86% of Boston's low-income one-parent headed
households in need of housing assistance.
The demographic changes within public housing itself reveals
the trend of poorer households and an increase in minority
and one-parent headed households. From 1963 to 1970, the
percentage of tenants on public assistance and fixed incomes
rose from 57% to 75%. In 1960, 13% of the families received
AFDC, in 1975, 21% and in 1978, 46%.23 The percentage of
adult non-workers was 79% in 1975 and 86.5% in 1978. In
the 1960s, the non-white population increased from 13.5% to
37% and in 1979, to 53% in the family developments.24 In
1975, 72% of all BHA households were one-parent headed house-
holds. The median income of tenants was $3,390 compared with
$9,133 for Boston.
These trends are unlikely to reverse themselves because we
are observing not only an increasing demand on the part of
existing low-income households for public housing, but also
an increase in the general population who are becoming eligible
for public housing. The 1960 Census indicated that about 15%
of the families living in Boston had incomes which were
hardly enough to afford anything but public housing, and
sometimes too little to afford even that. By 1968, a survey
commissioned by the BRA indicated that this figure had in-
creased to at least 19%.25
In 1970, MAPC reported that the private market did not ade-
quately meet the needs of approximately 260,000 households
in the Boston area, and 27% of the households were in need of
some form of housing assistance because of the failure of the
pirvate market.26 The University of Massachusetts Center for
Survey Research found that in 1980, 43% of Boston's house-
holds were eligible for public housing.27
A report from the Master's Office found that BHA family hous-
ing is increasingly a resource for minority households as
they represent between 65-75% of the family waiting list.
But, as the developments in South Boston, Charlestown and
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East Boston are not safe for minority families, the "effective
minority demand for the remaining family developments is even
greater than 65%.",28 Minorities also constitute 76% of the
waiting list for leased housing and Section 8.29
Despite the continuing problems in BHA management and main-
tenance, the waiting list for BHA housing contains over 7,000
households. 5,158 applicants or 75% of the waiting list is
for family housing and 1,785 for elderly housing.30 Approxi-
mately 500 households are added to the waiting list each month,
and it is projected that if the image of public housing im-
proved even slightly, the waiting list could easily increase
to 10,000.31
The estimated average waiting period for a family on the
waiting list was a means of 3.69 years and a median of 4.69
years in 1975. And for selected developments, the period
spanned from .41 of a year in Charlestown to 87.33 years in
Camden Street. In looking at Table 4, the long waiting
periods are due to the high demand and low vacancy rates in
certain developments, and also to the long delays in re-
occupancy.
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TABLE 4 : Selected BHA Developments and Estimated Length of
Waiting for 1975 (In order of increase time length)
Development Years
Charlestown .41
Mission Hill Extension 1.19
Orchard Park 1.38
Mission Hill 1.5
Franklin Field 2.06
Orient Heights 2.16
South End 4.55
Archdale 6.24
Washington/Beach Streets 6.98
Franklin Hill 7.24
Gallivan Boulevard 18.19
Lenox Street 19.16
South Street 20.89
Fairmount 30.0
Whittier Street 72.0
Camden Street 87.33
Source: Boston Housing Authority, "State of the Development
Report, 1975." 1976.
Unfortunately, the decline in all phases of BHA's operations
and an unstated policy of a "freeze" on assigning new tenants
to many of the developments, has resulted in a large number of
vacancies. (See Table 5.) In 1977, the vacancy rate for family
Vacancy Rates for Selected BHA Family Developments in Boston
1975 1977
Development
Units Units Vacant
Built Available Units
Commonwealth
Archdale
Orient Heights
Mission Hill
Mission Extension
West Broadway
648
288
354
1023
588
972
648
287
347
901
518
924
14 2.2%
1.4%
47 13.5%
276 27.3%
55 9.5%
89 9.4%
63 9.7%
28 9.7%
90 25.9%
446
105
184
49.5%
20.2%
19.9%
Source: The Court-Appointed Master's Office,
BHA "Vacancy Print-out," 1979.
"July 1, 1976 Report," and
Percent
Vacant
Units
1979
Percent
Vacant
Units Percent
225
116
347
453
181
244
34.7%
40.4%
42.7%
50.3%
34.9%
26.4%
Table 5 :
developments was 15%, by 1980, this figure had almost doubled
to 29%, or 4,000 vacant units. The vacancy rate does not
testify to a lack of need for these units, but that swift re-
habilitation and re-tananting must become a priority. Even
full occupancy of the existing stock would not meet the
current need for public housing, as it can be demonstrated
that development of a significant number of new public hous-
ing units is necessary. The high vacancy rate only con-
tributes to the flight of existing tenants by making the
developments more unlivable, and increases private and specul-
ative interests on the sites.
Public housing is viewed by the City and others as a liablity
just as it is increasingly needed by an expanding low-income
and minority population as a vital housing resource. Once a
stable housing resource because of its construction on un-
attractive or isolated sites, public housing not sits on prime
land and is seen as a development opportunity for many neigh-
boring institutions.
More than half of the BHA family developments, 16 of the 24
developments are threatened by outside interests for private
redevelopment. This ranges from requests from private com-
panies and institutions who are interested in acquiring the
sites, to actual development activities already underway.
Cathedral,- Charlestown, Lenox and Camden, Mission Hill Main,
Mission Hill Extension, Franklin Hill, Maverick, Orchard Park,
Orient Heights, and Whittier Street, are all located in up-
and-coming areas; unsolicited proposals and inquiries have
been made on these sites. Columbia Point, Commonwealth, West
Broadway ("D" Street), and Franklin Field are in the planning
and implementation stages for redevelopment.
The strategy for expanding Boston's housing stock through new
construction, rehabilitation and upgrading of existing stock
is presently being undertaken for upper-income groups. Unless
this trend reverses, we can talk of none other than public
housing as an essential resources in meeting low-income hous-
ing needs. It becomes imperative that improvements in public
housing, including redevelopment, serves the fulfillment of
low-income housing needs and that public housing not fall
prey to a middle and upper-income housing strategy.
CONCLUSION
Parallels can be drawn between neighborhood decline, dete-
rioration, and its eventual revitalization for a different
population group with the situation facing public housing.
If the process of emptying-out and boarding-up public housing
continues, we can anticipate a redevelopment process which
will unlikely be in the interest of low-income people.
The trend towards privatization, supported by official bodies,
speaks to the present weakness of the institution of public
housing. If adequate management and maintenance were provided,
and the Authority properly administered, opponents would gain
little ground in their attack upon public housing. A negative
perception of public housing leads to remedial solutions such
as private redevelopment, disposition and demolition, which
jeopardized the existence of the very institution itself.
The answer to the problem would be very simple if we all
agreed to the dissolution of public housing, but public housing
tenats , who are the ones directly affected by the conditions
in the developments, have not sided with the private interests
and liberal housing advocates who call for disposition,
demolition and an end to public ownership, management and
control of public housing. Tenants continue to advocate for
major improvements in public housing and reform of the BHA so
that the public housing stock can be maintained and expanded
to meet their needs. Tenants, through their efforts in the
Perez Case, the Consent Decree, and now Receivership, have
essentially held the point of view that as the single largest
housing resource for the poor, the apparatus and institution
of public housing must be reformed to fulfill the original
mandate of the program: the provision of decent, affordable
housing and suitable living environment for those in need.
Thus a strategy for meeting the housing needs of the poor
must first be one of a defensive posture, of holding on to
the existing low-income inventory; and second, of doing the
most to improve the existing housing through rehabilitation
and community development; and third, to aggressively
expand housing opportunities through selected channels that
make the most of government agencies, public and political
bodies.
The manipulation of these essential institutions is necessary
so as to convert the institutions into work in the interest
of low-income housing. Public housing is one such institution,
even though in Boston it has been perceived as an enemy and
slumlord to the residents. But it is at this time that the
potential exists and overriding circumstances demand that
basic reforms must be made to the institution of public hous-
ing so as to make it a protectorate of low-income housing
needs in the City. Boston's housing market, the housing needs
of the low-income and public housing population, and the City's
housing policy, all speak to the need to maintain public hous-
ing as a low-income housing resource.
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPT OF REDEVELOPMENT
"The property would be marketed to
middle income market rate tenants
. . . put on the tax role of the
City of Boston . . . [and] be pri-
vately owned and managed.
It is generally assumed although not
always proven that private sector
interests coincide with the public
best interests. In this case how-
ever, the opportunity exists to
structure the sale of the buildings
in such a fashion to best guard the
public interest."
--Consultant's Draft Report on:
Refinancing and Marketing the
Commonwealth Housing Project,
prep red for the BHA, March
1979
CHAPTER 3
THE CONCEPT OF REDEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
Private redevelopment appears to be an attractive and
readily available solution to the problems of our "troubled"
public housing projects. Privatization of public housing is
seen as an alternative by many which should pervade all areas:
from the already established pattern of private development
of low-income housing, to the familiar cry for private
management, and hence to private ownership of what is now
public housing.
Unlike the previous programmatic and jurisdictional exclusion
of the private sector, the trend now calls for public housing
to be placed under the control of the private sector. This
drastic change is presumably justified for both financial
and social reasons. Criticism has not only been levelled
against the present operations and conditions in public
housing, but also against the fundamental premise for how
the low-income population should be housed in this society.
This chapter takes a look at Pruitt-Igoe, an historic pre-
cedent for redevelopment; and public and private initiatives
in redevelopment, including an examination of King's Lynne,
a recent experiment in limited partnership.
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THE CASE OF PRUITT-IGOE
The concept of redeveloping public housing is not a new nor
strange process unfamilar to us. The sensationalism surround-
ing the partial demolition of Pruitt-Igoe in 1972, to the
total clearance of the site in 1976, cannot be seen solely as
a failure of the housing project, as has been presented to
the public. Instead, the razing of Pruitt-Igoe was a sign of
a larger redevelopment process that was taking place in the
City of St. Louis over the control of land. We must look
into the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe to find clues for why it
happened.
Built in 1954 to house 2870 households in 33 eleven-story
high-rise buildings on 57.5 acres, Pruitt-Igoe provided
housing for 12,501 persons. In 1960, the vacancy rate was
14% with 401 vacant units, but by 1970, the population
dropped by more than half to 6,007 persons with a vacancy
rate of 57%.2 Poor living conditions and a drastic population
decline were to precede demolition.
Before it was demolished, Pruitt-Igoe was a designated area
for the poverty (OEO) and Model Cities Programs. The Depart-
ment of Housing Education and Welfare (HEW) committed over $5
million in 1962 to alleviate social problems: a day care
center, health clinic and other facilities were established.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
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allocated $7 million in 1965, followed by another $5 million
in 1972 for physical rehabilitation. Part of the funds were
to be used experimentally to determine whether the high-rise
structures could be converted into three or four-story
buildings by cutting off the top floors.3 Numerous proposals
and plans were developed to restructure the buildings, in-
cluding an action plan developed by Skidmore, Owings and
Merrill. But none of these plans were carried out. They
were all abandoned due to doubts about the economic feasi-
bility of revitalizing the project. The project was sub-
sequently razed.
But it was not public housing tenents, residents in the
surrounding neighborhood, and the low-income population who
"gave-up" on Pruitt-Igoe or advocated for its demolition.
Pruitt-Igoe's housing, even though densely packed on the site,
was of sound construction. The buildings contained large
apartments which were quite different from the usual minimum
spaced units provided in many public housing developments.
Tenants and others had worked for years to get the St. Louis
Housing Authority and the City to improve conditions so that
the development could be saved and made habitable. A state-
ment representing their sentiment is enlightening:
When housing for 2,500 families on the Pruitt-Igoe
site was allowed to deteriorate and was subsequently
demolished, a gash was ripped in the flesh of the
black community just as, ten years before, the raz-
ing of Mill Creek Valley cut deeply into the black
community.5
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When Pruitt-Igoe came down, City officials and the St. Louis
Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) quickly
responded with a redevelopment proposal for the creation of
a "Business Industrial Square", with a mix of offices,
service distribution and light industrial usage to take place
on the site. The site's convenient access to major streets,
highways and thoroughfares ample labor supply, and readily
available utility service, were cited in the proposal for
the "Re-use of the Pruitt-Igoe Site." The report issued in
1977, stated: "The economic well-being of this City and this
region, depends ultimately on jobs for the people who live
there. This site is presently unoccupied (sic) and offers
an execellant opportunity to start meeting the need for
city-based jobs." 6 It was noted that the"utilization of the
site for commercial- industrial purposes would generate more
jobs, incomes and taxes than would other usages," as more
than 2,000-2,500 jobs would be created.
The redevelopment proposal was to be approved by the St.
Louis Housing Authority. As the feasibility of development
was dependent on the cost of the land to the developers, a
letter from Harry Morley, Jr., President of the RCGA con-
tained the following:
Our initial analysis indicated that the cost of
developed land in this site, made ready for industrial
and/or business purchasers, must be low enough to
compete with existing developed properties through-
out the St. Louis area, in order to make marketing
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of this site attractive for immediate turnover.
The cost of land, which will be established by the
Housing Authority, is of critical importance and has
yet to be determined. We do know that the cost of
improving the property with water, sewers, streets
and lighting for commercial and industrial purposes
allows a very small margin for land cost in order
to keen the market price at a highly competitive
level.
This RCGA proposal was submitted to the housing authority
and considered along with other proposals for residential re-
use, educational and community use. Not surprisingly, even
from an institution supposedly responsible for the provision
of low-income housing, Executive Director Costello stated the
Housing Authority's staff was "biased towards industrial
development."8
The community's response as represented by Macler Shepard,
President of Jeff-Vander-Lou Incorporated, a non-profit com-
munity organization, was the following:
Designating the Pruitt-Igoe site as industrial most
certainly will allow right-of-way for the North-South
Distributor highway and by so doing cause the immediate
disruption of even more families and provide a nice
bite size chunk of the black community between a
newly built commercial and industrial strip. I
see this Pruitt-Igoe industrial park designation as
a new name for urban renewal...
...As a scheme to remove black people and disrupt
the black community, proposing the industrialization
of the Pruitt-Igoe site makes sense.9
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The community was to cite eight other designated industrial
parks on the City's drawing board and more than 800 acres
of undeveloped land in present industrial districts, making
it unnecessary to use the Pruitt-Igoe site.
The community wanted housing replaced on the Pruitt-Igoe site
since it was located in a residential area; zoned for
housing; and adjacent to two schools, a library, a community
center and other residential uses. A low-income housing
shortage in St. Louis also justified the use of the site for
housing. But presently, some eight years after the first
building was demolished, the site remains vacant. Within
St. Louis, the Housing Authority, the City, and the business
community still continue to discuss the optimal re-use of
the site. It is clear that low-income housing has long since
been an abandoned concern.
Pruitt-Igoe established a precedent. We find private interest
in obtaining cheap and available land from a public source--a
continuation of urban renewal, and we find that the process
of total or partial clearance of the site is based on the
re-use of valuable infrastructures and amenities which remain
intact, e.g., access to transportation, labor supply, utilities,
and services. Public housing now falls within the "domain"
for urban renewal. We can now expect redevelopment to pro-
pose an entirely different "economic process" to take place.
For example, what was once public housing can be proposed
to industrial or commercial use, private housing or even
mixed-income housing, as long as it is privately developed.
A public housing site is to be put to the "highest and best
use," and may be cleared and left vacant for years, like
Pruitt-Igoe, or left to deteriorate, as in Columbia Point,
until such time as economic conditions are ripe for private
redevelopment to take place.
Columbia Point can be viewed as a second generation Pruitt-
Igoe. During the 1960's, Pruitt-Igoe was the target for
government intervention just as Columbia Point is today the
national demonstration for the Urban Initiatives Program. The
superficial factors cited for the failure of Pruitt-Igoe are
no different than at Columbia Point: design problems; the
tenant characteristics of predominantly black, minority and
very poor households; large numbers of female heads of house-
holds; the location and isolation of the site; and a history
of unsuccessful attempts at upgrading the development.
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Even though what took place at Pruitt-Igoe could happen at
Columbia Point--resulting in total demolition and a complete
re-use of the site, it will be unlikely for the following
reasons:
1. HUD cannot withstand another experience of
massive demolition of a recently built housing
project; this is a sign of gross failure by
the government.
2. A private redevelopment approach will take
place from the very beginning in the planning
stage, and not after demolition. Optimal
results can then be acheived by the participat-
ion of the private sector early on.
3. The redevelopment of Columbia Point, as opposed
to Pruitt-Igoe, offers the potential for market
housing as a profitable venture which is com-
parable to commercial or industrial development
options.
4. The "system" is adaptable and flexible so tenant
participation and tenant "partnership" is
readily discussed by HUD, the City and the
Housing Authority.
5. The new ideology of mixed-income housing,
the use of rent supplements, and other
measures to "disperse" the poor, have become
the touted answers to the low-income hous-
ing problem while maintaining a semblance
of a commitment to the poor.
Columbia Point may not go up in dust exactly like Pruitt-
Igoe, but for low-income tenants, the potential exists for
the results to be similar.
PUBLIC REDEVELOPMENT
HUD subsidies and Modernization
Public redevelopment and revitalization of our housing
projects have been the norm until recently. In examining
past initiatives by HUD in improving public housing, we
find many programs which were designed to supplement the
budgets of the PHAs . These were to assist the authorities
in maintaining their operations and were not necessarily
designed for making substantial improvements to the devel-
opments. As operating deficits continued to climb for the
PHAs, who could no longer meet their expenses from rental
income and reserves, the federal government made increasing
levels of operating subsidies available from $2.6 million
in FY 1968 to $985 million in FY 1978. Operating subsidies
became essential to the survival of the program in many
localities, in particular the larger cities.
The Modernization Program began in 1968, more than 30 years
after the start of the public housing program, and provided
through FY 1978 approximately $2.6 billion for capital improve-
ments covering emergency items, comprehensive improvement
programs and substantial rehabilitation. Recently, the
program also made available funding for "major repairs" and
for deferred, non-routine maintenance. In 1975, HUD instituted
the Performance Funding System (PFS) to provide each PHA with
the subsidies needed for efficient management by employing a
formula based on statistical averages of well managed author-
ities. This provided some additional funds to the PHAs to
improve their operations.
The programs described did not adequately maintain all the
developments. They were especially inadequate in making
major impact on developments experiencing a variety of serious
social, managerial and physical problems. For example, the
programs did provide the funding for important items such as
social services, improved management, security, tenant
participation, and other services which were needed in many
of the larger developments in the inner cities. But over
succeeding years, the combined factors of escalated energy
costs, higher costs for materials and labor, increased oper-
ating expenses, maintenance costs for antiquated buildings
with worn-out mechanical systems, had left many housing
authorities with depleted financial resources. The passage
of the Brooke Amendment in 1969 and similar amendments in some
states, along with the increase of lower income tenants in
public housing, and inadequate subsidies from the state and
federal government, further diminished the reserves of the
housing authorities.
Housing conditions continued to deteriorate with little re-
course for most housing authorities except to cut maintenance
and services, and defer problems until such time as they were
able to correct them.
The Target Project and The Urban Initiatives Programs
It was not until the mid 70's that HUD created comprehensive
programs to address the severe problems in some of the major
developments. Both the Target Projects Program (TPP) and
the Urban Initiatives Program (UI) provided special funding
to severly distressed public housing projects. Funding is
provided to supplement modernization funds and operating
subsidies, and amounted to an extension of the Annual Contri-
butions Contract (ACC). It provides for substantial rehabil-
itation, extensive site improvements, security/crime prevention
programs, and physical restructuring of the site.
Begun under the Nixon Administration in 1974, the TPP gave
priority to management improvements, the start-up of social
services and tenant programs, capital improvements and deferred
maintenance. Funds were distributed to over 300 projects.
The program had some successes, but since funds were spread
so thinly, many of the PHAs were not able to meet their
objectives of "turning around" some of their most "troubled"
housing projects. Among those with large allocations, none
succeeded as Columbia Point did in doing so little with so
much, for few PHAs were funded at a high level of $8.4
million for one development.
The Urban Initiatives Program, announced in July 1978, un-
veiled the most comprehensive program to date by the federal
government. Some 67 public housing authorities were to share
nearly $264 million in a coordinated program between HUD and
the Departments of Labor, Justice and Interior, to restore
rundown projects in the large urban areas.10 The UI program
was the Carter Adminstration's response to growing concerns
and pressures from public housing tenants and others who in-
creasingly saw the dangers of continual deterioration and the
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potentials of demolition after the Pruitt-Igoe incident. The
National Tenant Organization and local and regional tenant
groups were increasingly fearful that PHAs would resort to de-
molition as a quick and simple solution to their housing
problems, rather than apply a concerted effort to explore
alternative approaches in rehabilitation.
The spirit and thrust of the program is well stated by
Patricia Harris, then Secretary of HUD, during the announce-
ment of the Program on July 10, 1978. The following is an ex-
cerpt from her speech, made after showing film footage on
the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe:
What you have just seen, ladies and gentlemen, is
$36 million of the taxpayers' dollars going up in a
cloud of dust. What is even more disturbing is that
for 12,000 people, a potentially decent place to
live and raise a family ended up in a pile of debris.
This is the way things used to be done. It was quick
and easy, to be sure. But it did not solve the
problem, it just caused it to be moved to another part
of the community.
Demolition is not the answer! It is an extravagant
wast. Quite often, these projects can be turned
around to provided an atmosphere in which the dis-
avantaged can live with pride and dignity.
This is the approach which this Administration is
taking, not the approach which believs troubles can
simply be "blasted away". No longer will we destroy
people's hopes and dreams by blowing up troubled
public housing projects that are structurally sound.
Subsequently, the majority of the funds, $259 of the $264
million, were awarded to 33 local housing authorities for
targeted rehabilitation to physically upgrade and do major
restructuring of selected developments. The proposals had
to contain comprehensive approaches to problem solving, while
also demonstrating innovative efforts to avert the course of
mothballing and demolishing buildings. The BHA received $10
million to rehabilitate 1504 units at Columbia Point and an
additional $450 thousand for management improvements.
These federal programs have only just begun to address the
serious problems confronting many developments. (At the State
level, Massachuetts responded in 1979 by legislating funds
for state-aided developments.) Much of the subsidies targeted
to the developments are claimed to be inadequate, but some
have successfully been applied to upgrade and "turn around"
critically troubled projects. Cabrini Green in Chicago,
Millvale in Cincinnati, and Riverview in Springfield are some
of the projects which became successful under the Target
Projects Program. Hunter's Point in San Francisco is a mod-
erately successful public redevelopment attempt under the
Urban Initiatives program. It will be some time before we are
able to judge the results of the developments receiving UI
funding as many are still in the planning stage. Neverthe-
less, there are examples which show that public redevelopment
can work, given sufficient funding and proper management of
the redevelopment process.
PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT
Public housing authorities may turn to private redevelopment
as a solution when they believe that insufficient funds
exist to "turn around" a development, to keep it well-managed,
or when the development does not provide a desirable social
environment. While these are often the official responses,
other underlying explanations may exist.
First, we will briefly address the variability of internal
factors which may influence a PHA to turn to private rede-
velopment. While it is often acknowledged that financial
conditions impinge heavily on the decision, many other fac-
tors contribute to or deter the ability of the PHA to provide
viable housing. Some of these factors reflect the extent
of the PHA's commitment to the long-term maintenance of
their public housing inventory. This may include the cost
and social effectiveness of particular management tech-
niques which will affect the housing conditions; the con-
text in which the PHA operates, either as an agency for
the delivery of housing services or as a political patron-
age machine, may affect the PHA's long-term interest in
maintaing their developments; the extent and nature of
labor/management relations will affect workers' performance;
and the quality of tenant/management relations and manage-
ment responsiveness will affect the level of services and
tenant responsibility in maintaining their development.
Existing housing conditions, administrative efficacy, and the
availability of funding and services, also impact on the
future of the development.
But what becomes clear is that certain decisions by the PHAs
can either contribute to the successful delivery of low-
income housing and discourage the need for income mix and
other experiments, or doom public housing to failure re-
gardless of the level of subsidies and funding provided.
The internal solvency of a PHA is perhaps one of the key
factors in how it responds to the external pressures for re-
developing its stock. Housing authorities with a history of
mismanagement have a difficult time acquiring the necessary
funds and lack the ability to properly expend any allotted
funds. They may be politically and ideologically uncommitted
to the public housing program and more likely to seek random
solutions for solving their problems. This may include re-
lieving themselves of their responsibilities through re-
financing mechanisms such as the use of Section 8 for re-
financing, federalizing state developments, and disposing of
their housing stock to private developers.
The call for income and social mix appears to be for both
financial and social reasons: so that a higher rental in-
come can be realized and fewer "social problems" exhibited in
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the community. The racial make-up of a development is often
used to judge the quality of an environment. The clamor for
income and social mix may not have been thoroughly studied
or justified, but often it is unconditionally supported by
many public housing officials. Important questions have not
been answered prior to charges against public housing for
"concentrating" low-income households, as stated by Chester
Hartman:
to what extent are current public housing projects un-
healthy places to live in simply because of this pop-
ulation concentration and to what extent are they
objectionable on other grounds (public ownership and
management, opperssive design, lack of amenities, ex-
cessive rents, etc.,) thereby making he issue of
population concentration irrelevant?l
One would expect that responsible PHAs serious in their in-
tent to provide housing to those eligible would at least go
to the extent of achieving income mix allowable under public
housing, and upgrading physical and social condition in the
developments,prior to drawing any conclusions about the re-
prehensibility of maintaining viable low-income communities.
External pressures also influence a PHAs decision to opt for
private redevelopment. Within both HUD and the Congress,
there are forces urging income mix and greater reliance on
the private sector. The housing and construction industries,
facing a lag in construction starts and high interest rates,
are encouraged by the use of the private and public finan-
cing backed with public guarantees for developing subsidized
housing.
In addition, many PHAs, particularly large authorities in
the major cities, are facing a variety of local factors
related to changes in the city's real estate market which
makes many of the housing projects attractive for private
redevelopment. In Boston, developments such as Orient Heights,
Lenox and Camden, Commonwealth and Gallivan Boulevard, would
easily make attractive market-rate housing bec-ause they are
well situated in secure neighborhoods. These and others are
easily developable as private housing.
It is thought that only a few developments offer private
redevelopment potential--it is assumed that the majority of
Boston's public housing is in such bad condition that they
would never leave the public inventory. Recent trends have
shown that this is not necessarily the case. Extremely
poorly run and dilapidated projects such as Mission Hill
Main and Extension, Charlestown, and Columbia Point attract
investors who can profit by investing in presently down-
graded stock. Even some of the worst developments in Boston
are being proposed for private ownership for funding under
Section 8, such as East Broadway and Franklin Field. The
inefficiencies and problems in public ownership and manage-
ment of the BHA, moreover, lend support for a private solution.
As many vehicles for developing housing can be manipulated
to increase opportunities for investors such as tax shelters,
depreciation and syndication, increased risks will be brought
to the continual survival of public housing.
Many justifications are made for the move towards privatization.
They range from the benefits to be gained when housing is
placed back in ciriculation in the private market to a naivete
that ownership and the motives behind privatization do not
matter as long as housing is delivered. More often than not,
proponents forget to explain the deplorable conditions in the
pirvate market which maintains a majority of the poor in
substandard conditions. The following excerpts from the BHA
consultant's report on refinancing the Commonwealth develop-
ment presents a commonly held view:
Unfortunately, public housing as it exists in a never,
never world outside of the market, pays little or no
heed to the rationales which motivate investors or
operators/owners. It goes without saying that public
purposes and motives need not, and perhaps should not,
conform to the private sector. But when the public
sector performs so badly in the same field as the
private sector perhaps the time has come to look and
learn from the private sector.
While public and private motives might not be the same,
perhaps the time has come to recognize effective
methods of delivering standard housing, regardless
of the motive. 13
But it is hard to ignore "motives" as a factor. The "cost"
to the public will not be insignificiant in attracting private
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interest in providing housing for the poor, furthermore, the
results may be questionable. As stated by Chester Hartman:
One of the distinct advantages to greater involvement
of the private sector is the opportunity thereby pre-
sented to solve the dilemmas of insufficient motiva-
tion and inadequate jurisdistion regarding the issues
of incentives, it is axiomatic that if these are made
sufficiently attractive, the private sector will
produce.. .The obvious question that must be asked
about utilizing the private sector to achieve a
public welfare goal is at what price?14
It is also argued that part of the problem with existing
public housing is that when property is publicly held it
cannot benefit from the substantial tax benefits which
play an increasingly important role in real estate development
today. 15 Even if tenants were to somehow own their units,
they would be unable to take advantage of traditional bene-
fits, since for low income tenants, equity contribution and
thus accumulation would be small, tax savings insignificant,
and capital appreciation uncertain.16 According to this line
of reasoning, it only follows that ownership of housing should
be so structured so as to benefit investors or limited
partners who would gain from tax shelters and through
claiming depreciation losses.
This is possible through the sale of equity to limited part-
ners by syndication. Other benefits such as cash flow and
capital appreciation, could accrue to the general partner(s).
As long as acquisition costs to the developer are low, and
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massive public funds are allotted for the maintenance of low-
income and subsidized housing, what was once public housing
could then be privately owned and managed. Tax revenues
would benefit fiscally distressed city, and the desired social
goals of income, and possibly racial mix, could be achieved
as long as there are necessary incentives provided to the
developer.
The Nature of Public Housing
Despite the gains from private redevelopment, the abandon-
ment of public ownership of housing should be considered
beyond questions of cost effectiveness; there are long-term
political and social consquences from any private redevelop-
ment attempt which must be carefully evaluated. Certain
short-term financial advantages may be gained by redevelopment,
such as market rental incomes, syndication proceeds, and poss-
ibly lower management costs, but what may be at stake is the
long-term commitment to low-income housing and to housing as
a public good.
Housing in the United States can be simply characterized as
"a commodity for the present and/or future profit of its
owners, rather than for use." 17 Private housing is expen-
sive; the cost reflects the accumulated profits from the
developer, builders, material producers, landowners, spec-
ulators, and financial institutions.18 Through income and
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resale the original construction costs of a building may have
been repaid several times, but each property transaction
requires refinancing and extrapolation of profits to the
previous investor(s), therefore the purchase price to the
new buyer is high and rents are high. Speculation will con-
tinue to increase housing costs, especially in attractive
neighborhoods. Costs to the homebuyers and renters will con-
tinue to climb irrespective of the extent of repayment of
the initial principal and financing costs.
Programs other than public housing, such as Section 8, rent
supplement programs, Section 236, 11(b) and 221(d)(3), con-
tinue to rely on landlords and developers to provide housing
at inflated costs. The budgets allocated for these programs
must be substantially increased along with rising rent
levels and financing costs, or benefits will be cut. The
public housing program offers the only possibility of avoid-
ing these problems.
The most distinctive feature of public housing which sets it
apart from private housing and other subsidy programs, is
that it does away with the commodity nature of housing. Land
is removed from the market through government action: con-
struction and financing are managed through the public sector
(with the exception of turnkey public housing); and the
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government guarantees the long-term financing and maintenance
of the units as low-income units. While public housing still
borrows from the private credit market by selling tax-exempt
bonds to financial institutions and individual investors to
cover initial development and modernization costs, once
the bonds are paid off, there are no more debts. 1 9 Expenses
will consist only of continuing operating and modernization
costs. During this extended period of public ownership, the
interest rate will be below the market rate because of the
long-term "mortgage". Unlike most private housing, public
housing is not repeatedly resold and refinanced with an up-
ward spiral of costs, interest rates and a succession of
owners or landlords who continue to thrive and profit from
their investments.20 Thus, public housing offers the advan-
tages of long term guarantees for low-income housing, govern-
ment subsidies to cover the major costs, in addition to de-
creasing costs over time. Housing and housing services will
be provided for use, not profit.
It would therefore appear that the critical problems of in-
adequate funding and management should be addressed within
the context of maintaining public housing so as not to
jeopardize the inherent advantages of public ownership.
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The Section 8 Alternative
With the objective of achieving better results, there are
those who argue for other subsidy programs to replace public
housing. Section 8 and 11(b), applied to existing public
housing, could bring quick financial relief by commanding
prevailing rents, rehabilitating the units, and letting the
Housing Authority off the hook for some of their most dilapi-
dated units.
Fallacious assumptions are often made when Section 8 is
proposed as a solution: first, that the government is willing
to go along with the higher costs and inefficiencies of the
program(as lower costs weigh in favor of public housing), and
second, that the government will continue to fund the level of
subsidies needed to maintain or increase rent subsidy programs.
There are serious doubts that as the costs for Section 8 in-
crease--as it must increase with the level of market
rents, that it will remain economical. There are no guarentees
that the initial grant will cover the increased costs 20
years from now: this includes the cost of replacing mechan-
ical systems, increased operating costs, and other major
expenses. Once adequate funding is no longer available, the
units will revert to non-low-income usage.
The Section 8 program is currently predicted to last only a
few more years, and will be increasingly harder to justify
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for the Administration or Congress to maintain. The govern-
ment might continue certain of its initial commitments, but
major expansion is unlikely. Boston and the surrounding areas
have received increasingly fewer units, and an extraordinary
effort in politicking and lobbying with the City and other
agencies is required for Section 8 allocations.
In reality, a Section 8 unit is aprivate rental unit subsidized
for the poor. The concerns for social services, job training
and other opportunities are non-existent for the tenant. Low-
income households may be scattered throughout the city, more
isolated than in public housing, and with no means to address
common problems. As a strategy to gradually reduce publicly-
owned housing and to make short-term gains for landlords and
developers, Section 8 is an excellent ploy.
Redevelopment in the form of non-profit ownership and limited
partnerships are other ideas proposed for public housing.
Again, the problems are with the disposition of public housing
stock and the necessity to package a variety of subsidy
programs to guarantee any low-income units. These would seem
unlikely as solutions. for most of public housing, even if the
ideas were widely supported, because of the lack of available
subsidy programs to fund the low and moderate-income com-
ponents. Also, the use of rental subsidy programs piggy-
backed on existing public housing appears wasteful, as other
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communities would be deprived of low-income housing oppor-
tunities. Even if public housing units are vacant, the cost
of program conversion to Section 8 in the long-run may far
exceed the cost of rehabilitating those units as public
housing.
Limited partnership has been singled out as a model for
certain developments, including Columbia Point. King's Lynne,
one of the first experiments in the region, provides an ex-
ample of this approach.
THE KING'S LYNNE PARTNERSHIP
King's Lynne, a partnership between the tenants organization,
the King's Lynne Residents Council (KLRC), and the developer,
Cocorhan, Mullins and Jennison (CMJ), has been raved about as
a successful model for redeveloping "troubled" public housing
projects. Formerly America Park, it was one of the worst
housing projects in the country due to its poor design and
construction. The transformation of America Park into a mixed-
income community was a difficult process: it took special
state legislation in order to finance and dispose of the site;
a local injunction stopped progress for over a year; and local
and state politicians had to rally around the project to
see its successful completion. The time between the initial
planning for redevelopment in 1972 and the start of construc-
tion spanned 5 years.
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Tenants and tenant leadership were strong and exemplary;
Greater Boston Community Development (GBCD) served as con-
sultants to the tenants; and the Massachusetts Home Finance
Agency (MHFA), the Massachusetts Department of Community
Affairs (DCA) and the Lynne Housing Authority all cooperated
in providing extraordinary funding and resources. Unfortun-
ately, it may be precisely the uniqueness of the redevelopment
process at King's Lynne which makes it impossible to reproduce
elsewhere, especially at a level which can protect the
interests of low-income tenants.
Other factors also contribute to the risk of such a venture.
Demolition of the 408 original low-income units was to result
in 900 new construction units for family, elderly, and adult
households divided into low, moderate and market units. But
local opposition brought this figure down to 750 units and
then 654 units. Budgetary problems finally resulted in 441
units of housing being provided on the 58 acres site, with a
total of 166 low-income units.21 New housing or relocation
assistance was committed to more than 369 low-income house-
holds during the development process. Many relocated off-
site with the use of Section 8 and Chapter 707 funds. Fund-
ing for 288 Section 8 units had to be provided for the new
development and for relocation. Large units, 6 and 7 bed-
rooms, were eliminated from the plan because of community
opposition. Larger tamilies had to leave, and were
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assisted with relocation monies as down payment on private
homes. By the start of construction, only 140 of the original
369 low-income households remained to be rehoused in the new
development.
In 1972, it was estimated that a new construction unit would
22
cost $31,388. By 1974, the cost for a 5 bedroom townhouse
was estimated at $57,000. A 4 bedroom unit plus den was
finally constructed in 1978 for $72,000.23 In addition to
the high per unit cost, substantial additional funding was
necessary for: relocating more than 200 households and
providing them continuing subsidies, subsidies for 300 low
and moderate-income units for the new development, interim
management, and providing social services during the relocation
and rehousing phases.
Funding for the $21 million development was obtained from a
$19.1 million permanent loan from MHFA; the $4.6 million debt
for America Park was retired by the State; rental subsidies
were provided through the Chapter 707 and 705 Programs and
Section 8; and the site was transferred to the development
entity for a mere cost of $500 thousand.
Although the total cost is not available, it should he
noted that actual per unit costs are substantially above
the already high mortgage value of the units, and the public
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share of costs far exceeds the private share.
To insure tenant/developer joint-decision making, ~the tenants
and CMJ formed the King's Lynne Apartment Corporation (KLAC).
The KLAC Board is comprised of 2 representatives from CMJ and
2 representatives from the King's Lynne Residents' Council. 2 4
KLRC has rights to 10% of syndication proceeds or $200,000,
whichever is greater, and 16% of cash flow. KLRC also has
rights to first refusal upon sale of the development.
While King's Lynne appears to be a successfull attempt at
private redevelopment of a public housing site; management appears
more efficient, and tenants have a major role in decision-
making, the resulting outcome for the low-income population
must be carefully look at. This includes the loss of low-
income units, difficult lifestyle adjustments in a mixed-
income development (which will be discussed in (Chapter 7), re-
maining problems in the quality of services and social
services, and no surety of the future if the partners want
out, sell the development, or if subsidies decrease or be-
come unavailable. In all, the attractiveness of King's Lynne
may be overstated.
Furthermore, cost overruns were excessive, even though wide-
spread support was given by all parties to see the development
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completed. Nevertheless, quite a few units were cut from
the plan. Not surprisingly, subsidies per unit are one of the
highest of any subsidized housing, making it ironic to char-
acterize King's Lynne as a "private" redevelopment solution.
In effect, if the same extent of public funds were used for
the limited number of low and moderate-income units, private
involvement may not have been necessary.
$19.1 million of public dollars for less than 300 units of
subsidized housing, in addition to rent subsidies for all
those units plus other costs, is hardly an impossible feat to
accomplish! The whole development could conceivably have
been publicly redeveloped and remained under public owner-
ship to provid quality housing for those in need. Moreover,
the tenants, the "stand-in" for the public sector which put up
57 acres, $19.1 million and additional resources for the $21
million project, to only obtain 10% of syndication proceeds
and 16% of cash flow, appears highly imbalanced. One begins
to question the public losses and the private gains from this
experiment. Incredible amounts of public funds were expended
to subsidize market-housing and private ownership. The
market mix component also meant excessive subsidization at
all income levels to make the site attractive to market-rate
tenants.
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The case of King's Lynne not only poses the question of
whether the experiment can be duplicated elsewhere, but
if the public sector has any business subsidizing market
housing and deeding property rights to the private sector
prior to the fulfillment of low and moderate-income housing
needs.
Limited Partnerships
In further discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
private redevelopment, in particular, limited partnership,
many factors make this option attractive to private investors.
But experience has not shown the positive results of such
arrangements; it will be hard to predict what will happen
to King's Lynne five to ten years down the road. 25
Initial syndication brings certain -advantages to the
developer(s) by providing the needed capital to cover con-
struction and development costs. Tax shelters would bene-
fit the investors. But this arrangement no longer becomes
profitable for the investors at a certain point in time,
usually when the development is well underway. The benefits
from depreciation at that time may no longer serve the tax
shelter needs of the partners if it declines below a certain
level. This is determined by the method of depreciation
selected. For example, accelerated depreciation such as the
200% declining balance and the five-year straight-line methods
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make it particularily profitable for the limiteds to only
invest up to the point when depreciation deductions reach a
level corresponding to the straight-line method, or when
diminishing returns are such that investments elsewhere would
bring greater benefits. Accelerated depreciation methods
bring the greatest return to investors during the first 5
years, what happens afterwards is hard to tell, as there are
few examples of syndicated mixed-income developments which
have been in existence for very long.
Important factors in postponing the point at which investors
pull out are arrangements to stagger or delay payments by
the investors over a period of years.26 The avoidance of
front-end loaded payments and rapid initial depreciation
will help maxmize, at least for a while, the time before
investors withdraw. But at a certain point, capital appre-
ciation and increased cash flow from a successful develop-
ment will also present a liability to the investors, as they
are not in the business for additional income. This is pro-
fitable only to the general partner(s) who may have a long-
term interest in the valuation of their property and in
holding on to their assets.
Other problems presented by a partnership include the possi-
bilities of the development getting sold because the inves-
tors or the developer(s) want out. Even with certain
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safeguards such as setting conditions for resale, program
commitments, secondary mortgage guarentees, and the right to
first refusal by the tenants or non-profit entity (such as in
King's Lynne), the security and maintenance of sub-
sidized housing may still be jeopardized. Problems of in-
sufficient investment and declining economic viability may
develop. If viability is not possible without programmatic
changes, such as shifting the income mix towards market-
rate housing, even the tenant co-partners have fudiciary re-
sponsibilities to their partner(s) to agree to sale or change
package mix to insure financial solvancy.
The precedents so far of high rates of foreclosure of 221(d)
(3)s and Section 236s and MRFA programs, resulting in re-
capture by HUD or the state, have not shown syndication to be
such an attractive alternative. Therefore while syndication
and new forms of tenant/private partnerships are becoming
popular, the long-term consequences for low-income residents
are not optimistic.
CONCLUSION
We have seen new programs initiated apart from public housing
which increasingly rely on the private sector in providing
housing, but now we see the active supplanting of existing
public housing. Both the redevelopment of Pruitt-Igoe and
King's Lynne reveal a clear reversion to traditional market
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mechanisms such as urban renewal, private ownership, and the
importance of equity and tax shelters, in place of upgrading and
preserving public housing. The consequences are such that
one would question the existance of any long-term commitment
to housing the poor.
The results of the private redevelopment efforts, whether
initiated by the local governments, the PHAs, tenants,
developers, or housing specialists, contain these basic ele-
ments:(l) the removal of substantial number of units through
demolition, and/or disposition, from the public inventory;(2)
a significant reduction in the number of available units
for low-income occupancy;(3) provide the private entities an
inexpensive and available source of land or housing stock for
negligible costs; and (4) changes in land-use and/or resident
composition in terms of income, and race and often family
size. In otherwords, past and present redevelopment efforts
are premised on basic changes vis-a-vis who will be served
by redevelopment. Many beneficiaries fall into place the
city, developers, investors, middle and upper-income groups.
If commitments to the poor exist, there are no examples of
public housing redevelopment attempts which have served the
low-income population by making available an equivalent
number of low-income units prior to providing housing for
upper-income groups.
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The long-term stability of subsidized units will weaken when
a development enters the private housing market. Fluctuation
and change in urban real estate, including the recycling of
properties and the invariable goal of attracting market-rate
tenants, will be a constant pressure which may jeopardize
the low-income component regardless of the safeguards.
The process of privatization also precludes the eventual status
of debt-free existance after expiration of the ACC, and to
other means for long-term, low-cost financing, direct grants,
operating subsidies, and other resources through the public
sector.
The results of private redevelopment have come to reflect
those who do not believe in housing the poor rather than
those who claim the inadequacies of funding and wish to main-
tain low-income housing. If private redevelopment were to
have meant an increase in commitments to the low-income pop-
ulation by expanding the number of low-income units under
private ownership, in addition to providing better designed
and constructed units, it is speculated that private re-
development would not be eagerly undertaken.
There is no magic to the "redevelopment" of public housing.
Just as we are familar with urban renewal, gentrification,
neighborhood recycling and revitalization which have
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historically displaced poor and minority houeholds, we are
seeing the smae trend in a domain originally immune to
market forces by virtue of public ownership. But land and
housing are commodities as are any resources under capitalism,
and public housing, if permitted, will once again enter the
market to be sold and resold for profit.
Pirvate redevelopment can result in a Pruitt-Igoe or a King's
Lynne. The lessons and dangers cannot be ignored in seeking
a solution for Columbia Point.
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THE COLUMBIA POINT HOUSING PROJECT
"With the commitment to build the JFK
Library and the Massachusetts Archives
next near the U Mass Boston campus, many
consider the Columbia Point housing
project the only sore spot left on what
is turning into a billion dollar peninsula."
--Boston Sunday Globe,
June 13, 1976
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CHAPTER 4:
CHAPTER 4
THE COLUMBIA POINT HOUSING PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
Located 3 miles southeast of downtown Boston on a peninsula
overlooking the Dorchester Bay and the spectacular downtown
skyline of Boston lies Columbia Point, the largest public
housing development in New England. Considered as part of the
Dorchester neighborhood, the project is comprised of 1,504 units
of family and elderly housing on 37.5 acres of land contiguous
to the waterfront.
Construction of the project began in 1951 and was completed
in 1954 at a cost of $20.2 million. The project, when first
built, was intended to be an innovative physical and social
experiment. Today, one can speculate about the many problems
that brought about its downfall, but it should be on record
that Columbia Point was fully tenanted when it opened 25
years ago, provided housing for a population of 6,000, and
operated successfully in this manner for more than 15 years.
During a period when the tenant population became poorer and
increased numbers of minority households moved in, changes
came about in BHA's management and maintenance practices.
Services were cut rather than increased, and 15 years of
adequate and timely upkeep were followed by 10 years of
progressively poorer management and maintenance. Problems of
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unemployment, crime, vandalism and drugs were out of control,
and the tenant population was faced with minimal housing
services, social amenities, and city services. This was all
to happen during a period when the rest of the peninsula began
to prosper with the location of major institutions and increased
interest from the local government and the private sector.
This chapter will give a short description of the neighborhood
institutions in the area; a description of the housing site;
and a discussion of the tenant population at Columbia Point.
AREA DESCRIPTION
Columbia Point presently shares the 351 acre peninsula with
the University of Massachusetts Harbor Campus, (hereafter
known as U Mass), the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library,
the First National Bank, the Boston College High School,
the Bayside Mall, the Dever Elementary School, the McCormack
Middle School, the St. Christopher's Catholic Church and other
institutions and facilities including a sewer pumping station.
Further down Morrissey Boulevard are the headquarters of the
Boston Globe and other commercial enterprises. Close to 5,000
jobs are located within walking distance of the housing project.
As we will see, the neighboring institutions and businesses
will play an active role in planning for the future of the
Columbia Point project, the only residential site on the
peninsula.
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Figure 1: The Columbia Point Peninsula
Figure 2: U Mass and the Columbia Point Housing Project
Figure 3: Location of Columbia Point
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Figure 4: Existing Structures at Columbia Point
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The Bayside Mall
The Bayside Mall is perhaps best know for its notoriety as
a failure in marketing, management, and design of a commercial
shopping center. The Bayside Mall opened in 1966 next to
the housing project and east of Carson Beach. It was a large
shopping center with 280,000 square feet of rental space, and
33 stores containing a mix of discount stores for food, home-
furnishings, toys and clothing. It was the largest shopping
area outside downtown Boston and provided for the residents
of Columbia Point, Dorchester and South Boston.
The Mall was reasonably successful in the first few years,
but because of management, marketing and security problems,
by 1970, the shopping center began to lose its tenants.
Major chains began closing their operations, so that by 1975,
only a drive-in bank remained of the original tenants. The
John Hancock Life Insurance Company acquired ownership of the
property after the original owners defaulted on their mortgage.
Today, only one of the buildings is occupied, the Boston
Teachers Union leases 33,000 square feet for an office and
meeting hall. The large parking area of the Mall is used
as a bus transfer point where police escorts are deployed
to protect school buses going into South Boston and Roxbury.
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When the construction of the U Mass Harbor Campus on the other
side of the housing project began in 1970, it was hoped that
the University could save the Mall with an increased market
and by changing the image of the peninsula. But nine months
before the planned opening of the University in 1973, the
last store vacated the Mall.
A University of Massachusetts study evaluating the closing of
the Mall stated that "vandalism, shoplifting and shrinkage
within the stores has not been reported as abnormally high
for urban centers, but harrassment and purse snatching by
young people in the parking lots plus the proximity to the
housing project has created a psychological barrier for the
people in the neighboring communities." The closing of the
Mall contributed to the notion that the housing project was
the cause of its failure, and strengthened a growing belief
at that time that the project had to be torn down or sold.
The University of Massachusetts Harbor Campus
The decision in November of 1968 to locate the University at
Columbia Point was the result of primarily negative factors:
the location would be in an area with no loss to the City's
tax base, there would be no significant landtaking and no
strong opposition from the immediate neighborhood.2 One of
the final sites under consideration was to locate in Copley
Square, but as the Boston Phoenix reported, it "was killed
largely by the BRA, which didn't want to lose tax-producing
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property, and the John Hancock Insurance Company, which wanted
to build its office building there." 3 In addition, Hancock
had a positive incentive for U Mass to locate on the peninsula
as the Company now owned the Bayside Mall.
Located on 103 acres at the southeastern end of the Columbia
Point peninsula, the present structures cover 60 acres, including
College I and II, the Library, Science Center, Administration
Building and Service Building and a recently completed gymnasium.
The campus represents an investment of $149 million, the single
largest appropriation from the State budget, and consists of
1.6 million square feet of building area and 1,623 parking spaces.
The partially completed campus opened its doors to students in
the Spring of 1974. The 1979 enrollment of 8,200 students
served by 700 faculty and staff members5 is not expected to
grow significantly above 10,000 students.
The Master Plan of the campus reflects the isolationist and
"fortress" like design of the buildings to protect it from
the "hostile" environment: including the noise from Logan
Airport, exposure to the open sea and prevailing wind, poor
sub-surface conditions, and its neighbor, the public housing
project. 6
Presently, there exists poor access between the University
and the housing project. Separate vehicular access to U Mass
from Morrissey Boulevard is provided, and the University
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Figure 7: University of Massachusetts Harbor Campus
Figure 8: Bayside Mall
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maintains its own shuttle bus between the MBTA Redline and the
campus. There exists only one public bus connection between
the University and the housing project. No pedestrian links
exist and one encounters barbed wire and chain link fence when
cutting across from the housing project to the University.
U Mass, having prided itself as an urban-related, higher
education institution with the purpose of educating the poor
and working-class students, found itself moved from downtown
Boston to an isolated site on the peninsula next to a
community it wanted to have nothing to do with.
The John F. Kennedy Library
The location of the Library was narrowed down to two choices,
the Charlestown Naval Yard in South Boston and Columbia Point.
After much lobbying from Dorchester, a heavily Irish community,
the Library Trustees made a final decision to locate the library
at the tip of the peninsula. The $12 million Library was
completed and opened in October of 1979. A staff of 45
hosts approximately one million visitors annually. The
design of this building also shows an attempt to close off
any view towards the housing project by focussing on the
open waters.
Morrissey Boulevard Business Facilities
In 1964 the First National Bank located its computer facility
on Columbia Point between Mount Vernon Street and Morrissey
Boulevard. Employment having grown steadily since 1970, the
Bank currently employs 1,700 on a full-time basis.7
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The Boston Globe's main office and printing facilities are
located on the extreme southern edge of Columbia Point.
Built in 1963, it is currently the largest employer in the
area, employing some 3,700 people. Several other small manu-
facturing facilities and a broadcast station are located in the
area.
Boston College High, the Dever & McCormack Schools and
St. Christopher's Catholic Church
Boston College High School is situated on a 40 acre campus
on Morrissey Boulevard, opposite the housing project. The
school has a daily attendance of 1,700 students. The Dever
and McCormack schools, an elementary and middle school re-
spectively, are also located directly across from the housing
development. Both minorityand white students are bussed to the
schools. Some Columbia Point residents attend these schools,
but the majority are bussed out. Adjacent to the schools is
St. Christopher's Catholic Church which is the community church.
It frequently lends its space for use to the tenants.
City Park
A city park is located on 8 acres of a 13.5 acre city-owned
site directly north of the housing project along the shoreline.
The park contains ball fields, tennis and basketball courts and
a tot-lot area.
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Pumphouse Area
A City of Boston sewer pumping station is located at the end
of Mount Vernon Street. Most of this facility is vacant and
available for re-use with approximately 20,000 square feet of
floor area in an 85 foot high space. The City and University
owned land totaling 17.4 acres adjoining the pumphouse and
waterfront is undeveloped. Redevelopment proposals have re-
commended the re-use of the pumphouse as a University/Community
Center and area around the pumphouse for new housing.
Transportation Conditions
Columbia Point is 15 minutes from downtown Boston, potentially
making it one of the most accessible and attractive sites
in the city. The site is served by both highways and mass
transit systems. Two regional highways bound Columbia Point
on the west. Morrissey Boulevard and the Southeast Expressway
interface at the Kosciuszko Circle. The public transportation
system includes the MBTA Redline connection at Columbia Station
on the Ashmont Line located across Kosciuszako Circle and two
bus connections. The recent appropriation of $8.5 million for
construction of a new station on the Quincy Line will further
enhance the peninsula's accessibility by increasing inter-area
transportation.
The transportation linkages have all focused on accessing the
growing numbers of institutions on the peninsula. The Kennedy
Library, as well as U Mass, are reached by a separate road
from Morrissey Boulevard, whereas the housing project is reached
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through Mount Vernon Street, to a dead end at the pumphouse.
Transportation services for the residents of the housing project
are presently inadequate, and pedestrian access between the
project and the University and Library is nonexistent.
SITE DESCRIPTION
The development consists of a total of 30 buildings: 15
seven-story mid-rise buildings serviced by elevators; 12
three-story low-rise walkups; and 3 one-story structures. The
buildings are aligned on three parallel streets running the
length of the development. The low-rise buildings are primarily
located along Mt. Vernon Street and the western part of the
site and the mid-rise buildings form a dense core in the center
of the development and continue out towards the eastern edge of
the site. Intended for family living, the majority of the low-
rise buildings and centrally located mid-rises contain 3-5 bed-
room units. Of the total stock, more than half are three or more
bedrooms, with another 39% containing two bedroom units. The
majority of housing suitable for elderly units (1 and 2 bedroom
units) are on the eastern part of the site in 4 mid-rises. The
low-rises constitute 34% or 384 units, and the mid-rises, 66%
or 1,120 units . (See Table 6 ). Four different types of
low-rises and mid-rises exist. But they all contain the basic
elements of four wings arranged around a stair or elevator core,
with entrances to 4 units per floor. Any variations are in the
length of the wings, number of stories, and unit sizes.
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Table 6: Unit Size Distribution at Columbia Point
Unit Size
1 br.
2 br.
3 br.
4 br.
5 br.
Low-Rise
108
48
180
48
384
Mid-Rises
196
476
448
0
0
1,120
Source: Boston Housing Authority, "Columbia Point Street
and Apartment Numbering Plan," March, 1955.
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Total
196
584
496
180
48
1,504
Figure 9: Columbia Point, view from Mt. Vernon Street
E.
'-~~~-
Figure 10: Columbia Point, typical low-rise building
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Figure 11: View From Dorchester Bay
Figure 12: Columbia Point Building Number Plan
The buildings are better designed and of higher quality when
compared with other family developments around the city. The
arrangement of no more than 4 units per floor around a cir-
culation core provides more privacy than developments with con-
tiguous units sharing common walls on both sides, and double-
loaded corridors. All of the units have cross ventilation, with
the majority having exterior orientation in three different
directions. The buildings are of first class construction
of reinforced concrete frame with masonary walls and brick
exteriors and contain full basements with the first floors raised
4 feet above the ground level. As with most public housing
units built for families during the 1950's and 1960's, the
units are undersized and are approximately one-half the square
footage of MHFA's current design guidelines. Tenants complained
that bedrooms and kitchens are too small, common space does not
increase appreciably with unit size, 4 and 5 bedroom units
contained only one bathroom and closets are inadequate and do
not have doors. 8 Nonetheless the buildings have non-load bearing
interior walls, easily lending themselves for renovation within
the existing framework.
Density was a problem in certain parts of the site, especially
in areas which contained a large number of children, but
problems were contingent on the level of parental supervision
and tenant assignment policies at a given time. When fully
occupied, the tenants lived with a density of 38.7 units per
acre, which is in the low to mid-range of density of the
139
developments in Boston. Other developments, such as Mary Ellen
McCormick and Old Colony, which are large and generally regarded
as "successful" BHA developments, have comparable or higher
densities. 9 The area of major deficiency is the location of
the buildings in the center of the site. Two mid-rise buildings
are completely surrounded on all sides, making it the most un-
appealing section of the site. Lack of open space and play
areas for children of all ages created additional problems.
Most of the present problems with the buildings are non-structural.
The majority of the problems stem from the lack of maintenance
and repairs: broken exterior doors, damage to the interior walls
and ceilings, broken windows and fixtures, elevators that are
in need of repair, hallways filled with debris, broken mailboxes,
and other superficial problems. Extensive work was completed in
1978 to upgrade and overhaul the heating, electrical, and
plumbing distribution systems at a cost of $4.5 million.
The following complete the site: a one story administration
building containing offices, an assembly hall and a day care
center are located on Mount Vernon Street. A renovated steam
heat generator plan and a City of Boston Parks Department
recreational building are located on the eastern edge of the
site.
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Approximately 80 residential units are occupied by social service
agencies employing some 125 people. They include, a Health
Center, Community Security Program, the Columbia Point APAC,
A Senior Center, and an Alcoholic Program.
POPULATION
In the early years, Columbia Point housed many Second World
War and Korean War veterans and their families. 10 These
families included two parent households comprised of young
couples with one or two pre-school age children occupying the
smaller units, and large families occupying the 4 and 5 bedroom
units. Many of the families were Irish, had one person employed,
and came from the Roxbury area or from throughout the city.
Surprisingly, few came from South Boston. Italian, minority
and other households made up the rest of the development. As
early as 1959, Columbia Point housed 241 minority families,
most of these were small families, as 99% of the 4 and 5 bedroom
units were occupied by large white families. 11
The veteran households had a high turnover rate as they would
move out to the suburbs or other areas as soon as they were
economically able to. But many households also remained and
contributed to what was considered a self-contained community
they were content to live in. Many chose Columbia Point
because of its location, it was separate and removed from
problems in the rest of the City and was therefore a good place
to raise children. The isolation of the site even reinforced
a sense of community.
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When periodic fights would erupt between the white youths at
Columbia Point and the youth at Old Colony and South Boston,
and later, when many of the white and minority children were
bussed to South Boston for school, the population at Columbia
Point absorbed the problems and still maintained a sense of
community. 12
During the first 10 years from 1954 until 1964, Columbia
Point had close to full occupancy of the 1500 units (see Table 7).
Characteristic of most of Boston's public housing at the time,
it remained predominantly white. By 1965, the minority population
had increased from 13% to 44%, but the vacancy rate remained
small with 123 vacant units.13 Management, repairs and services
were still being maintained and tenants lived in a functioning
and viable community. Ground maintenace was reputed to be
"excellent" as a sweeper and groundkeepers would go through
the site daily. Repair and upkeep of the units were not as
satisfactory, but materials and hardware were obtainable from
management 14
This was all to change. By the late 1960's, the project
experienced tremendous problems in security, crime, vandalism,
juvenile delinquincy, and drugs. In 1966, the Health Center
opened and other social service agencies began to locate at
Columbia Point. It was during this period, with the agencies'
cooperation, that BHA started to assign "problem" tenants and
families to Columbia Point because of the availability of
services. 15
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According to BHA, family profiles at Columbia Point in comparison
to other projects suggested a higher concentration of families
with problems. From this time on, the quality of management
and housing services deteriorated and large numbers of vacancies
symbolized the decline of the community.
In 1969, after the decision to locate U Mass at Columbia
Point, the vacancy rate rose to 23.4% or 339 vacant units.
When the University was under construction and the communities
of Dorchester and South Boston were demanding a response from
the University on its impact on the community, the project
experienced its worst decline. In a two year period 670 units
were vacated: In 1971, living conditions got so bad that 324
families (21.5% of all households) moved and in 1972, another
347 families (23.1% of all households) moved.16
By early 1974, when U Mass first opened its doors and the Mayor
announced the first revitalization plan for Columbia Point, the
vacancy rate rose to 29% or 425 units. The 1,021 occupied units
now housed approximately 5,000 residents. The population was
23% white, 64% Black and 13% other households. 66% of the pop-
ulation was under the age of 20, and 9% over age 65. The median
income was $4,150, 77% of the households were on public assist-
ance, and 62% received AFDC.1 7
The location of the University on the peninsula had brought
about renewed interest in developing the rest of the peninsula.
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Table 7: Change in Occupancy - Columbia Point (1954-1979)
No. CD
Units a Ltn
od oD
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Years
Key: * Total units occupied
+ Elderly units occupied
.- Units occupied by social agencies
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1500 
-
1200 -
900-
600.-
300.-
e *
1979
A series of major plans were proposed; Columbia Point became
the proving ground for all sorts of approaches to solving the
social and physical problems of the housing project. Developers,
government officials, planners, social workers, architects,
and do-gooders were armed with proposals they tried to sell
the tenants. The actual effect of all this interest fed the
rumors that the project was to be demolished, sold, given to
U Mass for use as offices, classrooms and/or dorms or converted
to market rental housing. In all cases, many tenants felt
that their days in Columbia Point were numbered and left
"while the going was good." 18
The tenants who remained firmly rejected all of the plans
they were offered. It was during this period that the accusation
was first made that conditions in Columbia Point were the result
of a deliberate plot to rid this highly desirable tract of land
of its undesirable public housing tenants. Up until now, only
$350 thousand had been spent on Columbia Point through moderni-
zation, while $5 million in additional work was needed for major
improvements to the elevators, incinerators, water proofing,
roofing, painting , security, paving and the electrical dis-
tribution system.
The desirability of the development as a place to live was
sharply reduced by an increasingly high crime rate, accelerating
physical deterioration, and the increasing vacancies. Crime
at Columbia Point had risen as in the rest of the city, and reached
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a peak in 1971 when 522 serious and 234 minor crimes were reported.19
Tenants no longer wanted to live in a place perceived as unsafe
and deteriorated. Columbia Point had become a center of drug
dealing , not necessarily from the residents, but from outsiders
who specifically came to Columbia Point to do business. The
residents themselves felt abandoned by the police who appeared
to have given up any attempt at deterring these activities
at the development. Even though the crime rate had decreased
substantially by 1973, elderly and small families continued to
vaca'e the one and two bedroom units. These were especially
hard to re-tenant at the time. Larger families were reluctant
to move, as few other options were available elsewhere.
In 1975, through the use of Modernization and other funds,
and after considerably opposition from the tenants, the BHA
consolidated residents in better maintained structures to
achieve 100% occupancy in these buildings. This resulted in
full occupancy in 16 of the 27 buildings, while 11 seven-story
buildings were boarded and welded shut. The vacancy rate was
now 44.8% or 618 vacancies. Eventually, 772 units in mothballed
buildings were taken off the rent roll.
By 1976, the minority population increased to 86% and the
overall tenant population declined to 2,100 as tenants continued
to move out. The average family size exceeded 4.0 persons and
the median age was 14.20 The lack of repairs and deferred
maintenance problems had resulted in fostering a high population
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turnover. This made it extremely difficult for those with any
long-term interests to live in the development. Up until this
time, 55% of the 555 remaining households have resided in
Columbia Point for 5 years or more.21
The mothballing of the mid-rise buildings was intended to
improve security by reducing the areas in which the criminal
element flourished. But instead, the mothballed and empty
buildings seem to have foreshadowed the continuing physical
as well as social decline of the development.
When the City proposed The Boston Plan in August of 1977,
there were only 470 occupied units with 390 family and 80 elderly
households. The median income was $4,107 compared with $9,133
for the rest of the city. 95% of families lived below the
poverty line and 36% of the youth and 20% of the adults were
unemployed. 22
In 1979, only 347 households, 280 family and 67 elderly house-
holds, remain in the development .23 The families occupy 12
of the buildings mostly located at the western part of the site.
Other families are housed in partially occupied buildings
scattered throughout the site. The elderly live in 3 mid-rise
buildings on the eastern part of the site. These units, along
with 96 of the family units, had been modernized in 1978.
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Columbia Point became one of the most expensive developments
to maintain, operating deficits were among the highest in
comparison with other BHA federally assisted developments.
It had over an $800,000 operating deficit in 1975; but as
shown by the high number of vacancies and continued population
loss, there was a dramatic decrease of necessary revenues from
rental income. Furthermore, the high cost of maintenance, and
problems with vandalism and security, could be attributed in
part to BHA's tenant assignment policy, of placing families
with problems at Columbia Point, and in part to inefficient
management and maintenance, calling for a significant amount of
deferred maintenance and repairs to be made under emergency
conditions.
CONCLUSION
Larger families, decreasing incomes, problem families and other
changes in the tenant population made it more difficult to maintain
the initial positive environment in the development through the
years. The community,.lacking social cohesion, was no longer
able to control what went on within the development. As soon
as a community is perceived as transient, with no strong
collective feeling among its people, illicit activities begin
to take hold. Female heads of households are absorbed in taking
care of younger children, young men are left to roam the site,
no viable economic opportunities exist and the community ex-
periences a condition which is hard to turn around. But these
factors cannot be isolated from the changes in BHA's management
and tenant assignment policies during this period.
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The BHA was unable to keep up with daily maintenance and
embarked on a process of cutting services and maintenance
functions as planning for the peninsula's redevelopment pro-
gressed. BHA did not re-tenant units after families relocated,
moved or transferred out of the development, and thus encouraged
a steady decline in the number of Columbia Point residents.
These conditions, as we shall see, precipitated the call for
drastic solutions in redevelopment.
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CHAPTER 5: BACKGROUND HISTORY AND PLANNING INITIATIVES
"The project is a stepchild who
has suddenly become Cinderella.
Everyone wants to surround her
with luxury. But if the money
for this proposal doesn't come
through, the stepchild is back
on the doorstep, and all the con-
cern for her welfare is gone."
--Edward Sorrell, Director
of the Colymbia Point
APAC, 1974
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CHAPTER 5
BACKGROUND HISTORY AND PLANNING INITIATIVES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers the background history of Columbia Point
and documents four periods of active planning for redevelopment
by (1) The University of Massachusetts and the City of Boston,
(2) The Boston Housing Authority, (3) the Peninsula Planning
Committee, and (4) the Columbia Point Community Task Force.
Each period is characterized by its own set of actors, events
and redevelopment proposals. An attempt will be made to focus
specifically on the evolution of the redevelopment plans for
the public housing site and the events which impact on the
population at Columbia Point. This chapter will identify the
significant issues which emerge around the planning process,
the control and use of the housing site, and who is to gain from
redevelopment.
HISTORY AND EARLY PLANS
The history of Columbia Point is fascinating. In 1630, the
Puritan settlers landed on a place called "Mattapannock"
(Columbia Point) by the Indians, and went on to build the first
Dorchester settlement near the junction of Pleasant and Cottage
Streets.2 Columbia Point was used solely as a calf pasture for
the town of Dorchester.
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in 1883, at the tip of the calf pasture a pumphouse was
constructed to pump sewage through a tunnel under Dorchester
Bay to discharge it at Quincy Bay in the outgoing tide. The
existing pumphouse (see Figure 13) was built in 1905 as the
world's largest--with a fly wheel spanning 50 feet in diameter
and weighing 72.5 tons.
From 1915 until the 1930's the site south of the pumping
station was used by the Boston Consolidated Gas Company to
manufacture gas from coke (see Figure 13). The site was next
used for dumping refuse from the City of Boston. In 1942, the
site where the Bayside Mall is now located was filled and a
prisoner of war camp was constructed for Italian prisoners.
After the Second World War the temporary shacks were used to
house returning veterans.
Only three miles from downtown Boston, the Columbia Point
peninsula was bypassed in the city's urban development plan.
Originally marsh land, the area is primarily land fill and as
recently as 1950 contained only a sewage pumping station, a
city dump, an abandoned prisoner of war camp, and two industrial
buildings.
In the 1950s and 1960s major construction took place on the
site, even though it was still used as a dump until 1962.
From 1949 to 1953, the Boston College High School was built.
152
Figure 13: Aerial photo of Columbia Point, c.1919
Construction of the housing project began in 1951, with the
addition of 10 acres of fill in the surrounding tidal flats
and salt water marshes. In addition, the City planned for
the additional construction of 800 units of veterans
housing and for 2 elementary schools, 1 junior high school,
a church and shopping facilities. The 800 units of veterans
housing were never built, but one elementary school, the
Dever School, was built in 1957. St. Christopher's Catholic
Church was built in 1957, and the McCormick Middle School, in
1965. Shopping facilities were non-existant until the
construction of the Bayside Mall in 1966.
With the opening of the Southeast Expressway in 1959, and
the closing of the Old Colony Railroad, commercial develop-
ments started to expand adjacent to Morrissey Boulevard. These
included: the WHDH Radio Station (1960), the Dickie-Raymond
Company (1962), the First National Bank Computer Center (1964),
and the Boston Globe (1963). Development boomed along the
transportation arteries leaving the land further down the
peninsula beyond the housing project untouched (see Figure 14).
The housing project was now a thriving community of close to
1,500 households. Bus connections served the needs of the
residents, taking them into South Boston and to the markets
on Broadway.
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Figure 14: Columbia Point early development, c. 1965
'A.
From the beginning, the lack of concern for the project was
apparent. The project was known for its stench as refuse was
dumped and burned. Leaking sewage was also prevalent. 3 It was
not until 1962, 5 years after the opening of the housing project
and after numerous demonstrations by tenants, that the State
Legislature passed an act directing the City to prohibit all
dumping of trash and refuse at Columbia Point.
In 1962, Edward Logue, became Director of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA), and in 1964 proposed to
designate the Columbia Point peninsula as an urban renewal area.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development turned down the
request as Columbia Point was not a slum, not blighted, and
not a developed area in need of renewal.4 This effort was
the first by the City to identify the site as a candidate for
renewal and to consider a comprehensive development plan for
the peninsula. 5
From the 1960's on, plans were introduced regularly for the
peninsula and the housing project; Columbia Point became the
focus of everyone's vision of creating their "utopia" in an
undeveloped part of the City. Many of the plans did not
amount to much. In 1962, Action for Boston Community
Development (ABCD), the local anti-poverty agency, came to
the housing project and suggested that the development could
be improved by hanging balconies on the buildings and renting
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the units to middle-income tenants.6 In 1966, a short-lived
proposal was developed by the BRA to use the site for a
World's Fair' This plan included linking by bridge, the
peninsula and Thompson Island and re-using the infrastructure
7
built for the fair in creating a new "town-in-town . In
1968, a privately sponsored development plan was proposed
that also didn't make any headway.8 Also in 1968, Columbia
Point tenants were approached by the BHA to become a demon-
stration project in tenant management to be funded by the
Federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The BHA Board
was in favor of selecting Columbia Point for this experiment,
but the tenants were skeptical of the BHA's motives. The
demonstration was to finally take place at the Bromley-
Heath housing project.
Even though none of these plans came to fruition, they demon-
strated increasing interest in developing the peninsula.
As most of the land was in public ownership, the subsequent
location of the U Mass Harbor Campus, the Kennedy Library,
and the designation of the State Archives on the peninsula
became part of the City's strategy to improve the area for
eventual private investments. It was hoped that initial
public actions could be followed by private actions.
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE CITY
THE THOMPSON PLAN
The University and the Community
When the decision to locate the University in Columbia Point
was announced in 1968, the seriousness of the impact of the
University in creating housing and transportation problems
led to the formation of coalitions and active organizing of
both students at U Mass and neighborhood residents in Dorchester
and Columbia Point to work for their active involvement in the
University's plan. A newsletter issued by the U Mass Boston-
Dorchester Alliance, a group of students and community people,
states their concern:
The site is filled land, facing Dorchester Bay; but
the campus abuts the largest of the working-class
neighborhoods of old three-deckers that lie
beneath Boston's veneer of education, culture,
and style. Most Dorchester people did not want
U Mass at Columbia Point. Indeed most students,
faculty, even administration preferred an in-town
location. Even so, the school is being set in
Dorchester like some expensive chess piece, and
it is now clearly the responsibility of the
University--students, faculty and administration--
to see that it serves and responds to that community.
Right now there is every indication that the entry
of U Mass will be nothing short of a disaster to
most of the people of Dorchester. 9
The primary opposition came from the Dorchester community
who were concerned about the impact of 6,000 students, when
the University opened, and the 20,000 projected students
converging on their neighborhood. The impact of the
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University on the residential housing pattern was seen as a
major problem. Students would hold legal residence within
30-40 miles of Boston, but would be unwilling to commute long
distances or live with their parents and would seek housing
close to campus. Residents were fearful of students turning
to the relatively inexpensive housing stock in Dorchester and
other housing within walking distance of the school. The
residents cited these examples: the results of neighborhood
change in Allston-Brighton, the Back Bay, the Fenway, Cambridge,
Somerville, and Waltham had brought about large settlements
of students in secure neighborhoods containing a supply of
low-priced housing. This had led to serious problems for
residents in those areas. The charge was made that "for
every unit of housing that students occupy in Dorchester,
one unit of housing would be subtracted from the already
critically low supply available to Dorchester residents." 10
Rents would rise and landlords would exploit both students and
desperate community residents. The poorest tenants would be
driven out to make room for the more lucrative students.11
Transportation would be another problem created by the commuter
campus as thousands of staff, faculty and students would
arrive from throughout the city and suburbs.
In November of 1971, two neighborhood organizations, the
People First (TPF), and Dorchester Tenants Action Council
(DTAC), approached U Mass with questions about the University's
impact on the neighborhood. They were informed that the
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University would be glad to work with a more represenatative
group from the area.12 The Community residents organized
themselves into the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force to
again approach the University about what it intended to do
to protect the community from adverse impacts related to
the construction of the new campus. The Task Force included
more than 26 community organizations in addition to in-
dividual residents from Columbia Point and Dorchester.
The University was not caught unprepared. Robert Wood had
become President of U Mass in 1970. With an extensive back-
ground in urban development and planning, recently as an
Undersecretary at the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and previously as a Professor at M.I.T.,
affiliated with the M.I.T. and Harvard Joint Center for
Urban Studies, he had an interest in solving the problems
created by the location of the University and wanted to
develop an overall plan that could fit the needs and future
of the University. He was well known for his ability as a
strong "mover" who had great determination in accomplishing
his goals. 13
By December 1971, a month after the community first
approached the University, a committee appointed by President
Wood issues its "Report on the Future of University of
Massachusetts" or "The Alden Report", outlining the new
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direction of U Mass as an urban educational center, and
acknowledging that it had a special obligation to "help
develop plans and marshal resources for increasing the
housing supply in Dorchester" in order to avoid disrupting
the community, and "at the very least, to see that it has
no deleterious effects on the surrounding areas."14
In response to the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force's
concerns, particularly around housing, Robert Wood sought
funds for the hiring of a consultant to be selected by the
Task Force. More than $30,000 for the study was raised by
the University from local corporations and businesses. 15
The subsequent hiring of Justin Grey Associates (JGA) by
the Task Force in 1972, became the start of an ugly battle
between the University and the community. Even though the
Task Force was to direct the consultants, the University
paid the consultants and expected the result of any study to
be in accordance with the University's plans and for JGA to
focus specifically on the housing impacts.
In taking on their task, the consultants redefined their
assignment from the University and saw themselves as solely
responsible to the Task Force and the community.16 Not only
were housing issues addressed, but also transportation, physical
planning, admissions policies, campus employment, contracting
and purchasing and other benefits, such as community access
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to University facilities. All of these items were contained
in the "Scope of Services" pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement
between the Task Force and U Mass on the funding and management
arrangements for the study. 1 7 In the end, the community controlled
the conduct of the study.
Prior to the formulation of the Task Force's housing recom-
mendations, a preliminary assessment by the consultants showed
an estimated one-third of the student body would seek housing
nearer or more accessible to the campus, and predicted that
about 40% of those students would be willing to live in on-
site housing. 18 It was found that University staff would have
no impact on the area's housing, although there would be some
influx from the faculty. Therefore, thwarting pressures from
the University and others who were calling for a "housing
market analysis" to be made, the consultants embarked on a
"survey of student housing needs" by interviewing more than 400
U Mass students at random to ascertain in greater detail the
potential impact of large numbers of students on the community. 1 9
Questions were asked in relation to the students' present
housing status, housing costs, mode of transportation, housing
requirements and anticipated changes in residency, e.g.,
whether the students intended to live at home or move to
Boston, Dorchester, or close to campus.
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The survey increased the level of friction between U Mass and
the Task Force; the University feared that the results of a
student housing needs survey would only exacerbate the fears
of neighborhood residents of an encroaching student population
and confirm the severity of the housing problem. The Task
Force felt that the results of a housing market analysis
desired by the University could be damaging to the community
as a trend towards housing deterioration could call forth
improvements which could lead to "displacement of large
numbers of residents through University-related influx".20
The Task Force and the consultants continued their work with
little contact with U Mass or the President's Office. Monthly
reports were sent from JGA to the U Mass Boston Monitoring
Committee, a committee established to oversee the study.
The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force Report
Twelve months in the making, the Dorchester-Columbia Point
Task Force's "Report on the Impact of U Mass in Dorchester"
was released in January 1973. The most significant findings
predicted a "major housing impact" with up to 35% of the
students expected to move closer to campus. The 1980 enroll-
ment of 15,000 students would mean 4,625 students looking for
housing in an already impacted area, and more than 40% of
the affected students would be willing to live in student
apartments on campus. 21 The Task Force Report recommended
that student housing be built on part of the University's
site and not in the community; that the University curb its
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enrollment from 15,000 to 10,000 students; and supported
the Alden Report in that the University itself should not
expand, but remain small as the center of a university
system which is dispersed throughout the Boston area.
(The actual enrollment at U Mass Harbor Campus is 8,000 for
1979, and is not expected to rise above 10,000).
The Task Force, in cooperation with the Columbia Point
Development Council and Coordinating Committee, also re-
commended that the University raise funds for an organiza-
tional effort to mobilize Columbia Point tenants to make
decisions on what physical and social changes would take
place in the housing project; the University should set up
permanent community-wide vehicles for communication and offer
technical assistance in proposal writing; and the University
should:
...Assist the tenants of Columbia Point and the BHA
in raising about five million dollars for upgrading
the physical condition at Columbia Point, not just
with a minimum of physical necessities, but in-
cluding the amenities which would make it an
appealing and attractive place to live. 2
2
The Task Force rejected the notion of U Mass taking over the
Columbia Point housing project for student housing, but
left open the possibility of tenant approved married student
occupation of the project.
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Other recommendations were that the University should negotiate
with the Task Force for a specified number and types of jobs
to be filled by Dorchester residents; that U Mass should open
a slot on its Board of Trustees for a Dorchester resident; that
transportation in the form of shuttle buses or a "people
mover" be installed; and that the use of private cars be
discouraged.
The President's Office did not respond particularly well to
the Task Force Report and felt "double-crossed" by the
consultants who were viewed as helping to spread discontent
among the community. Apparently President Wood had wanted
a document to serve the University by laying the basis
for a broad, private development proposal for the peninsula,
to pacify rather than to provoke the community, and reassure
uneasy City and State officials who were concerned with the
community protest. 2 3
The publication of the Task Force Report was seen by
community residents as a confirmation of the severity of
the University's total impact on the community. Mrs. Jean
Matthews, Chairman of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task
Force viewed the Report's conclusions as a vindication of
the Dorchester Tenant Action Council's position: "The
report says the same thing we said a year ago, namely that
U Mass had to build housing. People didn't believe us when
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we said that because they thought of us as a radical organiza-
tion. But (a) $35,000 (report) is making people believe."24
Response also came from other parts of the community. The
U Mass Boston-Dorchester Alliance spearheaded a drive to
demonstrate that the community would be severely impacted
unless housing was built by the University for students and
also community residents. The U Mass administration had until
now stated that money for housing was not available and
"a commuter school has no business in housing."25 The
Alliance even criticized the Justin Grey Associates' survey
as poorly designed and that it had insufficient input from
students and residents. They felt that consideration was not
given to the question of different rent levels affecting
the housing choices of students. The Alliance claimed for
example, rents in Dorchester at $50 per month would attract
more students than the Back Bay at $75-100 per month.
Therefore, the results of the survey were inadequate and
housing needs were even greater for the area. The Alliance
concluded that "attractive, economically practical housing
must and can be built, possibly on University land at
Columbia Point, possibly on other locations within or near
the community."26 Dormatories were not acceptable to students
and should not be built, and housing for students and
community residents should be considered in a form that
does away with apartment hunting and "exploitative land-
lords." Any housing was to mutually benefit the Dorchester
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neighborhood and the students. At issue from the Task Force
Report was the need for the University to take measures to
lessen the severe impacts projected on the community's
housing and transportation patterns. First, for transporta-
tion impacts to be alleviated and housing to be constructed
to meet community needs, that is, low and moderate-income
housing for residents and students. Second, the University
should not encroach on the public housing project. Third,
the community ought to benefit from employment opportunities,
admissions policies, access to University facilities, and
participation in the planning and direction of the
University.
The community felt so strongly about the University's impact
in the area that in March 1973, the Columbia-Savin Hill Civic
Association demanded that the University delay opening its
Columbia Point Campus until a "total transportation solution"
was worked out. Governor Francis Sargent was called upon to
"give this his highest priority," as "unless more attention
is devoted to transportation difficulties, Dorchester's
housing market would be severely strained by students wanting
to live near the campus." 2 7
Also in this month, Mayor White issues a policy statement
expressing concern about the impact of the campus on the
community, even though he had supported the University's
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location there in the first place' He recommended that
funding for part of the building program (College III) be
denied until the impact was "better addressed," and reiterated
the Alden Report recommendation the U Mass Boston not expand.
The Mayor filed a bill with the State Legislature requesting
a master plan for the campus. He also requested that any
contracts over $25 thousand require his approval. The City
proposed that 300 units in the housing project be reserved
for students. In turn, the City would intensify its own
efforts to safeguard existing housing in Dorchester through
regulatory means.
Finally, the City proposed a committee with joint University,
City and community participation be formed to study all housing
and related issues.28 Not surprisingly, the Mayor's bill
did not pass the Legislature, the BHA rebuffed the City on
proposing a modified takeover of the project, and the
Dorchester Tenant Action Council noted that it had yet to
see code enforcement, rent control, housing assistance, etc.
come from the City. One thing that did emanate from the
city's effort was the "joint committee." This was to bring
together the interests of U Mass, the City and local
businesses in the near future.
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The Campus Impact Study Group
Under tremendous pressure, the University convened a thirty
member advisory group to give the U Mass community input into
the development plans. The Campus Impact Study Group (CISG)
comprised nine faculty members, eleven administrators, and
ten students, who for 7 weeks looked at the issues raised by
the Task Force Report. The "Report of the Campus Impact
Study Group," a 58 page statement, was released in April
1973, only 3 months after the Task Force Report. This was
the first response from within the University on the Task
Force Report.
The Report listed 46 specific measures to avert the housing
and transportation crisis when the new campus opened,
noting that:
... nowhere are the problems more glaring or more
pressing than in the areas of housing and transpor-
tation. According to one popular version, UMB
(U Mass Boston) is a commuter school to which no
one can commute. Despite over-simplification and
distortion of the facts, there is an element of
truth in this charge. ...The housing problem is
even more acute than transportation. 29
The CISG "accepted" the general analysis and recommendations
of the Task Force concerning transportation as "both
accurate and reasonable" and expanded on Task Force recom-
mendations in more detail.30 Included was the recommendation
that despite three unsuccessful attempts of U Mass to elicit
funds from the Legislature and the Governor's Office for a
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study of transportation problems, (including a request for
$9 million in 1969, $2 million in 1970, and a third request
in 1971), the University should "support the concept of
construction of a mass transit linkage to the campus" and
increase its efforts to secure $12 million for a "permanent
mass transit link." Additionally, a stop on the Quincy Line
at Columbia Road should be explored in addition to subsidized
parking at outlying MBTA parking lots. Commenting on the
Vollmer Associates Report, which was undertaken by the MBTA
in response to the University's transportation needs, CISG
said that the University should not rely exclusively upon
this report as a basis for planning a mass transit linkage
because "it does not adequately take into account access to
the Columbia Point housing project" among other linkages. 31
In the design of the mass transit connection, both Columbia
Point residents and U Mass should have access to it," and
be planned so that it also "reinforces any future plans to
develop Columbia Point." Other recommendations were that
the University set up an Office of Transportation, limit
parking spaces, raise parking fees, and encourage car
pools and mass transit over automobiles.
In the area of housing, the CISG stated that while they were
aware of the long-standing decisions of the Legislature and
the Board of Trustees that the University should "keep out
of the housing business":
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We agree with the Task Force that the University
has the responsibility to help local community
groups protect and strenghthen their housing
resources.. .development and renovation of ad-
ditional housing units for community residents
will be essential in enabling local residents
to withstand the UMB impact.3 2
The CISG recommended rejection of student housing on the
U Mass campus or in the surrounding area, but that the
University should "make a strong commitment to cooperate
with Dorchester neighborhood organizations who wished to
develop housing." Additional measures such as University
support for a Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation
were recommended. The CISG focused on dispersing the student
housing impact and increasing the University's "active
participation" to develop "joint student-community housing"
outside the high impact area of Dorchester, Columbia Point
and South Boston by recommending the U Mass also work with
community organizations within Boston, Cambridge, and Quincy
who "wished to provide low rent housing for neighborhood
residents," who would agree to the University leasing space
for establishing "UMB learning centers," and who would rent a
certain percentage of units (20-35%) to students. The concept
of mixed residential learning facilities would be a major
undertaking and the University should be a partner in the
effort. Moreover, "every agency which was a party to the
decision to locate the University campus on Columbia Point,
including the City, the State, and those private enterprises
who opposed its location elsewhere-bear a direct responsibility
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to the high impact communities adjoining the Columbia
Point campus."33
In addressing the public housing project, the recommendation
by the CISG that "the University assist local community
organizations in efforts to protect and improve their
neighborhood housing resources must apply fully to the Columbia
Point housing project. It was suggested that a public state-
ment by the Board of Trustees be made showing the commitment
of the University that it had "no intention of taking over
the Columbia Point housing project for student housing." 34
The educational interests of the residents were to be
addressed and youth with academic potential living in
Columbia Point were to be identified and encouraged to
attend U Mass. It was stated that "education is the
University's business" where it can best serve the community.
In responding to other issues raised by the Dorchester-
Columbia Point Task Force Report and recent events, the
following statement was made:
The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force recommends
that the University take strong action to assist
the Columbia Point residents in their efforts to
improve their housing situation. This recommenda-
tion clearly relies on the University's proximity
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to the Housing Project as the means for improving
conditions for the residents.. .The Campus Impact
Study Group agrees that UMB, as an urban campus
and next-door neighbor, must work in cooperation
with the housing project. The University certainly
should not allow itself to be used as the "cutting
edge" to get rid of low-income people. We oppose
the proposal put forward by the Mayor's Office
that 300 units in the Columbia Point housing
project be set aside for students. 3 5
The report stated that " students should not be used to fill
vacancies when there is a need for low cost housing throughout
the City," unless they can quality under the same criteria
as other Columbia Point tenants and this was found acceptable
to the tenants. The development of on-campus student housing
was decided not to be consistent with the educational role
of the University nor "popular" with the students as it would
increase friction and tension between the members of the campus,
the community and the residents of the housing project by
creating two fundamentally different communities. Never-
theless, after good faith neogtiation with the community,
if a dispersed student housing impact was not achieved,
''a limited number of housing units might be constructed on
or near the campus," but under no circumstances were they
to be student-only housing.
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In response to the Task Force's fear of a partial or full
takeover of the project, the Committee recommended: "Protection
of the total square footage that now exists at the Columbia
Point housing project should be guaranteed for present and
future low income tenants." The University cannot help
directly with major capital improvements or funding for new
management alternatives, but as "change will occur as a result
of the juxtaposition of the housing project and the University
Campus," the University should insure that "whatever change
occurs, is beneficial for present and future low-income residents
of Columbia Point." Cooperation and strengthening of relations
are needed to work in areas of mutual benefit and concern.
University commitment of manpower and certain funds should be
made, including fund raising for technical assistance. A
strategy for cooperation for the next few years should
be developed with the following objective for residents to
consider: joint cooperation with the University for "mixed
community-student housing under the control of the community
that might be built on the City land adjacent to the project
and the pumping station or on part or all of the current
Bayside Mall." This was the first mention of a housing develop-
ment plan for the peninsula by a University group.
It was recommended by the CISG that the Board of Trustees adopt
their recommendations and that other efforts be made to work
with the community in areas such as transportation, employment
safety, recreation and the need for shopping facilities.
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The CISG then asked that the University postpone regular classes
at the campus from September 1973, until January 1974, at the
earliest, and that the University refuse to agree to move to
the Columbia Point campus, which was then nearing completion,
until the Board of Trustees adopted the housing policies
proposed in the report.36 In a concurring statement by
eight members of the CISG, this accusation was made:
...we go beyond the CISG report to emphasize, in the
strongest terms, that the Columbia Point campus
must remain closed not just until January, 1974, but
until it can open without inflicting substantial
hardships upon the people of Dorchester-Columbia Point.
This position, it must be understood, is not a re-
jection of the spirit or the particulars of the CISG
Report. It is, however, an indictment of those in
the University whose previous unwillingness to
respond adequately to the Dorchester-Columbia Point
Community has brought us all to the brink of confron-
tation and disaster.
University of Massachusetts Trustee's Statement
On May 10, 1973, William Hamilton, Jr., Acting Chancellor,
addressed a memorandum to President Wood and the Board of
Trustees transmitting the Report of the CISG. In it he
stated his support for many of the Task Force as well as CISG
recommendations: "most of them should be implemented in some
form or another." The issues of transportation, admissions,
and employment were also mentioned in the memorandum. In
assisting local residents "to protect and strengthen their
housing resources," the University's role is defined in
his memorandum as a "catalyst," with activities to be initiated
directly by the Chancellor, the President's Office and the Trustees.
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Furthermore, a request was made of the President's Office and
the Trustees to make a specific statement and to take action
concerning the role the University is prepared to play in the
long-range development of the Columbia Point peninsula:
...this should include the possibility of housing re-
novation and development associated with and adjacent
to the Columbia Point Housing Project and in the context
of mixed income, mixed community-student housing as
proposed by the CISG Report. Proposals have been put
forward for the development of light industry at the
Bayside Mall site. From the University's point of
view, improved and expanded residential facilities for
existing residents as well as for others in need of
housing would be much more desireable for Columbia Point.
Continued leadership is requested from the President
and the Trustees, so that we may work with community
leaders, the Mayor, the Boston Housing Authority, the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, and others to
explore what residential possibilities might exist 37for the future development of the Columbia Point Peninsula.
The significance of the memorandum is it reveals for the
first time, the University's interest and leadership
in establishing a mixed-income residential community
on the peninsula. Nowhere does the CISG Report make any
mention of a mixed-income residential community' This new
development and the intrigues behind it will soon become
apparent.
Throughout this period, angry community residents continued
to meet over housing and transportation problems as the campus
was due to open in four months. "The people of Dorchester have
got a right to some answers out of him (President Robert Wood),"
said Jean Matthews, Co-Chair of the Dorchester-Columbia Point
Task Force, "that campus is not going to open until we get them."3 8
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In response to the continuing community pressure and the
CISG's recommendations, the University Board of Trustees,
in June 1973, restated their determination to "make this campus
an asset for its immediate neighbors, the community adjacent
to the Columbia Point campus, and to address promptly any
problems associated with the University's new location." The
Board's statement stressed that the University would remain
a commuter institution, and would support the City's effort
to rehabilitate and revitalize the project for the benefit of
present residents: "the university has no intention of taking
over the project for student use," and would "cooperate with
city agencies and community groups to discourage conversion
of local family dwellings to student use." Also expressed
were the goals of providing quality higher education and of
serving the public interest. 39
The University then took measures to insure that the campus
would open without incident. Prior to the opening of the
Harbor Campus, the University established 2 Field Offices,
one in Dorchester, and one in Columbia Point, to facilitate
relations between the community and the University. The offices
were aimed at providing assistance to "impact area" residents,
identifying and helping them take advantage of employment and
education opportunities at the campus. Library service,
athletic programs for high school students and a variety of
other services were developed. A commitment was made
for special recruitment and admissions for students from the
impacted area.
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To avert the problem of students moving into the community,
the University's Housing and Transportation Office would monitor
student residential movement into the communities and adopt
a "no-listing" policy which excludes from the University's
housing list all housing resources within Dorchester, South
Boston, and Columbia Point.40 In addition, the University
established the New Directions Committee to address the issues
raised by the Task Force Report, the CISG, and the Monitoring
Committee.
Even though initiatives were undertaken by the University, a
central problem remained of how to avoid a confrontation with
the opening of the new campus. By the end of the summer, it
became clear that the University's construction was behind
schedule, that certain factions within the University were re-
sisting the move, and that relations with the community had
deteriorated. The University's opening date was postponed
until January 1974.
In a confidential memorandum from the U Mass planning staff
to President Wood, the long-range objectives of the University
were expressed: the need for a large neighborhood that could
sustain adequate shopping facilities and successfully co-exist
and be more effectively linked with the University. The
planners felt that the problem with the housing project
was the high concentration of poor people isolated on the
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peninsula with very few amenities. Social isolation was
further intensified by the surrounding neighborhoods of
Dorchester and South Boston who wanted to keep out the poor
who were predominantly Black and Spanish-speaking. The
solution would have to be the absorption of the low-income
community into a mixed-income setting, and the creation of
major transit links that would break up the isolation.4
Land adjacent to U Mass and to the Bayside Mall could be used
to double the residential population without displacement of
any of the existing residents, while creating a mixed-income
community. The memorandum suggested that only a major
developer could take on this task of creating a "New Town,"
and that the University had "no authority nor mandate to do
anything except to work in ways of joint cooperation with
the residents."
A "housing proposal" and a redevelopment plan for the peninsula
became the basis for the University to "patch-up" relations
with the community, plan for the future improvement of the
University's surroundings so that it would become a "good"
location, and insure the goodwill of the community when the
University opened its doors.42 During the summer of 1973,
President Wood, Vice President Peter Edelman and other U Mass
officials held preliminary discussions with Mayor Kevin White,
BHA Administrator Samuel Thompson, and officials from the BRA
and the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA). According to
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Vice President Edelman, U Mass now saw itself as a "broker"
using its academic resources to make housing proposals attractive
to potential developers. Initial discussions centered on a
limited dividend approach for "a housing development of 2,500
units, including the 1,500 unit Columbia Point project on a
88 acre tract next to U Mass Boston." This was to "ease the
anticipated pressure on housing in Dorchester and South Boston,
with no loss of low-income housing."43 The University and
City officials, in response to Columbia Point residents fear
of displacement by students and staff, insisted that any
housing scheme would maintain the number of low-income units.
Andrew Olins, the Mayor's Assistant for Housing, stated: "Nobody
is going to be relocated. If eligible students and faculty
go in there, it will be to the extent that new, low-income
housing is constructed and existing low-income units are
renovated."44
High level discussions continued through the summer. The
Bayside Mall site was isolated as a likely site for additional
housing , even though it was questionable that the cost of
the site, valued at $4 million , would permit anything but luxury
housing. The City was asked to consider the development of
housing on the peninsula as a top priority, and William White,
Head of MHFA, said his agency would give 90% toward the private
development of housing in the area.45 The announcement of
these activities put a halt on the Hancock Company's effort to
seek rezoning of the Bayside Mall site for industrial use.
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According to newspaper accounts, in spite of community opposition,
Hancock had applied for a zoning change to permit light in-
dustrial development, and had held preliminary discussions with
the Boston Gas Company, the Polaroid Corporation, among others.
Now with the zoning changes blocked by the City, Hancock had to
reconsider the future of the Bayside Mall. 4 6
The Thompson Plan
After consultation with the University's planning staff, the
Mayor's office, the BRA, and the U Mass President's office
looked at two architectural firms and selected Ben Thompson
Associates (BTA) to prepare an overall redevelopment scheme
for the peninsula.
In September, 1973, the announcement was made of the con-
sultants who were to begin a process of working with the
University and a newly composed "Task Force" of community,
public and quasi-public bodies on a cooperative effort for
redevelopment. The 17 member Columbia Point Task Force
consisted of representatives of the City of Boston, the BHA, the
BRA, U Mass, and neighborhood organizations and agencies from
Dorchester, South Boston, Columbia Point, and Savin Hill.
A representative from one of the Columbia Point agencies, who
was also a Columbia Point tenant was a member of the Task Force.
With the technical assistance of Ben Thompson Associates, the
Task Force worked in a cooperative effort to plan the re-
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development of the peninsula. In an interview, one partici-
pant observed: "The nice thing about this proposal is that
it gives everyone a 'win,' the Mayor with his commitment to
the city; Wood with his commitment to an urban university;
and the community people with their demand for housing."4 7
"What we have been doing is creating the process by which we
will find out what is best for the project, and for the
peninsula," proclaimed Samuel Thompson, BHA Administrator.
"Perhaps then this peninsula can become a very lively in-
teresting community in which the University happens to be
one member," commented U Mass Chancellor Carlo Golino, who
had formerly served under Governor Ronald Reagan at the
University of California and was now the prime University
spokesman in the Task Force.
The new planning activities along with the University's
construction brought about a changed atmosphere among the
participants. The Boston Globe reported: "The sight of the
University's brick red towers rising from the old City dump
seems to have inspired everyone. Critics who four months
ago were complaining about 'heavy' traffic and housing 'crises,'
are now debating the number of parking spaces and written
proposals for specific parcels of land. ,48
The approach of the Columbia Point Task Force is inter-
esting. Contrary to earlier public statements made by Task
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Force members, the proposal assumed that at least 300 of the
projects 1504 units would be removed to lower the density and
to make room for new construction, even though project residents
had repeatedly opposed removal of any low-income housing units. 49
Not by coincidence, more than 300 units were presently vacant
and another 80 were used for agency offices. Among the par-
ticipants there existed differences in the number of low-income
units which were to be removed. BHA, which previously opposed
any diminution of low-income housing, changed its mind and
began to support "judicious pruning." As stated by Jerold
Hickey, spokesperson for BHA: "We are not opposed to having
units refurbished, or even replaced, as long as we get back
an equivalent number."50 The BRA and the City proposed the
retention of only 1,000 low-income units in the redevelopment
plan. But at the same time, Andrew Olins stated that:
"There is no question of forcing people out, it won't happen."51
During this period, the City also guaranteed existing
residents housing in the new development.
By the time it was completed, the Plan proposed 1,000 low-income
units after redevelopment for the approximately 1,000 re-
maining households at Columbia Point. Taking this base figure,
2,000 additional units of moderate income, and 1,000 units of
middle-income housing would comprise a 4,000 units develop-
ment, or "four times the number of low-income units needed."52
On the question of demolition, "complete rehabilitation of
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existing units" was proposed, even though some units would
be "selectively removed" for the purposes of increasing
open space and for community facilities. New housing con-
struction along the northern coastline and near the pump-
house would complete the remainder of the housing develop-
ment. A "town center" proposed near the Bayside Mall would
provide a neighborhood meeting area and municipal services.
The existing Bayside Mall would be redeveloped into a major
shopping center.
After seven months of work by the Task Force and the Ben
Thompson Associates, in January, 1974, "The Columbia Point
Peninsula: A Program for Revitalization," was completed.
The plan contained the following:
o The physical and social conditions of the exist-
ing neighborhood must be improved by the creation
of a more broadly-based social structure with
major emphasis on the needs of the low and mod-
erate-income family.
o The construction of new housing and the maximum
integration of subsidized housing and non-sub-
sidized housing should create a setting which
would attract new residents in a family oriented
development and greatly improve living conditions
for present residents.
o The completed development should have approximately
4,000 low, moderate and middle-income units, de-
pending on the type and availability of housing
subsidies.
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o Residents of Columbia Point will not be displaced from
the Peninsula. The housing to be constructed or re-
habilitated shall be, as far as is practical, staged to
coincide with the necessary relocation within the
project and shall include an adequate number of af-
fordable units of appropriate size to allow the re-
location of all residents who desire to remain at
Columbia Point.
o Adequate public facilities, including elementary and
high schools, must be provided, if it is likely the new
population would overburden existing neighborhood facilities.
Moreover, the new facilities and services provided shall
be available to the surrounding communities.
o The shopping facilities at Columbia Point must be
revitalized to serve a wide areaof the South Boston
and Dorchester commuhities as there are few modern
shopping centers nearby. The complete change in the
image of Columbia Point, as well as the new market
potential generated by the University of Massachusetts
and the major residential expansion described in this
proposal will enable a shopping mall to meet the needs
of the community.53
On January 17, 1974, Mayor White, at a City Hall press conference,
announced the "$150 Million Proposal" for revitalization to
transform Columbia Point into "one of the handsomest neighbor-
hoods in the City," and to make it one of the "great assets
of the City of Boston."54 A large model put together by Ben
Thompson Associates was unveiled before the press and public
showing the total redevelopment plan and a 12 page booklet
was distributed describing the Task Force's policies and
development program (see above). The Columbia Point Task
Force had now completed its work.
As planned, on January 26, 1974, 9 days later, the University
of Mass opened its doors for the first time. The opening took
place with little incident and no opposition from the larger
community. 185
The Response to the Thompson Plan
The representatives of South Boston, Dorchester and Columbia
Point on the Task Force had mixed response to the Thompson
Plan. Those who supported it felt the Thompson Plan addressed
the community's need for shopping and housing by proposing the
renewal of the Bayside Mall and increasing the supply of housing
for the area. The reactions from others were different. Thelma
Peters, one of the Columbia Point agency representatives and
a former tenant, and Bernard Sneed, a tenant, objected
to the lack of community participation from the housing project
in the plan. They were both members of the Task Force, but
represented the agencies they worked for and had not been
chosen by Columbia Point residents as their representatives.
Therefore, they did not report to the tenants' meetings. Sneed
was to comment, "as a resident, I would just like to be assured
that the proposal is going to benefit the residents of Columbia
Point. The residents must have input."55 Not a single tenant
representative was informed nor involved in the development
of the plan, even though at least two tenant organizations ex-
isted at the time, along with Columbia Point tenant leaders
and TPC, other concerned tenants could have been approached.
But the City felt differently. Andrew Olins commented that:
"This project is the opposite of Park Plaza. There the plans
were all drawn up before the community was asked what it
thought. Here the community will be involved at every step." 56
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Response to the plan was also voiced by those not on the
Task Force. Jan Wampler, an architect and M.I.T. professor,
who had been working with Columbia Point residents for the
past few years in small-scale revitalization, had not been
consulted during the planning activities. "They say that the
whole plan was based on community participation. How much
could the community have been involved if the plan calls for
tearing down something the community worked on for two years,"
Wampler commented.57 The Thompson Plan called for the demoli-
tion of 110 Monticello Avenue, a building Wampler had just
completed plans for. Wampler, perhaps reflecting the worst fears
of the tenants said that: "In order to attract a developer,
they'll have to move the poor out of Columbia Point." 58
Equally skeptical about the lack of tenant involvement were a
number of faculty members of U Mass who stated their concerns
in an article in the campus newspaper, the Mass Media, on
February 26, 1974:
The $150 million development plan for Columbia Point
was officially unveiled at Boston City Hall last
month. After the show, several Columbia Point
residents asked that the model be taken to the
Columbia Point project so that the people who
would be most affected by it would have a chance
to see what had been planned for them. They were
told that the project residents would have to
come down town to City Hall because the model
couldn't be moved.
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As the Columbia Point people left City Hall, they noticed
that the model was being taken apart so that it could
be moved to another location in City Hall. A week later
the model was again disassembled and this time trans-
ported to Cambridge to the office of Benjamin
Thompson and Associates.
In addressing the proposed elements of the housing plan,
criticisms were raised by the residents concerning the un-
certainty of the proposed housing subsidies--only market-rate
housing seemed assured. The proposed 2,000 units of moderate
income housing did not specify rent levels, and contained
"nothing to discourage fearful visions of a middle class in-
vasion at Columbia Point," reported a Boston Phoenix article. 59
The subsidized housing pieces were deemed infeasible by the
critics of the plans given the policies of the Nixon Adminis-
tration. Inconspicuously footnoted in the Thompson Plan
itself was the following: "As of this writing, federal
housing programs have been suspended and new legislation has
not been approved by the Congress. The final mix of housing
cannot be determined at this time."60
The Dorchester Community Action Council (DCAC), which
consistently advocated the preservation of 1,500 low income
units, protested the provision of the only 1,000 low-income
units after redevelopment. Their position was that keeping
1,500 units should be an "absolute minimum... the real need
is for an even greater number."61 But the most poignant
remarks came from Columbia Point itself. The tenants and the
Columbia Point Inter-agency Council opposed the plan in favor
of immediate efforts to improve present housing conditions.
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Thelma Peters remarked, "it's fine to go downtown and imagine
what might happen here in the long run, but the residents are
more interested in what is going to happen in the short run.
People are living here under intolerable conditions, and
nothing is being done." 62 Edward Sorrell, Director of the
Columbia Point Area Planning Action Council (APAC), commented:
If existing housing is allowed to deteriorate, residents
will continue to be driven off the Point, and any
guarantees for rehousing existing tenants will be
useless. We've got 300-350 vacancies this year. Next
year maybe there'll be 500-550. The Housing Authority
and the BRA can afford to wait three to four years,
until living conditions are really intolerable. Then
when there are 300-350 families left.. .they can say
'we don't displace anyone' and be perfectly accurate. 63
Unfortunately, this statement made in 1974 was to be
most prophetic of events to come. The Thompson Plan was never
carried out, first, because financial feasibility was never
established to begin with--the evidence leads one to believe
that the parties never had any intention of implementing the
Plan. Second, the peaceful opening of the U Mass Harbor
Campus was perhaps in itself, the achievement of the unstated
objective.
Even though the plan fulfilled the desires of the Mayor, the
BRA, U Mass and others as to their vision of what should
take place on the peninsula, Andrew Olins had to admit "the
New Town is a dream, not a plan."64 There were no specifics
on the public or private investment needed for the 150
million dollar "dream."
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The planning for the redevelopment of the peninsula, as
correctly feared by tenants at Columbia Point, distracted
from the real problem of improving or upgrading the housing
project for existing tenants and public housing applicants.
In referring not only to the planning process which excluded
the residents, but also to the impact of the proposed re-
development plan on the poor, Lou Finfer, Director of DCAC
commented: "what we could have is a sneaky Park Plaza" 65
In summing up many people's thoughts about the timing of the
revitalization plan, especially in light of the opening of the
U Mass campus, one community participant observed, "sometimes
I think it's just something to keep people busy." 66
The Thompson Plan can be seen as the first major redevelop-
ment proposal in the history of Columbia Point. The Plan itself
was to meet a quick demise after the opening of the University,
but the components of commercial, recreational transportation
and housing improvements, and the theme of a mixed-income
residential community are present in all subsequent plans,
even until today--6 years later. The precedent was also es-
tablished by the Mayor and the BRA to guarantee housing
solely to existing tenants in the development. The City
maintained its position in all of the following plans.
As the number of existing households decreased because of
worsening conditions in the project, each subsequent redevel-
opment scheme contained fewer numbers of low-income units.
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While appearing generous in guarenteeing housing to existing
low-income residents, the City's policy in reality worked to
the long-term detriment of low-income people. As will be
seen, this policy shows that the number of low-income units
provided in the redevelopment plans are politically deter-
mined and not based on a financial nor social assessment of
the number of low-income units which can be maintained in
the new community.
The commitments made by U Mass during this period cannot
be overlooked--especially the University's statement of sup-
port and assistance to present tenants and in not "taking over"
the project for student use. U Mass was successful in its in-
stitutional mission of opening its doors to students without
undue community protest, but U Mass still has to contend with
its relations to its neighbor, a deteriorated housing project
that U Mass made a commitment to assist and not harm.
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THE BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY
THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
In the aftermath of the massive publicity surrounding the
Mayor's unveiling of the $150 million Columbia Point Revi-
talization Plan, pressure mounted on the public agencies to
do something about the housing project. U Mass had just
opened its doors, the Kennedy Library had $500 thousand ap-
propriated for design and planning, the State Archives and
the Boston Opera Theatre were also being considered for loca-
tion on the site. The period from 1975 to 1977 is character-
ized by public initiative from the BHA, the Court, the BRA,
and HUD in response to the serious physical and social
conditions at the housing project. In addition, it was a
time of growing tenant activity in the affairs of their
community.
It was during this time that Columbia Point received $8.4
million of Target Projects Program (TPP) monies from HUD for
modernization and tenants programs and BHA prepared a $10
million proposal which was eventually funded under the Urban
Initiatives (UI) program. For the first time, tenants were
active participants in deciding the level of modernization,
as a result of a referendum which came about after a series
of confrontations between BHA and TPC. The 17-page balloting
package was probably the most comprehensive piece of infor-
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mation ever made available to every family in a development
and included detailed information on five proposed levels of
modernization.
Developments at Columbia Point were not separate from the
city-wide events. The suit by tenants against the BHA in
1975, Perez et al. vs. BHA, the subsequent Consent Decree
orders, and the appointment of the Court-Appointed Master,
were to lead to more pressures on the BHA for increased
tenant participation. TPC's Task Forces throughout the city
had become more active in their developments as housing con-
ditions continued to worsen.
The tenant population at Columbia Point was suffering tre-
mendous strains as 240 households had moved out between June
1974 and August 1975; conditions were declining precipitously
because of increased crime and vandalism and the lack of
housing services. Long-deferred maintenance and repairs had
led to serious problems with the heat, hot water, plumbing
and electrical systems, and to the need for extensive repairs,
roof and finish work. The number of remaining households
was 721.67 Tenants were angry at the present conditions and
at the prospects for the future. In a petition signed by the
residents, including many elderly, it stated the following:
What are we waiting for? For me to move or die,
whichever comes first, and then there will be
another empty apartment to be devastated? Why?
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I pay my rent, I keep my apartment clean to the
best of my ability. I love my home at Columbia
Point, but BHA is making it more and more difficult
for me to live here, is it a part of an inhuman
plan to empty Columbia Point and make it available
to them that has?
How and where do we of 70, 80, and 90 years get the
energy to pack a h seful of furniture for moving?
And why should we?
Many of the concerns during this period, from both the public
agencies and the tenants, were around immediate issues such
as security, social services, maintenance, repairs, etc.
These were seemingly far afield from planning for the redevel-
opment of the peninsula, but the manner in which these issues
were addressed was to have important long-term consequences.
Policy decisions relating to mothballing of buildings,
demolition, tenant relocation, tenant participation, re-
tenanting of vacant units, rehabilitation, management and
preliminary negotiations on long-range planning did not alter
the course of redevelopment. They, instead, reinforced the
City and the private sector's dominance over the redevelop-
ment process.
The Target Projects Program
The Target Projects Program was the brainchild of H. R.
Crawford, then Assistant Secretary at HUD, who had earmarked
Columbia Point as one of the chosen projects.69 With the
announcement of the program from HUD, BHA submitted an appli-
cation on January 16, 1975 for a requested budget of $20
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million for the following:
1. Management assistance for staff training, devel-
opment of a computerized work order system, data
processing, and staff performance and hiring
guidelines.
2. Development of a security program including the
hiring of security personnel.
3. Physical improvements to the buildings and
housing rehabilitation.
4. Improved tenant services and communications with
management.70
The TPP awards were announced in April of that year. Columbia
Point was one of 10 awards made to major cities during the
first year of the program. (The Year Two awards were smaller
and were distributed among many housing authorities.) HUD
continued to consider Columbia Point a top priority, although
by this time, Crawford was no longer there. The $8.4 million
in TPP funds and the modernization funds of $6.3 million
brought a total of $14.7 million to be added to the $10 mil-
lion in Urban Initiatives funding.
In 1977, the Perez case resulted in the Consent Decree, a
more than 270-page document detailing reforms BHA must com-
plete over a three-year period to bring about a complete
reorganization of the Authority, and improve its administra-
tion and management, and to begin to effectively spend accrued
modernization and program funds. Columbia Point was included
in a Special Order because the modernization plan had not been
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completed. Weekly meetings were held between the Court-
Appointed Master's office, which was charged by the Court to
oversee the implementation of the Consent Decree, BHA, TPC,
Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS), and a few tenants and
the architectural consultants, to discuss plans for the
housing project around vacancy rehabilitation, security and
mothballing of the buildings. 72
The Master, Robert Whittlesey, stipulated to BHA that modern-
ization funds for Columbia Point had to be committed in 1975
and TPP funds expended by March 1977. Furthermore, part of
the Court Order stated: The parties (BHA, TPC and GBLS) and
the Master were to "closely cooperate in the preparation of
a comprehensive proposal for the revitalization of those
units in Columbia Point," and submit an application for
funding to HUD by October 1, 1977. The order for the interim
was as follows:
. . . In addition, by July 1, 1977, the parties and
the Master will prepare interim procedures to en-
sure, to the extent reasonably feasible, that the
number of families currently living at Columbia
Point (approximately 430) does not significantly
decrease during the preparation and implementation
of this comprehensive proposal. 73
Included in the Order were measures for the "prompt proces-
sing and assigning of tenants to Columbia Point, to the
degree feasible, of both current and future applicants who
select Columbia Point." The appropriate social service
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agencies were to inform eligible persons of the availability
of apartments, and BHA was to undertake the procedures for
cleaning and repairing the vacant units for occupancy. The
order appeared to deal with the components of an overall
strategy for "turning around" and fixing up the development
by placing emphasis on vacancy rehabilitation, security, re-
tenanting and insuring no decrease in the resident popula-
tion, but actual events were to turn out quite differently.
For numerous reasons, BHA did not carry out the Order. Some
of the reasons may be attributed to the inherent difficulties
involved, yet others to the general unwillingness of the BHA
to follow through on making the development a viable community
for present and future tenants. Contrary to what most people
believed, the Master did not have the power to force the
Authority to do anything. The Master's role was only to make
recommendations and to evaluate BHA's activity.
In 1975, Columbia Point had three on-site managers and a full
maintenance staff responsible for the upkeep at the develop-
ment. Once TPP funds were received, management staff was
divided into four components: (1) security, (2) social ser-
vices, (3) tenant employment and training and (4) moderniza-
tion. 4 Additional full-time staff were hired: a vacancy
rehabilitation/mothballing crew of 20 craftsmen was put in
operation, a TPP Director, a Community Organizational Spe-
cialist, a Tenant Training and Employment Specialist, six
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Building Service Aides, a secretary, and security personnel.
The Aides, security forces, and the secretary were mainly
tenants. Already Columbia Point had a disproportionate share
of management staff when compared with other developments.
The first TPP Director, it was reported, could not success-
fully coordinate all TPP efforts and was relieved of his
responsibility. The then Deputy Administrator at Central
Office took responsibility for the program, and according to
management staff, was available at his desk "once every three
weeks" while awaiting retirement. Unfortunately, Roland
Burke, Chief Planner for Columbia Point and other develop-
ments, who eventually became the Columbia Point Development
Coordinator, had to seek approval from the Deputy Administra-
tor prior to any action. This caused considerable delays
and last minute changes in planning and implementation at a
time when critical steps had to be taken for extensive re-
habilitation and improvements in management and security.75
By December 1975, tenants and community agencies were angry
and vocal; modernization had not progressed and conditions
were worse than before in spite of the funds from HUD:
Why am I living from day to day for several years
with the ceiling of my apartment peeling to pieces
all around me, into my food, and into my body, with
money available for rehabilitation?
Why do I have to remove draperies and curtains
from windows and spend my days and nights bailing
out my apartment when there is a bad rainstorm, in
some instances even move furniture away from wallq
and there is money available for rehabilitation?76
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The prevailing sentiment at the time was that BHA "didn't
give a damn" about tenants; rumors were spreading that the
development was going to be sold; the tenants were unorganized
and disheartened; and many described the morale of the commu-
nity as having reached its lowest. Justification for these
sentiments was only to be confirmed in a confidential report
circulated in BHA's Department of Planning, Development and
Modernization which stated that:
. . . there is little to suggest that the BHA will
be able to live up to its responsibilities by pro-
viding timely routine and nonroutine maintenance
and that there will be a Columbia Point social
system wherein rules will be enforced by the man-
agers and tenants and where deviant behavior [e.g.,
vandalism] will be successfully reduced. 77
The problems of delays and inaction continued to plague the
modernization program. In a letter from Administrator Samuel
Thompson, BHA notified the Master that progress as of March
4, 1976, resulted in: 53 vacant apartments being prepared
for occupancy for relocated households from mothballed build-
ings, 3 mid-rises (7-store buildings) had been vacated with
windows sealed and utilities shut down; and repairs had been
made to approximately 88 units in "most serious condition." 78
This was the extent of progress a year after the TPP award.
While the BHA continued with its slow-paced and inefficient
work procedures, there was considerable confusion among the
residents about what was taking place. The weekly discussions
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with the Master, BHA, TPP staff, and TPC led to the following
decisions:
o tenants were insufficiently involved in the plan-
ning for TPP and modernization and time should be
allotted for BHA to fully inform tenants of the
plan,
o a joint BHA and TPC letter should be issued to
inform tenants of the current status of the work
schedule and to reassure them that they would
not have to leave Columbia Point.
o the decision to mothball buildings should be seen
only as a temporary measure until funding became
available for rehabilitation, and a decision was
made as to the future use of the buildings.79
May 27, 1976, a BHA/TPC letter was sent to all Columbia Point
tenants. It was the first letter issued on joint letterhead
and signed by both Board Chairmen. It advised tenants of the
following:
o To insure safe and desirable housing for the 600
families, the mothballing of largely vacant mid-
rises is proceeding along with the consolidation
of families in restored apartments in the devel-
opment.
o In one and a half years, approximately 330 families
will be housed in three-story buildings with the
remaining families and the elderly housed in mid-
rises.
o Beginning in the fall, "every one of the approxi-
mately 750 family, handicapped and elderly apart-
ments will be modernized."
o Modernization will be for existing tenants at
Columbia Point.
o Mid-rises that are "mothballed" will remain vacant
and boarded--no decisions have been made for their
future use and no decision will be made for at
least one year.
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o Meetings will be scheduled with BHA personnel,
including TPP staff and TPC, to d Hcuss these
plans in detail with the tenants.
Originally, the combined TPP and modernization funds were to
fully rehabilitate 754 units with an initial estimate of $3
thousand per unit. The proposed number of units then dropped
to 654 with an estimated $8 thousand per unit.81 After spend-
ing close to $4 million on overhauling the heating, electrical
and plumbing systems, mothballing, and other services, approx-
imately $4.8 million remained for housing rehabilitation. By
July 1976, it became apparent that substantially fewer units
could be redone than was originally planned; it was decided
that enough funds were available to rehabilitate two out of
five designated areas, including one for the elderly.
By now, BHA knew that additional funds would be needed for
the easterly portion of the site and circulated a draft
"Application to HUD for Supplemental Funding" in October,
hereafter known as the "October Plan." Before delineating
the contents of the plan, it should be said that BHA put
together this plan without input from the tenants nor proper
notification to the parties, TPC and GBLS or to the Master's
Office. Considerable friction between tenants and management
developed as to the content of the plan, necessitating inter-
vention by the Court. The Master was designated to coordinate
meetings between the tenants and the Authority on the future
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development plans for the project and to insure that tenants
themselves made a decision on the final use of the remaining
$4.8 million TPP monies. 83 This broke the impasse between
tenants and management.
The Modernization Referendum
Up to this point, BHA planners had argued that large tenant
meetings could be avoided and only tenant leaders be consulted
on the BHA's modernization plan. Whereas TPC, GBLS, the
tenants, the architects, and the Master had maintained through-
out discussions that tenants must be part of the decision-
making process. Now was a prime opportunity for tenant input
and to build an organized tenants' voice.
By request of the Court, on January 18 and 19, 1977, four
meetings were scheduled in the development to provide detailed
information to tenants in voting on the various options for
modernization. TPC noted that: "The first round has been
won, Columbia Point tenants will make decisions about the
future of the community now that their participation in the
planning process has been assured. ,84
Of the remaining TPP budget for modernizing family and elderly
apartments, tenants had to make the decision on how to spread
the limited funds. Five options were presented ranging from
a plan that rehabilitated 420 units at $15 thousand per unit,
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to rehabilitating 608 units at $7,200 per unit. 85 All
tenants, 16 years of age and over, were to rank order their
choices with the clear understanding that selecting the
option for a higher level of renovation would essentially
mean that fewer units could be renovated for existing fami-
lies. The consequence, as described by one tenant, would be:
"those with better apartments will not be in good stead with
people whose apartments have not been improved."86 Large
numbers of tenants turned out for the meetings and the final
vote took place on January 27. An overwhelming majority
chose Choice No. 1: modernizing 420 units (252 family and
168 elderly units) at a cost of $15 thousand per unit. BHA's
expectation to the contrary, tenants selected a level of
modernization for the smallest number of units so as to in-
sure that the renovation would be of the highest quality.
The modernization items included were new kitchen cabinets
and sinks, washer hook-ups, new recessed showers and fittings,
heavy security screens for all windows, glass brick for the
hallways, new entrances, and landscaping. This was a result
that surprised BHA and others who had feared that any sig-
nificant decision left up to tenants would be poorly con-
sidered, and tenants would have elected to spread the money
among as many units as possible.8 7 Moreover, 200 tenants had
attended the meetings, showing a successful demonstration of
tenant participation.
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While the tenants' decision was commendable, BHA then managed
the design and implementation phases with questionable compe-
tency and efficiency.88 Prior to the tenant referendum, Stull
Associates had been hired by the BHA. They had in the mean-
time proceeded with design and working drawings. Problems abound:
BHA was late in providing an exact budget and the final
design by Stull Associates had problems with its esthetical
appeal and functional use. Proposed entrances and vestibules
were little improvement over the existing entrances but cost
$10,000 each. A section of the living room on the first flocr
front units was awkwardly enlarged as a result of the vesti-
bule. Many tenants felt that these changes were unnecessary.
Complaints were made that an intercom system was not installed
and that the entrance design of contrasting red brick against
the existing orange brick made a mockery of their housing.
Within the units other problems were found. Fuse boxes were
placed in the middle of living room walls and closets still
lacked doors. In the stairwells, the particular design of
the fire hatches and fire escape installations created more
of a problem than before and became dysfunctional in a short
time.
The contractor hired was the lowest bidder but was tackling
his largest rehabilitation job. Work crews left unfinished
work. Six to eight-inch gaps existed between newly installed
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partitions and existing outside walls and security screens
did not fit. Pipes were also not adequately encased nor
sealed and the walls were not properly painted. Poor workman-
ship was so pervasive that a year later plaster was falling
down and pipes and ceilings leaked.
After completion of the rehabilitation work, Alan Root, then
Chairman of the TPC Board, sent a letter to Brendan Geraghty,
the BHA Assistant Administrator for Planning, Development and
Modernization, stating the results of TPC's inspection of the
renovated buildings: "Quite frankly, I am aghast at what I
saw. From both design and construction points of view, the
project is a disaster of the first magnitude." On the posi-
tive side, it was noted that halls have been cleaned and
roofs replaced, but on the negative side: "the overall rede-
signing of the buildings is unimaginative and incompetent. . .
Somewhere along the line, the architects became confused.
They were being asked to redesign an apartment building in
which people live--not a fortress and not a zoo for caged
animals. ,89
By the end of the first phase of modernization with the com-
pletion of all the elderly and only 96 family units, the cost
per family unit came to $21 thousand. This was a high price
for a questionable design and for units of poor quality. In
addition, 156 occupied family units were still not rehabili-
tated.
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The TPP experience showed an example of BHA's inability to
manage adequate design review and construction; correct its
deficiencies in contract supervision and make adequate work
inspections. The high per unit cost meant that the agreed
upon number of 252 family units could not be completed within
budget since only about $1 million remained. Tenants and BHA
staff agreed to suspend the remainder of the work rather than
to start work on another building and encounter the same
problems.90 The BHA's original commitment to the tenants to
rehabilitate 750 units resulted in only 168 minimally reha-
bilitated units for the elderly on the eastern part of the
site, and 96 units for families in four low-rises on the
western part of the site.
Also during this period, the mothballing of buildings resulted
in 618 units removed from the rent roll9 in addition to 134
units which had already been removed as they were occupied by
social services. A total of 722 units, close to half of the
original units were now unavailable for occupancy. (See
discussion in Chapter 4.)
The HUD Task Force
In June 1976, at the initiative of HUD, an attempt was made
to set up a new Task Force on Columbia Point. A group of
more than 40 people attended meetings chaired by Ed Pollack
and Lee Dennison from HUD. HUD wanted to bring together a
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larger and more representative body than the 1973 Columbia
Point Task Force to once again work on outlining a develop-
ment plan for the housing project and the total peninsula.
It was also to be a public counterpart to the private efforts
already underway by U Mass President Robert Wood and local
business and corporate officials who were informally meeting
on their own to develop plans for the peninsula. The Task
Force membership included, among others, representatives from
the BHA, the BRA, HUD Regional and Area offices, the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs (DCA), Office of State Planning
(OSP), the Master's Office, TPC, Columbia Point tenants, and
local Columbia Point agencies. The First National Bank of
Boston, U Mass Harbor Campus and the U 1ass President's
Office also sent representatives. A large number of Columbia
Point tenants, more than a dozen, were to participate in this
planning for the future of the development.
The Task Force proved to be short-lived, but certain important
discussions and decisions were to take place at the meetings.
For the first time, HUD went on record as not being in favor
of having public housing sold and also not being in favor of
any demolition on Columbia Point.92 BHA concurred with HUD in
not wanting to sell Columbia Point, and agreed (again) that
citizen participation from now on was to include the tenants
and TPC, and residents were once again assured that they would
be guaranteed the right to housing in all future plans.
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Some participants questioned whether the development could
survive on the existing scale and if there should be some
form of income mix. James Baecker from the BRA stated that
the City was interested in developing a larger income mix
and a "more balanced neighborhood with better relations."
Gershon Ratner, GBLS attorney for the Class (tenants) in the
Perez case, responded that 600 units were now occupied and
any redevelopiaent plan should have 1,500 units for low-income
residents. Housing for any income mix should be beyond the
1,500 low-income units. Even Robert Whittlesey, the Court-
Appointed Master, went on record to say that revitalization
of apartments to attract people with more money to move in
was not necessary.93 Vacant units at Columbia Point should
be rehabilitated with the necessary landscaping, physical
amenities and possibly lowered density in some areas.
Columbia Point tenants, including James Jackson, then Task
Force Chairman, Al Irving, Chairman of the Columbia Point
Community Development Council, and some elderly tenants ex-
pressed their strong fears of mothballing, of the diminishing
population, and of tenants being permanently "put out."
They would rather see units all occupied than vacant.
When the Task Force was presented with five options from the
BHA covering the range of possible solutions for the project--
from full occupancy of the 1,500 units to demolition, the
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group arrived at a consensus to reduce the density in the
development, maintain family and elderly occupancy, keep the
project within BHA income limits and also seek more moderate-
income public housing eligible tenants. The following
assumptions were established for the future of the project:
(1) the continued existence and maintenance of low-rent
housing with "no sale, no demolition"; (2) no tenants will be
"forced out"; and (3) the necessity to concentrate on seeking
additional funding for renovations.94 A proposal to decrease
density while still maintaining low and moderate family and
elderly housing and upgrading the physical and social environ-
ment was supported by this body.
In spite of the intense frustration among the participants,
especially the tenants, the program outlined by this Task
Force did point the direction towards a feasible and viable
alternative for revitalizing the housing project and maintain-
ing it for low and moderate-income households. The proposal
depended on increased allocations from HUD for rehabilitation,
but steps necessary to improve the housing project could pro-
ceed independent of or in conjunction with a total redevelop-
ment plan for the peninsula.
The Task Force's work was to lend impetus to the verbal com-
mitment from HUD for funding for the "October Plan" in 1976,
which was subsequently funded through the Urban Initiatives
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program in 1978. Even though the Task Force disbanded, the
commitments made by HUD and BHA on no demolition were stated.
The Task Force's solution to the housing project is one which
substantially improves housing conditions by lowering density
without demolition and maintains Columbia Point as long-term,
low and moderate-income public housing.
The October Plan
The draft of "The Columbia Point Housing Development and the
Peninsula: A Proposal for Revitalization," otherwise known
as the "October Plan" was first submitted to HUD for supple-
mental funding by the City of Boston and the BHA in October
1976. This was one of the few jointly produced proposals by
the City and the BHA which explicitly articulated the short
and long-term policies of the agencies in redevelopment. The
plan delineated a clear set of housing policies as regards
"problem" tenants, reoccupancy, and housing improvements which
were consistent with the objective of eventual private rede-
velopment.
The proposal called for $10.8 million to augment the current
$8.4 million in committed TPP funds to implement a "realistic"
program to "create within the Columbia Point housing develop-
ment a sound, safe residential community that is and will
continue to be an integral part of the changing character of
the Columbia Point Peninsula." Without it, "the use of
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presently available funds must inevitably be a short-term
holding operation, benefiting neither the needs of present
residents nor the general public interest in what happens on
the peninsula."95 The funds would be applied to supplement
existing work items under the TPP and modernization program,
including: reroofing, mothballing, breakthroughs, upgrading
of buildings and systems, renovation and site work, security,
social services, and improving the circulation and usable
outdoor space. The proposal stated that:
It has become even more clear that the stabilization
of the Columbia Point housing development which
dominates the mid-section of the peninsula is key
to the successful implementation of any revitaliza-
tion program. This issue is central to not only the
interest of the present Columbia Point residents but
also for those interests fo sed on the future de-
velopment of the peninsula.
Not surprisingly, the report attributes many of the problems
at Columbia Point to "original design and site planning
flaws," requiring extensive physical physical restructuring.
No mention was made of management problems. "Stabilizing"
Columbia Point was discussed for the first time with the ulti-
mate objective of looking "beyond modernization towards the
challenging possibilities for the total peninsula."97
Standard housing for low and moderate-income or public housing
residents was not the stated goal, because improved housing
was needed to "assure a permanently upgraded residential
environment that can be a catalyst for revitalization else-
where on the peninsula." Furthermore, this would "make
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possible future consideration of the integration of the
upgraded buildings into a broader and more comprehensive
development program for the total peninsula." 98 The goals
further specified a substantially upgraded environment for
640 low-income housing units: 400 family and 240 elderly
units when the actual tenant population at the time was 456
family and 99 elderly households. Ironically, the proposal
states: "The request for supplemental funding can be seen
as an appropriate continuation of the commitment to current
residents."
Over 860 or 56% of the apartments, including many large
family units were vacant, but the plan did not address their
renovation. The mothballed buildings would remain, and addi-
tional ones would be mothballed and conserved for future use.
Rehabilitation of all units was said to be too expensive,
costing at least $40 million. "Current thinking leads to the
conclusion that renovation of all the structures is not a
sound option; rather it is one which would deter the realiza-
tion of the inherent potential of the peninsula as a whole." 97
Moreover, since the construction of Columbia Point 25 years
ago, thinking has changed regarding policies which concen-
trate so many low-income families in any one housing develop-
ment.
The October Plan also discussed the option of turning the
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Columbia Point project into one entirely for the elderly,
handicapped, adults over 50, and for households without chil-
dren.100 This was discarded because the elderly were con-
sidered too "neighborhood conscious" and wouldn't want to
relocate--therefore a sufficient market for elderly housing
at Columbia Point did not exist. Furthermore, the City and
BHA couldn't ignore the fact that this would violate the
commitments to rehouse existing family households!
Additonally, the City and BHA recommended policies directed
towards reducing the overall population of low-income fami-
lies. Eviction policies were to be "vigorously" enforced,
and social services would be brought in to work with disrup-
tive and "problem" tenants. Simultaneously, the City would
make housing commitments to only present tenants--no new
families would be moved in as only 400 family units would be
provided.
Once made public, the October Plan drew heavy criticism and
anger. In a letter to BHA, the Master addressed a list of
25 items for clarification in the proposal.10 1 Gershon
Ratner from GBLS also drew up an extensive list of questions.
Columbia Point tenants and TPC protested their lack of input.
In a letter on November 23 to Marvin Siflinger, HUD Area
Director, TPC stated their serious concerns about the contents
of the proposal and complained that they were not notified
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prior to its circulation. Apparently, the tenants had re-
ceived the proposal the same time it reached HUD. The pro-
posal was labeled as "vague" and "flimsy," specific long-range
goals for the project were purposely left out; tenants ques-
tioned the commitment of the City, HUD and BHA for Columbia
Point to remain a low-income housing development. Not even
the short-range goals were adequately defined. The answers
to questions of improved maintenance and repairs; continuing
attrition; the need for rehabilitation; the number of build-
ings to be demolished; etc., were not addressed or were
skillfully avoided. TPC further questioned why the proposal
provided rehabilitated units for only 400 families, given the
presence of a greater number of families who were living at
Columbia Point.
The final plan submitted to HUD on November 4, 1976 did not
receive funding as anticipated. Instead, an award was post-
poned for two years until the submission of another proposal
under the Urban Initiatives Program in 1978.
To summarize, the October Plan outlined the objective of the
City and BHA in redevelopment. This was to be nothing short
of a mixed-income housing scheme with a substantially reduced
low-income housing population. Even though the proposal was
not funded, BHA and the City were able to carry out certain
policies in the interim. This meant a "hold" on all vacant
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units and buildings until such time as a plan consistent with
redevelopment for mixed-income housing could proceed. Attri-
tion would continue as units were not retenanted. It can be
inferred from the October Plan that any major improvements in
housing conditions for existing and new tenants would be
incompatible with the overall objective of private redevelop-
ment. An improved, fully occupied, well-run housing project
could jeopardize the City and the BHA's plan, but a largely
vacant and deteriorated project would not only confirm that
public housing could not work, but would easily justify rede-
velopment.
This period of activity at Columbia Point included a poorly
managed attempt at small-scale modernization, an aborted
attempt at defining a low-rent housing approach to redevelop-
ment, and, finally, submission by BHA to the City embracing
private redevelopment. The BHA did not show any evidence of
working in the long-term interest of low-income residents nor
of maintaining public housing. A major effort by tenants
did not bring forth substantial improvements. Also the ten-
ants were "jerked around" by the inconsistencies of the public
agencies who varied their positions on demolition, mothballing
and their commitment to public housing.
Among the protagonists, the City, the BHA, the BRA, the
tenants, and HUD, only the tenants were to suffer. Columbia
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Point residents were now faced with 40% of their development
mothballed, one-fifth of the units modernized out of the 750
units which had been expected, and continuing problems in
management and maintenance.
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THE PENINSULA PLANNING COMMITTEE AND THE CITY
THE BOSTON PLAN
The Peninsula Planning Committee
When modernization plans were being developed by BHA and
Columbia Point tenants, a group representing private sector
interests proceeded to work on an overall redevelopment
strategy for the Columbia Point peninsula. This group
originated as "The Neighbors" and was later renamed the
Peninsula Planning Committee (PPC). Under the leadership of
U Mass President Robert Wood, the group was formed to spear-
head a private initiative comprised of financial and commercial
"giants" to tie together the total development of the
peninsula including: completion of the U Mass campus and the
JFK Library, planning for the State Archives, and the Boston
Opera House, redeveloping the housing project, and reopening
the Bayside Mall, and attracting new residential and commercial
102development of the area.
The group's membership in 1976 consisted of representatives
of local businesses and institutions including Ephron Catlin,
former Executive Vice President of the First National Bank
of Boston, and Treasurer of Affiliated Hospitals; Robert Wood,
President of U Mass; Gerhard Bleicken, Chairman of the John
Hancock Insurance Company; Richard Hill, Chairman of the First
National Bank; Thomas Galligan, President of Boston Edison
Company; William Taylor, President of the Boston Globe;
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Steven Mugar of Star Markets; Raymond Nasher, a major Dallas
housing developer; and others. Public institutions or
affiliated members consisted of Samuel Thompson, BHA
Administrator; Paul Guzzi, Secretary of the Commonwealth;
Andrew Olins, Assistant to the Mayor; Robert Kenny, BRA
Director; and other agency representatives. Columbia Point
tenants, community and neighborhood organizations were not
included as original members of the group.
By this time, the project had only 542 occupied units, in-
cluding 460 Black and Hispanic households and 90 elderly
households. A large part of the project was already mothballed,
including 9 seven-story buildings.105 To the members of the
group, it was apparent that only publicly supported institutions
were locating on Columbia Point, e.g., U Mass, the JFK Library,
and the State Archives, because of City and State actions,
legislative decrees, other public action, and the like. For
more than 10 years, public initiatives were unable to leverage
private sector interest. The mostly vacant Bayside Mall was
a symbol of the failure to attract continuing private invest-
ment. In the past few years, only one new tenant, the Boston's
Teachers Union, had moved into the Mall. It was high time
for major private developments to take place on the peninsula
and for better utilization of public funds to achieve this.
There was firm belief that Columbia Point had great potential
for development in the immediate future. Robert Wood, in a
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meeting of the group on September 22, 1976, described the
peninsula as "Boston's next major opportunity for residential
and commercial development." But the prevalent feeling among
members of the group was that the housing project presented
"the most serious fiscal, political and psychological obstacle
that must be overcome," prior to any major private investment
or redevelopment effort on the peninsula. 1 04
These and other sentiments of The Neighbors group were
reported in a Boston Globe article the next day. To everyone's
surprise, on September 28, a few days later, a group of
Columbia Point tenants demonstrated outside the Boston Globe
office in protest over the development of plans for the area
without their involvement, objected to the portrayalof the
housing project as a "psychological obstacle" to private
development plans and as a "dumping ground " for Black and
Hispanic families.1 05  The protestors said that they were
not allowed to participate in the meetings of The Neighbors
and were "fed up with the insinuation that their intelligence
is such that they cannot speak for the themselves, do not know
what they want, or cannot participate in meetings with ed-
ucators, businessmen, government agency representatives, etc."
Among the tenants' demands, the Boston Globe was to retract
its negative characterization of the project, and tenants
were to have representation on The Neighbors group.
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Tenants also requested a written commitment from U Mass that
it would assist tenants in their efforts to improve their
housing.
Robert Wood responded that The Neighbors was to represent a
positive force in the community," not aconspiracy, but a
partnership." And tenants for the first time, on September 29,
a day later, attended their first meeting of theNeighbors.
Even though tenants came to this meeting, the representatives
subsequently chosen were again, like the Mayor's Task Force,
employees of various Columbia Point agencies and not tenants.
They included Charles Knowles, Executive Director of the
Columbia Point APAC ; Mark Goode, TPP staff member from BHA;
and Al Irving, Chairman of the Columbia Point Community
Development Council. These representatives contributed to
The Neighbors group but could not speak for the tenants them-
selves.
Senior Citizen City
In the midst of all the controversy surrounding Columbia
Point, in February, 1977, City Councilor Louise Day Hicks,
a member of the Council Committee on Housing and a known
segregationist, proposed the conversion of the Columbia Point
housing project into an "exclusive Senior Citizen City
complete with health clinic, shuttle transportation and a
shopping mall."106 This was to be the first Senior Citizen
City in Massachusetts if not in the East.107 A resolution
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was submitted to the Boston City Council calling for the
establishment of a commission composed of municipal, state and
federal officers to "devise and implement a conversion plan"
for the housing project. 10 8
This event was viewed by the tenants as yet another attempt to
displace low-income minority families under the guise of
providing elderly housing. This plan by Hicks did not result
in much, but did show the opportunism inherent in those who
were hostile to the tenants. Nevertheless, the event did have
some impact on how officials viewed Columbia Point. As noted
by a BHA Planner:
Columbia Point is the only development to have had the
entire Boston City Council, certain HUD officials and
diverse BHA Board members go on record that the only
way to make the development into a liveable environment
is to convert it into an all-elderly development.109
Land Use Approaches
Returning to The Neighbors group, Ephron Catlin was named
Chairman and Robert Wood Vice-Chairman. A year long planning
process began for the peninsula. On May 17, 1977, the group,
already renamed the Peninsula Planning Committee (PPC) issued
preliminary ideas in a report called. the "Columbia Point
Land Use Approaches." The report received limited circulation
and was an attempt to look at redevelopment alternatives in
both plan and program. The land-use options represented
three approaches to the site. They were not mutually
exclusive; ideas from each one were to be juxaposed and
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combined where appropriate. Each of the options reflected a
different overall community character for the peninsula.
The first option placed an emphasis on continuing institu-
tional development; the second, on creating a large and
diverse residential community; and the third, on economic
development and new employment opportunities. Each option
incorporated a mix of use in addition to its primary empha-
sis. They were all to represent a realistic picture for how
redevelopment could occur.
Option 1: Institutional Emphasis
o Existing institutions will serve as a base to attract
other institutions. For whatever reason, substantial
funds for new housing will be unavailable, and in this
absence, the existing housing will be made a safe,
stable and attractive, low-income residential commu-
nity of up to 1,000 households.
o The Bayside Mall will be revitalized as either a re-
tail shopping center, serving the neighborhoods or as
a regional attraction such as a trade center or a
commercial recreation center.
o Remaining land areas will be developed as amenities to
the housing project.
o A hotel/conference center will be developed and the
pumphouse structure will be used for services such as
a restaurant, tourist and student related shops, and
a community center.
Option 2: Housing Emphasis
o The advantages of a rare waterfront location with a
view and proximity to Boston and surrounding institu-
tions would attract the interest of private housing
developers. Public planning and investment in infra-
structure would be provided.
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o A commitment to 588 low-income units (the number of
existing households) will be sustained, and up to 1,800
new or additionally renovated housing units will be
developed with an overall mix of 25% low-income, 50%
moderate-income and 25% market-rate units.
o The need to attract a residential market to the areas
would imply that the new development be of high quality,
with density controls for open space and amenities.
o New housing would be developed along the waterfront
for nearly a mile long stretch with less than 30
dwelling units per acre.
o Presently mothballed buildings would be renovated or
demolished and new housing built in place.
o The area immediate to the pumphouse will be developed
as a community center and for service-related func-
tions.
Option 3: Economic Development Emphasis
o A primary need would be to develop employment opportuni-
ties for the unemployed and underemployed residents.
Columbia Point is a well-suited location for major
employment intensive development.
o Businesses locating on the peninsula would be compatible
with local employment goals and result in tax revenues
to the City.
o The natural amenities coupled with historic and academic
facilities could attract retail and commercial activi-
ties with a broad geographic appeal. Combination light
manufacturing/retail and employment intensive office
uses would be ideal.
o The present commitment to 588 low-income units would be
sustained. Also mixed-income residential needs could
be met within a reduced housing area, by an emphasis on
units for adults and childless couples.
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The three land-use approaches present a snap-shot view of
development possibilities. Certain thematic emphasis are
present in all of them. The institutional emphasis, the first
option, can be seen as a continuation of the current trend on
the peninsula, with scattered and uncoordinated plans for each
section of the site. Mostly, non-tax producing public institu-
tions would locate there. A developer would be found for the
Bayside Mall, and the public housing site would remain low-
income, as in all likelihood a housing developer could not be
found. This option basically outlined a "no market," or
negligible development interest in the site. This was the
only plan which sought to maintain substantial units of low-
income housing.
The Committee did not choose this option. Low-income housing
and continued institutional development were not desireable
results for the City and local businesses, if private develop-
ment potential existed. No new housing would leave low-
income housing as the only residential area and continue the
stigmitization of the peninsula. It was feared that this would
probably discourage all private redevelopment. Low-income
units subsumed into a new, mixed income development which would
be privately owned and managed would be a far wiser option.
The housing and economic development options presented al-
ternatives with market potential. Since the site was at-
tractive, either private housing or some form of profit-making
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and tax producing enterprise could locate there. Mixed-
income housing, as long as it private, and commercial and
industrial development were interchangeable, productive
land-uses. The choice was solely dependent on what the
participants saw as more suitable for the peninsula. There-
fore, both options only considered 588 units of low-income
housing--so as to defer development activities to more profit-
able uses, regardless of the extent public housing could be
rehabilitated. While available funding was seen as no dif-
ferent than in Option 1, the emphasis would be placed on
developing mixed-income housing.
The final selection made by the Committee most closely
approximately Option 2, the housing emphasis. In conjunction
with this, the development of specific parcels such as the
Bayside Mall, the Pumphouse, and the land adjacent to the
MBTA station would be undertaken.
The Composite Development Plan
In June, 1977, four weeks after their review of the Land-use
Approaches, the PCC issued the "Composite Development Plan"
to solicit consensus among Committee members about a more
specific course of action. The PPC's work had to be speeded
up so that it could be incorporated in the City's "Boston
Plan,"by July. The Composite Development Plan reflected
the work by the Committee to define a framework for future
activities and to outline both public sector investment and
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policy requirements and private development opportunities.
In the Composite Development Plan, mixed-income occupancy was
"an essential factor in the overall development success of
the peninsula ,"112 and $30 million of public investment was
to serve as the catalyst for $142 million of private invest-
ment. Development opportunities were outlined in four areas:
1. The Bayside Mall.
2. The area occupied by the housing project and residential
open space,
3. The underdeveloped land surrounding the pumphouse and
shoreline.
4. The area surrounding the Columbia Station transit stop.
The final redevelopment plan would result in the following:11 3
o Creation of a new, mixed-income housing community
with a population of 25% low, 50% moderatE and 25%
middle-income households.
o A commitment to house 420 existing tenants in new or
modernized housing.
o Construction of 780 to 1,040 new units with an average
density of 30 to 40 units per acre.
o Demolition of more than half of the existing housing
project (16 of the 27 buildings).
o Conversion to non-public management and private owner-
ship of existing housing.
o Conversion of the pumphouse to a conference and cultural
center and the possible development of a new hotel complex
to create 650 jobs.
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o Revitalization of the Bayside Mall for retail and office
use to create 850 jobs.
o Development of the beach front area, two marinas, and
facilities for recreational boating.
o Relocation of the Columbia station to allow for industrial
development on 11 acres of land.
o Creation of a special entity with authority to raise
funds through bonding as well as from federal and state
sources directed towards the development of the peninsula.
The decisions made for the housing site will be looked at in
more detail. The plan contained the following on demolition:
Demolition of the existing structures is assumed as the
most reasonable approach, because of the prevailing
negative image attached to these "hi-rise" buildings, the
difficulty of incorporating them successfully into a new
mixed-income community and the related difficulty of
attracting private development interest in adjacent land
parcels.
The possibility of selective retention and renovation of
some of these buildings would depend upon as yet unanalyzed
potential for renovation into market housing, availability
of funds, developer interest and market conditions.ll4
On income mix, the plan proposed to rehouse only 420 low-
income households and that a "succesful merger of new and re-
novated housing and the utilization of income waivers with
the low-income component would allow gradual social transition
to a broader income spread."
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Regarding ownership and management, the PPC recommended that
public bodies involved in the ownership and operation of
Columbia Point should investigate mechanisms allowing transfer
of ownership, particularly to permit incorporation of older,
renovated units into a comprehensive mixed-income housing
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development program under non-public management.116 In assessing
the Composite Development Plan, decisions on demolition of the
"hi-rises", ownership, selective retention and renovation,
depended on market conditions and the ability to attract
private development interest. The motives behind the Plan
were not premised on the re-use potential of the buildings.
Comparative cost advantages of rehabilitation, or an examination
of the existing physical design problems and how the buildings
can be corrected and made suitable for habitation were not
undertaken. Neither were there attempts to look at how the
7 story "mid-rises" (not hi-rises) could be renovated.
In achieving a merger between new and existing housing,
the use of housing subsidies other than public housing would
help to disperse the poor and eliminate their presence as an
identifiable element. As long as all housing on the peninsula
is made sufficiently attractive, a market would exist for
other income groups, therefore, the less low-income tenants
were tied to particular units because of subsidy programs,
the better. If the buildings have a negative "image," hence
no market demand, they should come down. The need to "merge"
old and new buildings to allow for market housing and income
mix would mean the disposition of public housing land and
stock to the private sector. It is interesting how one re-
quirement leads to another the moment the objective becomes
the creation of mixed-income housing'
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The Peninsula Planning Committee's proposal represented the
private sector's interest in putting the site to itshighest
and best use; it had very little to do with maintaining the
integrity of the housing authority or the public sector in
fulfilling their mandate to house the poor.
The Boston Plan
The Peninsula Planning Committee's Composite Development Plan
was submitted to Mayor White in July, 1977, to be incorporated
into "The Boston Plan," as part of the City's newest strategy
to obtain federal funds.117 As there had been close collabora-
tion between the Mayor's office and the PPC, major revisions
were not made to the basic plan. The PPC's plan was inserted
into the body of the new document as one of the four target
areas in Boston for neighborhood and commercial revitalization.
Changes and additions to the plan were made simply to outline
in greater detail development and financing mechanisms, and
to elaborate on the economic and social benefits to the City.
For example, the City of Boston, acting through the BRA,
would designate a sole developer for each parcel, and "acquire
all the land necessary for public ownership with the BHA,
U Mass and the City donating land." Marketing strategies for
the new residential development would "focus on the growing
middle and upper-income sector demand for housing." 118 The
City also expected the development to increase the property
values on the peninsula and thereby increase the City's tax base.
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The BRA provided assistance in producing schematic drawings
and constructing a model of the new redevelopment plan.
The Boston Plan was announced by the Mayor in August, 1977.
The Plan first drew an indifferent response from the tenants,
who had become aware of it by reading the newspapers. They
just viewed it as another plan in a succession of plans, with
no more likelihood of being implemented and no different than
the 1974 Thompson Plan. Tenants were becoming accustomed
to being excluded from plans which never seemed to address their
needs and which had little potential for realization.
The Columbia Point tenants were not consulted during the
development of the plan, even though many tenants were actively
involved with the BHA modernization efforts underway at the
time. An initial response came from Gershon Ratner, GBLS
attorney in the Perez Case, who said that the demolition
proposed "doesn't respond to the need for low-income housing
in the City."120 The City and the Peninsula Planning Committee's
claim of tenant endorsement of the plan was attributed to the
participation of Charles Knowles, Executive Director of the
Columbia Point APAC, who had praised the plan. He did not
even live in the project.
On September 4, 1977, came the announcement of a "summit meeting"
for Columbia Point called jointly by Senator Edward Kennedy
and Representative Thomas O'Neill to launch efforts to obtain
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Figure 15: The 1977 Boston Plan, BRA Model
Figure 16: Proposed new marina and townhouse development
231
funds for the Boston Plan. Senator Kennedy, Governor Dukakis
Lieutenant Governor O'Neill, Mayor White, Representative
O'Neill, Speaker Thomas McGee, Senate President Harrington
and Peninsula Planning Committee members were present to
discuss two items: insuring federal funds for the Boston
Plan, in particular Columbia Point; and devising a mechanism
to manage and coordinate the peninsula's development.
The Boston Globe reported that it was the "first time that
such an array of political figures had gathered to unite
being a single project such as the Boston Plan's Columbia
Point development."121 Again, no tenants were invited, nor
informed of the meeting.
Three days later, Columbia Point tenants began holding major
community meetings in the development to discuss the Boston
Plan, specifically the issues of demolition, income-mix,
tenant employment and housing guarantees to present tenants.
Demands were made to the City and HUD to rehouse present
tenants, give them preferences for new units, and increase
housing subsidies and employment opportunities. On September 21,
1977, in a letter addressed to Governor Dukakis and attendees
of the "summit meeting," signed by Marjorie Hardiman, TPC
Chairman and Myra McAdoo, TPC Executive Director was the
following:
TPC formally protests the continuous planning for the
public housing at Columbia Point without any proper
tenant involvement. We also have a responsibility to
and for the 10,000 families on the current waiting
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lists. (With) the increasing need for affordable housing
for low income people, we have a commitment to increasing
the number of units available...
...We, and the tenants at Columbia Point, are increasingly
concerned that with the three groups now actively planning
for this area, the ultimate winners will be the financial
and development community--and the tourists. A majority
of the tenants at Columbia Point have now lived there
for ten or more years. THESE TENANTS WILL NOT MOVE OUT
OF COLUMBIA POINT. NOR WILL WE PERMIT MAJOR DEMOLITION
OF PUBLIC HOUSING UNITS. 122
Tenant's reactions were now so strong around the disclosures
of the plans for Columbia Point that on October 17, 1977, a
month later, at the TPC's Annual Meeting comprising all the
city-wide tenant Task Forces, the following resolution was
passed (see Appendix):
Be it known that the TPC, representing more than 60,000
tenants of Boston Public housing does hereby express
its complete and active opposition to any action which
would result in any reduction in the total number of
occupied or unoccupied rental units now administered
by the BHA.
TPC opposed any reduction of rental units in public
housing, at any development, or in subsidized housing
for any reason, unless compensated by the addition
of at least an equal number of new rental units--
either through subsidized housing or other public
housing programs.
Like all the other plans, the Boston Plan resulted in no
action, while conditions continued to deteriorate in the
development. In October 1977, only 453 family and elderly
households were still living in Columbia Point. This was
a decline of another 90 households from the year before. 123
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Some important precedents were established during this period.
To summarize, the Peninsula Planning Committee's Composite
Development Plan and the City's Boston Plan reiterated a com-
mitment to rehouse existing tenants and the creation of
a mixed-use and mixed-income environment on the peninsula
as outlined in the Thompson Plan. But instead of the commit-
ment in 1974 to rehouse 1,000 low-income households, only 420
households would now be provided for. The original proposal
for a 4,000 unit mixed-income development had been reduced to
1,500 units.
Both the Composite Development Plan and the Boston Plan laid
the basis for more detailed development issues on the extent
of demolition and disposition of the public housing site,
converting to private management, developing marketing strategies
for attracting middle and upper-income households, and
identifying individual parcels as public and private invest-
ment opportunities. The two plans, moreover, established a
rationale for private redevelopment of the public housing site,
which remains a dominant theme even now.
Columbia Point tenants were still excluded from the planning
process. But, as momentum and support of the plans developed
among private and public sector officials, the Columbia Point
tenants and the city-wide public housing tenants' organization,
the Tenants Policy Council protested the exclusion of tenants
from the planning process, and passed a resolution opposed to
the reduction of low-income units in Boston.
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THE COLUMBIA POINT COMMUNITY TASK FORCE
REVITALIZATION PLAN
Tenant Task Force Elections
In April 1978, Columbia Point tenants elected a new Tenant Task
Force which was to be the most active in bringing tenants into
the redevelopment process. Over 50% of the households voted in
the elections, a result of intense organizing work done by the
residents; TPC; Mark Goode, the Community Organizational
Specialist; and Stan Gibson, the Revitalization Director. For
the first time, an elected and representative tenants Task
Force was established at Columbia Point.
Until now tenants had been largely excluded from decision-making.
A combination of factors changed the climate for negotiation and
leverage to enable active participation from tenants. First,
the successful tenants' referendum on modernization spurred
momentum for the involvement of tenants in an organized fashion;
positive results for both the tenants and the BHA were attainable
from increased participation of the residents in decisions af-
fecting their housing and community. The progress made ufnder
the Target Projects Program, even if limited, had encouraged
tenants to be more active. Second, TPC continued to advocate for
tenants' input in all levels of decision-making in full aware-
ness that the interests of tenants would never be served unless
an active and vocal Task Force existed.
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Columbia Point was seen as a precedent for the rest of public
housing in the city. The results of redevelopment could have
serious implications for all public housing tenants. A cohesive
local tenant body was absolutely necessary since TPC could not
continue to play a central role in negotiating with the different
parties around planning for Columbia Point. Third, the Master's
Office and the TPP staff had supported the employment of tenants
in security, construction, and management positions and were able
to achieve increased tenant interest. And fourth, the Consent
Decree had been signed on May 8, 1977. This put pressure on the
BHA to perform in all aspects of management, including tenant
participation. HUD regulations under TPP and UI programs also
allowed for the funding of independent tenant activity.
The Tenants Policy Council announced the election of an eight
member Task Force with an additional seven elected auxiliary members.
The officers were Terry Mair, Chairman; Robert Rodriguez, Co-chair;
Ruby Jaundoo, Treasurer, and Annie Smith Lacy, Secretary. Regular
meetings were established with the Master's Office to discuss the
Special Orders; with management and TPP staff to discuss modern-
ization and ongoing concerns; and with BHA central office staff
and local social service agencies to keep abreast of any new
developments. The Task Force formed several working committees
after completing a training program dealing with the Task Force's
oversight responsibilities in such areas as BHA management and
maintenance, security tenant employment, social services and
planning for redevelopment. Special training sessions were
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conducted which covered aspects of housing management, subsidy
programs, tenant assignment procedures, budgets, information
on the Consent Decree, and updated information from BHA, BRA
and TPC, on the redevelopment efforts.
Part of the educational process led to a trip in May to King's
Lynne (formerly the America Park housing project, described in
Chapter 3), to visit the partially completed site. During this
trip, Task Force members were impressed with King's Lynne's
history and the recent redevelopment efforts. The Columbia
Point Task Force and the King's Lynne Residents Council entered
into a dialogue about the possibilities of redeveloping Columbia
Point in a similar manner. Eleanor Wessell, the King's Lynne
tenant leader came to speak at a Columbia Point Task Force
meeting. In June 1978, the Task Force took another trip to
King's Lynne.
This experience was to be an important turning point for the
Task Force who had little knowledge of a redevelopment effort
which encompassed not only the components of tenant decision
making, but also tenant ownership. In contrast to this,
the existing plans for Columbia Point lacked any significant
gains for tenants. As stated by Terry Mair:
Many of us feel that the present plans for Columbia Point
are disappointing, the modernization that is ongoing
needs to be re-evaluated as the community needs 124
something more substantial than a lick and a promise.
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In the Spring of 1978, the Peninsula Planning Committee as a group
had pretty much dissolved. Gordon Brigham, who had worked on
Columbia Point in the U Mass President's Office had left to work
for the City, heading up the Boston Plan. U Mass President
Wood, was one of the few PPC members how remained active. He
continued further efforts to establish a public entity or devel-
opment mechanism to proceed with implementation of the Boston
Plan. The PPC had already proposed 3 development options in a
July 22, 1977 memorandum from Paula Rosen, the PPC attorney,
to its members:
1. Establishing an urban renewal corporation.
2. Amending the Massport Authority Statute so as to
develop Columbia Point.
3. Establishing a Columbia Point Development Corporation as
a public corporation.1 25
Robert Wood backed the idea of enactment of a statute creating
a city agency or authority to deal exclusively with the develop-
ment of the peninsula by establishing a separate entity from the
BRA and BHA to handle Columbia Point. He even prepared the draft
legislation to be approved by the State Legislature. This al-
ternative would give the new entity unparalleled powers to
adquire parcels by eminent domain, grant 121A tax status, float
bonds, and essentially perform all functions of a state housing
agency without influence from the City, the Mayor.'s Office or the
City Council. It was to be modelled after New York's Urban
Development Corporation (UDC). But Mayor White did not like the
idea, and put a halt to any further activities in this direction.12 6
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With a dormant Peninsula Planning Committee, the BRA controlled
the planning process. Robert Walsh, the new BRA Administrator,
reputedly said that the BRA would "call the shots" from then on
as to what would happen on the peninsula. BHA who had up to now
taken a back seat in the process, finally said "no," after all
it was BHA who owned the housing site. Brendan Geraghty, the
Assistant Administrator for Planning, Development and Moderniza-
tion moved to establish BHA as co-partner in the process.127
Roland Burke had already left, and a new BHA Columbia Point
coordinator had to be hired. The Planning Department was
restructured so that the new coordinator would be responsible
directly to the Assistant Administrator. In the Spring of 1978,
the BHA and BRA proceeded with negotiations on a joint develop-
ment plan.
The Columbia Point Survey and Planning Program
The "Columbia Point Survey and Planning Program" undertaken by
the BRA and BHA was to encompass the work items needed for im-
plementation of the Boston Plan. It became necessary to acquire
planning funds for a work plan which included: market studies
for moderate and market-rate housing, an assessment of the availa-
bility of housing subsidy programs, a market study, for the
Bayside Mall and other commercial parcels, transporation studies,
sub-soil analyses and other studies. In carrying out the work
plan, the BRA and the BHA agreed to sharing information, holding
regular meetings, and consulting each other prior to any funding
submissions. 12 8 If disagreements surfaced, immediate efforts
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made to resolve them. These measures were taken to prevent either
agency from "taking over" the redevelopment process. Each agency
recognized the other's "legal responsibilities and legitimate
rights" with regard to the development of the peninsula.
The work items were divided into two parts: the revitalization
of the existing public housing project and the development of
"contiguous areas for recreation, commercial and housing users."
BHA was responsible for the public housing site, including
an analysis of the physical conditions, the resident population,
tenant composition, the demand for low-income family and elderly
housing, ownership options, financing mechanism for subsidized
housing, and the different management techniques. Included as
part of its task, BHA was to analyze alternative "replacement
housing" for low-income units lost through redevelopment. 12 9
The BRA tasks included overall urban design of the peninsula,
project inventory, housing market analysis for the entire site,
environmental, transportation and air quality studies, develop-
ment potentials, and financial feasibility.
On March 16, 1978, a joint letter signed by Robert Walsh,
Director of the BRA and Kevin Feeley, Acting Administrator of
the BHA, was sent to HUD Secretary Patricia Harris to inform her
of two agencies cooperation in comprehensive planning and ap-
proximately $1 million would enable the agencies to carry out
the Survey and Planning Program over a two year period.130
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This package to HUD contained two important elements of the
City and BHA's policy on redevelopment:
Any demolition of conventional public housing units
cannot be implemented in isolation to the housing
policy and needs of the City of Boston as a whole.
Accordingly, Boston's plan for the peninsula proposed
that every unit which is demolished or otherwise not
available for low-income housing purposes be replaced
by an alternative unit of low-income family housing some-
where in the City of Boston. As part of the survey and
planning process, the City and BHA will develop a city-
wide policy that assures through the location of units
and administrati 91of subsidy that such replacement units
can be created.
An agreed upon task by the two parties was for the BHA to take
prime responsibility for organizing and directing a planning
process which would investigate "alternative methods of
achieving a viable socially integrated residential community
adequately serving the needs of low-income families and other
residents ," this included:
In the event that the development alternative finally
selected represents less low-income housing than
presently exists in the Columbia Point development
(1,504), alternative replacement low-income family
housing units must be provided within the City of
Boston. These units must be in addition to the level
of units which would otherwise be received.
The various methods by which this commitment could be
met, (either by developing or obtaining such units
through subsidized or public housing, new construction,
rehabilitation, Section 8 certificates, etc.) must
be analysed and evaluated. This planning process should
be conducted in a joint manner between BHA and BRA.1 32
Even though the requested funds were not awarded by HUD because
of the imminent funding of the Urban Initiatives Program, the
work plan was nevertheless undertaken by the BHA and BRA in
the succeeding months, that is all items except for replacement
housing. 241
The Goody and Clancy Plan
Continuing relations between the Columbia Point Tenant Task
Force and residents at King's Lynne eventually led to the Task
Force contact with the firm of Corcoran, Mullins and Jennison,
Inc. (CMJ), the co-developer with the tenants of King's Lynne.
CMJ proceeded to work with the Task Force in formulating a
suitable plan. The architectural firm of Goody and Clancy was
brought on to develop with the tenants an overall concept and
design for the public housing and the adjoining sites. The
result was "Harbor Park: A Proposal for the Redevelopment
of Columbia Point." It was modelled after King's Lynne with the
Columbia Point Tenant Task Force and CMJ as co-developers.
The collaboration between CMJ and the Task Force almost led to
the designation of CMJ as sole developer in the awarding of
Urban Initiative funds to Columbia Point. Joan Goody had spent
several weeks with the Task Force developing the site plan and
the building and unit design; Joe Mullins was a friend of the
BHA Board Chairman Barbara Carpenter; meetings between CMJ
and Steve Coyle at HUD took place; and John Connolly, a BHA
Board member, and others supported CMJ as developer for the site.
For a period it looked as though CMJ might be "wired into" the
UI program, and have a likely chance of being designated the
developer for the rest of the housing parcels on the peninsula. 133
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The Harbor Park plan contained the following elements:
o Development of a mixed-income residential community on a
50 acre site including the BHA site, the northern shore-
line, and part of the U Mass property.
o Substantial rehabilitation and new construction with
retention of all existing low-rises for renovation
into family housing would take place.
o Approximately 8 mid-rises would be demolished and the re-
maining 6 mid-rise buildings would be used for elderly
housing. 192 units of new townhouses would be constructed
on the easterly side of the site, and 6 high-rise towers
would be located near the shoreline.
o Low-rises would contain duplexes with separate ground floor
entrances. Fourth floors and balconies were to be added
to the buildings for stacked duplexes of 3, 4, and 5 bedroom
units. The wings of the buildings were to contain 2 bedroom
units and new exterior stairs.
o Mid-rises would contain 1 and 2 bedroom units for elderly
and adult households with the existing 3 bedroom units
converted to three elderly units.
o New townhouse family units would consist of 2 stories,
two to four bedroom units facing onto pedestrian paths
or walkways . Parking would be removed from the units.
All townhouse units were to have private back yards
and balconies.
o The construction of community and service facilities would
include an elderly service center, an adult educational/
cultural center, a daycare center, and play area, large
outdoor play spaces, a swimming pool to be added to the
existing recreation center, and a beach and a marina.
o Street patterns would be arranged diagonally from Mt.
Vernon Street to the shoreline. A new road would be
constructed along the shore.1 34
The plan did not receive support from the staff at BHA, the
only group skirted by CMJ's lobbying effort. This included
Brendan Geraghty and Kevin Feeley, who wanted to submit several
letters not just CMJ's showing developers' interest in the site
so as to insure competition in the selection process. Friction
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developed between the Task Force, who wanted the CMJ designation
and the BHA staff who did not want to name a sole developer.1 35
Differences were also apparent between the BHA staff and the
various BHA Board members who were in favor of CMJ.
The Urban Initiatives application which was submitted by BHA
in August 1878 finally contained several letters of interest from
other developers. This a clear affront to the Task Force and CMJ
who already had completed work on a partnership proposal. 136
The Task Force was back at step one now that a developer selection
process would have to take place prior to the awarding of a
contract. Even though the Harbor Park Plan did not receive
serious consideration due to the politics surrounding its
introduction, it was the first time in any of the proposals that
a more detailed and realistic plan was proposed showing actual
unit design;a concept for the redesign and adaptation of
existing buildings; and an attempt at producing a cohesive
site plan for the residential community. This was also the
first time tenants were directly involved in the formulation
of plans for the housing development. The tenants were to
learn quickly from this unsuccessful experience.
The Urban Initiative Proposal
Steve Coyle, Assistant to the Secretary of HUD and a former
Director of the Dedham Housing Authority, had created the
Urban Initiatives Program with Columbia Point in mind.137
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The BHA Urban Initiatives application requested funding
for Bromley-Heath and Orchard Park in addition to Columbia
Point, but HUD was to single out Columbia Point.
The BHA application as originally proposed requested funds
for housing rehabilitation and made only brief references to
private redevelopment. The total request for $10.7 million
was for rehabilitating all of the low-rises, a few of the mid-
rises, and landscaping to create a basis for a stable community. 138
Low-rises were to contain vertical breakthroughs for duplex
units on the ground floor. The rehabilitation improvements
proposed for the low-rise section of the development included:
o Extensive modernization of buildings including design
modifications to provide optimum security and sur-
veillance opportunities for tenants. Modernization of
apartments will include breakthroughs and other measures
to increase the amount of living space available and to
reduce overcrowding.
o Major new landscaping and exterior construction to create
a hierarchy of public and private spaces and a sense of
community and security for tenants.
o Rehabilitation of unused space in existing buildings to
accomodate service or nted uses for tenants (small grocery
and drug store operated by a community development
corporation).
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Although the requested $10 million figure was a hold over
from the previous BHA request, the unsuccessful "October
Plan," HUD wanted to grant BHA only $8 million until
Senator Brooke, Senator Kennedy and Representative Moakley
supported the retention of the $10 million. As a result,
Columbia Point received one of the highest per unit allocations
of the more than 30 "troubled" developments selected nationally.13 9
The announcement of the Urban Initiatives award in September
1978, brought forth the following response from Terry Mair,
Task Force Chairman, "I'm overjoyed, it's a step towards
progress. Columbia Point should be the place most envied by
every neighborhood in the City. It'll be a privileged place
to live in a mini-capital of Boston." David Carter, Columbia
Point Coordinator, succinctly summarized BHA's plan: "We
see the tenants as the key to the success of the entire strategy.
They and we want to create a mixed-income community." 140
But for the tenants, the award still brought no assurances of
tenant input. The lesson learned by the Task Force from the
Harbor Park experience was that it was futile to place their
energy in design issues until such time as tenants can control
part of the planning and decision making.
The Columbia Point Redevelopment Agreement
After the Harbor Park affair, relations between the Task Force
and BHA rapidly deteriorated. By late fall, the Task Force was
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working with the assistance of Greater Boston Community
Development (GBCD), to achieve a greater role for tenants in
the redevelopment process. GBCD had also provided technical
assistance to the tenants of King's Lynne. GBCD agreed to work
for the Columbia Point Tenant Task Force and to defer payment
until such time as a Task Force budget was approved by BHA.
The Task Force incorporated itself in December of 1978 as the
Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc. so as to be able to
receive funds, contract for services, and assume the role of a
development entity. 4 The Task Force's work concentrated on
seeking a legally binding agreement with the BHA to guarantee
the Task Force certain rights in representation and negotiation,
establish the terms on tenant input, and to require the BHA to
seek concurrence with the Task Force prior to any decisions
in redeveloping the housing project.142 This was to include
any expenditure of funds. In the proposed agreement, a schedule
for issuing the developer's selection kit was included, as was
an agreement for BHA to fund a Task Force budget.
The terms of a BHA/Task Force agreement became the major subject
of weekly meetings of the Columbia Point Coordinating Committee,
a committee initiated by BHA with representation from BHA's
field and central offices, the Task Force, and later the BRA,
to deal with management and maintenance concerns and planning
for redevelopment. 14 3 But, during this period, BHA became un-
responsive on reaching an agreement with the Task Force, as
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they did not want to provide the tenants with a budget so that
they could hire GBCD. GBCD was a source of contention since
the Court-Appointed Master was its former Executive Director.
BHA maintained that the Task Force should not select consultants
who might be in a position to influence BHA in its official
duties, 44 but BHA also did not respond to the Task Force's
request for assistance with the consultant selection process,
nor did they supply any guidelines or criteria.145 Revisions
in the Task Force's by-laws were also insisted on by BHA, who
felt that they were seriously flawed and open to potential abuse. 146
On December 18, 1978, Terry Mair, Task Force President, addressed
a letter to Barbara Carpenter, Chairman of the BHA Board, stating
that implementation of UI was in jeopardy because of the refusal
of the Authority to agree to a reasonable basis for tenant in-
volvement. 47 The elected Task Force had supported the UI pro-
posal back in August with the understanding that tenants had the
right to approve decisions on the expenditure of any funds and
that funding for technical support to the Task Force would be
provided. The letter stated that BHA refused to agree to any
role for the Task Force despite four months of work to reach a
written agreement, and backed off solely based on GBCD's in-
volvement with the Task Force: "we are seriously concerned
that BHA wants the form of a major tenant role but is not pre-
pared to live with the substance of that tenant involvement."
The letter continued to say that unless an agreement is reached
and signed, the Task Force will "oppose BHA going forward with
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the UI program here. We have so notified HUD in writing
today."148 Enclosed along with this letter was the 3rd draft
of an agreement for BHA to-sign.
BHA was still reluctant to sign the agreement, but in a letter
from Kevin Feeley to the Task Force, BRA agreed to enter into a
contract with the Task Force for technical assistance as long
as the BHA Board approved the selection of the Task Force's
consultant. The Task Force was to interview a number of con-
sultants, including a minority firm prior to making their deci-
sion.149 The message was clear, BHA did not want GBCD to be hired.
In the meantime, the BHA/Task Force agreement still remained un-
signed. But as time passed, BHA became eager to proceed with an
agreement so that a developer's kit could be issued by February 20,
1979. BHA was also under pressure from HUD to get things
moving. At the same time, BHA knew that without such an agree-
ment, they could take a chance and issue a kit on their own.
So without first consulting the Task Force, BHA sent to HUD
a draft developer's kit titled a "Request for Qualifications
and Site Analysis: Columbia Point Housing Development and
Adjacent Parcels." 150 This caused considerable outrage from
not only the Task Force,but also the City, who did not approve
of BHA soliciting on non-BHA parcels without their approval.
BHA was to pay dearly for this.
249
In a letter to Kevin Feeley, January 22, 1979, the Task Force
again insisted on the full participation of tenants, the right
of the Task Force to jointly select a developer with BHA and
BRA, and for no actions to be taken until a "detailed plan"
for the total housing site on the peninsula was agreed upon
between the Task Force, BHA and BRA. What had originally been
a BHA and Task Force agreement, now became a three party agreement'
The Task Force enclosed another draft of an agreement for both
the BHA and BRA to consider. 151
The inclusion of BRA as party to the agreement from now on was
to "haunt" BHA; a game of two parties teaming up against the
third was to set a trend for the negotiating style that followed.
Now BHA was also under pressure from BRA to sign so as to get
the redevelopment process underway. It is widely believed that
the real reason BHA finally signed the agreement was because
Tarry Mair addressed the BHA Board and said the Task Force was
no longer pressing for the hiring of GBCD as their consultants. 152
The BHA Chairman signed the agreement on February 21, 1979.
The three party agreement, known at the Columbia Point Peninsula
Redevelopment Agreement was signed by Terry Mair, President
of the Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc; Kevin Feeley,
Acting Administrator of BHA; and Robert Ryan, Director of the
BRA. The agreement contained the following:
1. All residents of Columbia Point on or after July 1, 1977,
who wish to remain will be provided decent housing on the
peninsula with housing costs not to exceed 25% of their
income.
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2. The First Phase of redevelopment shall include to the
maximum extent possible the revitalization of the existing
public housing development and the provision of decent
housing for current residents.
3. The Task Force, as the representative organization for
residents of the peninsula, will be joint participants in
the modernization, development and operation of all new
and rehabilitated housing on the peninsula.
4. All housing will be planned to accommodate a mixture of
residents with income, within each part to the extent
legally permissable, in a fashion which provides as good
a living environment for lower income people as for those
of upper income.
5. The Task Force will participate in the selection of a
developer for the BHA parcel with the final decision to
be made by the BHA Board.
6. The parties agree that the extent of demolition on the
public housing site shall be carried out only after the
agreement of the Task Force and the BHA to that demoli-
tion as consistant with an overall plan for the Peninsula
that effectively meets current and future residents' needs.
7. At the earliest possible date, management of the public
housing development shall be transferred from BHA to a
private firm.
8. The Task Force, BHA and BRA would agree to the details
of an overall plan, including income mix, location of
new and rehabilitated housing and the schedule of develop-
ment.
9. Social and community services, and Job training should be
provided for the current residents. 53
Preparation of the next developer selection kit and completion
of outstanding work items were due by the end of March, so that
the kit could be released in April. Developer's proposals were
to be received by July 1, and the developer or development team
designated by July 31.154
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The Coordinating Committee continued the process of reviewing
the work items, including the retail and market housing studies
prepared by the BRA and an assessment of low and moderate-
income housing needs prepared by the BHA. The Committee also
reviewed a proposal for the new MBTA Quincy Station, and prepared
the Task Force budget and contract to be approved by the BHA
Board.
During this period, BHA contracted the architectural firm of
Steffian Bradley Associates to do a limited study on the feasi-
bility of rehabilitating the existing buildings. This was to
include ideas for opening up the ground floors of the buildings,
redesigning living quarters and exploring alternatives to
massive demolition. Solutions for redesigning the mid-rises
were to be developed. The consultants were to explore possibi-
lities for vertical breakthroughs in the low-rise as well as on
the ground floor of the mid-rises. They were also to study the
use of facade treatments such as balconies and different
materials to break up the surface of the orange brick exteriors
and change their appearance.155
By March 1979 a letter was sent from Brandan Geraghty to Marvin
Siflinger stating that progress was being made by the parties.156
The Task Force was to be a joint developer with the private
development entity, the anticipated schedule for release of
the kit was still April, a developer would be designated by
July, and an estimated $50 to $60 million would be needed for
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redevelopment. BHA then requested from HUD a waiver of contract
bidding procedures for developer selection in favor of a deve-
loper review process which would include input from the BRA
and the Task Force.
By the end of March, the BHA Board approved $7,000 in seed money
for the Task Force with a full budget of $82,000 to be approved
by the Board at a later date. Throughout this period, the Task
Force was working with BHA and Steffian Bradley Associates on
design issues, and they also worked separately with the urban
design firm of Carr, Lynch Associates to develop their own version
of a redevelopment plan for the BHA and adjoining sites.
This was done without informing BHA and BRA.
In order to meet the deadline for issuing the developer selection
kit, the Coordinating Committee decided to informally solicit
opinions from developers, builders and architects on the
attractiveness of developing mixed-income housing and services
at Columbia Point.1 5 7 The initial feedback from firms such as
F.D. Rich, State Street Development, Stull Associates, Peabody
Construction, Cruise Construction, Housing Innovations, etc., was
positive. It was felt that a private developer should be brought
on as soon as possible with the immediate expenditure of the
UI monies. Even though a demand existed for market-housing,
recial and income mix have to be carefully planned. Simultaneous
development should start on the BHA and other sites and market
housing started in the rehabilitated units. As the anticipated
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market rents for new housing were anywhere from $400 to $700
monthly, other forms of ownership and financing such as Section
8, cooperative housing, and home-ownership programs were tbbe
considered for the low-income component.
By now the Coordinating Committee had been meeting extensively,
but was still unable to reach consensus on the following issues:
the range of unit sizes, building mix, the range of demolition,
the definition of income levels, income mix, and the location
for new units. The role of the Task Force, the review process
for developer selection, interim management and who was to be
rehoused, were other sensitive issues that were still unresolved
because of the diverse perspectives of the three parties.
The "threat" of any one party dropping out of the process kept
up the pressure to reach an agreement.
Different strategies were adopted by each party in the negotia-
tions. The Task Force wanted to tie in the development of the
adjacent non-BHA owned properties with the public housing site
to insure the construction of low-income housing throughout
the peninsula.158 The tenants wanted sufficient numbers of low-
income family housing to be provided in newly constructed
townhouses so as not to be confined to rehabilitated units in
the housing project. Cooperation with the City and the BRA
was necessary for the urban renewal designation, for packaging
the adjoining sites, and providing the necessary public im-
provements and investments for large scale redevelopment.
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If BRA or the City pulled out of the redevelopment effort,
there was sure to be no future development on the peninsula--
further jeopardizing any improvements to the housing project.
The City could just wait another few years until all low-income
tenants had moved and then redevelop the total site for market-
rate housing.
The BRA wanted to see market-rate housing constructed, but
market-rate housing could not succeed on the peninsula as long
as the public housing remained in its present condition. The
image of the peninsula had to be significantly changed by re-
developing the public housing. Furthermore, the public housing
site was the largest developable parcel and well situated. It
provided an inexpensive and scarce source of prime land if
the City could get BHA to dispose of it. In any case, if
private development could take place on a major portion of the
BHA site, it could result in a large number of moderate and
market-rate housing. In addition, the use of the $10 million
UI monies and other public funds could leverage substantial
private investments on the peninsula.
The threat to both the City and the Task Force was the pos-
sibility of BHA abandoning the joint development process and re-
developing the public housing site on its own. But BHA
was already reputed for its inability to maintain or manage,
let alone redevelop its properties. It was further under the
dictate of the Mayor who appointed 4 of the 5 BHA Board members.
Therefore, it was unlikely for BHA to take any leadership.
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Even if BHA wanted to proceed with redeveloping the housing site
by itself, it still needed the tenants approval and sign-off
for the use of the UI funds, and it needed additional funding
from HUD.
The BHA, with its history of negligence and indifference towards
tenants, didn't see any reasons to maintain public housing,
especially if it could "acceptably" relinquish its responsi-
bilities through disposition, private management and other means.
Thus, while willing to give lip service to "low-income housing
needs," it had basically already aquiesced to the City's program
for the development of the housing site. But unlike the other
parties, BHA was also accountable to HUD, its parent organiza-
tion, who did have concerns about the final impact of any re-
development scheme on the low-income housing population, and to
the availability of low-income housing, the unit type, ownership
and demolition.
The three parties with widely divergent interests were thus
juggling the issues of income mix, the number of family and
elderly units, how to phase construction, etc., to arrive at
some sort of compromise to keep the planning process intact.
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The Columbia Point Community Task Force Plan
On June 13, 1979, the Columbia Point Community Task Force un-
veiled their proposal for the peninsula: "The Columbia Point
Revitalization Plan," to the BHA, BRA, TPC, and the Master's
Office. With the assistance of Carr, Lynch Associates, and GBCD,
the Task -Force developed the "first plan of the revitalization
of Columbia Point prepared by its residents." The plan was to
meet the needs of current residents and help them make decisions
on the most appropriate ways of using the funds. The result
of 3 months of intensive work, the Task Force saw its plan as
an important step in the joint work process and as a basis for
continuing negotiations with the BHA and BRA.
The written report, a 130 page document known as the "Green Book"
(it has a green cover) was issued in July. The Plan contained
the following elements:
o Development of 1,250 units of mixed-income housing with 770
units of family housing (64%), and 480 units of elderly
housing (36%).
o Income mix is established with a minimum of 37.5% low
income, 37.5% low to moderate income, and 25% market
income. A minimum of 450 low-income units would be
provided to honor the February 21, 1979 Agreement to the
Columbia Point tenants.
o Development would proceed in 3 phases over an 8 year period:
Phase 1 is to take place on the easterly portion of the site,
including the BHA site and adjoining area near the pumphouse,
and contain 568 new and rehabilitated units. Phase 2
encompasses the remaining portion of the BHA site with the
development of 257 units of rehabilitated and new townhouse
apartments. Phase 3 would develop an additional 325 units
of housing primarily for adult (childless) households in
two towers on the rear portion of the Bayside Mall site.
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o The development would be owned and managed by a limited
parnership in which the Task Force would be a co-general
partner with a private developer.
o Existing families would be rehoused as soon as possible in
the new townhouses, in 253 or 45% of the 568 units in Phase 1.
o Sixteen of the total 27 buildings would be demolished or
partially demolished. 822 units would be lost and
493 rehabilitated from the 1,504 existing units.
o Use of the $11.2 million of UI and Modernization funds
would be for Phase 1. This would include rehabilitation,
demolition, a three year interim management program and
landscaping.
o Substantial income mix would be achieved through both owner-
ship and rental housing with the use of Section 235, Section 8,
moderate and market homeownership, low-income cooperatives
and other subsidy programs.
o Market level rents were estimated to be $615 per month for
a one-bedroom rehabilitated unit for the elderly, $540
for a one-bedroom unit in new construction walk-up, and
$768 to $1,080 for 3 to 6 bedrooms new construction, town-
houses.
o To accomplish 25% market rate income mix, the Task Force
felt that a reasonable goal would be 10% market housing in
Phase 1 which would increase to 50% by, Rase 3 so as to
gradually develop a market over time.
The comprehensiveness of the Task Force plan is demonstrated by
the inclusion of an overall site plan, a model, general program
and planning requirements for the housing site, a survey of
resident housing needs, housing design guidelines and a develop-
ment program encompassing construction phasing, subsidy programs
and implementation strategies. This was the most comprehensive
plan proposed by any of the parties. But, as with all the
preceeding plans, it also contained problems as to its adequacy
in meeting the needs of low-income residents.
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In May, 1979, prior to their presentation, the Task Force,
with the assistance of Gayle Epp, produced a "Resident
Needs Survey" to evaluate current housing conditions and
to identify specific needs of the tenants in the new
environment. This information laid the basis for some of
the recommendations presented in the Green Book. The results
of the survey, based on interviews with 71 Columbia Point residents,
called for some of the following modifications to -he apartment
units: a generously dimensioned kitchen, partially or fully
separated separated dining/family rooms, and a separate living
room. Larger units should contain half-baths, more storage
space, and living space on the ground floor with the bedrooms
above.160 As to landscaping and open space, residents preferred
designated areas for community and recreational use: sitting
areas for adults, playgrounds, tot lots, defined green space
and areas for enjoyment of the waterfront, instead of sprawling,
undifferentiated open spaces.
In analyzing the unit-to-ground relation, the Survey found that
50% of the families in the low-rises preferred living on the
second floor and 25% on the third floor because it was safer,
more private and had less traffic. 25% preferred the first floor
because they had difficulty climbing stairs or it was convenient
for their children. While this showed the same preference for
living on the first and third floor, the Survey concluded that
"the majority of families responding indicated a preference for
living on the first and second floor of a building," thus a
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recommendation was made in the Green Book that as many units
as possible should be located at or near the ground floor.161
Statistically, even though the residents voiced an equal desire
for the first and third floor (25% in each category), the Survey
did not conclude that the majority of residents preferred to live
on the second and third floor.
Other problems were revealed in the Survey. For example, the
conditions of families living in the mid-rise buildings were
not adequately addresses. The Survey did not comment on the
factors affecting the desirability of mid-rise living based
on interviews with the residents, but made a prior assumption
that mid-rise living was unsatisfactory. Efforts were not made
to ascertain the relation of family size, family composition,
or children's age with preferences for floor levels. Factors
such as the desire for direct access to the units from the
ground floor may well have been a response to the poor manage-
ment and maintenance, and other problems such as the lack of
security, than direct ground access being itself a crucial
factor for family living. (See discussion in Chapter 1.)
The Resident Needs Survey is incomplete and ambiguous in cer-
tain areas, nevertheless, it is the first attempt in the his-
tory of planning at Columbia Point that current needs and
residents satisfaction were documented. The Survey is a
commendable achievement for the Task Force as the Thompson Plan
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and the Boston Plan did not collect or analyze any data reflecting
residents' needs. Unfortunately, it is in the translation and
interpretation of the Survey that the weakness of the Green
Book is revealed. The design and site plan have little to do
with a rationale understanding of the tenants' needs or with
a realistic solution for low-income housing.
The Task Force's housing objectives were to: (1) Create an
attractive mixed-income family housing environment at
Columbia Point; (2) provide decent and affordable housing
as soon as possible to meet the current residents' needs; and
(3) to maintain "a substantial commitment emobdied in the initial
development of public housing at Columbia Point.162 While these
are laudible goals, it is questionable that the results of the
plan proposed in the Green Book are consistent with these.
To achieve a "predominantly low-rise, family oriented community"
the following decisions were made: demolish or "top" most of
the mid-rises, create a community of garden apartments and walk-
ups of the existing low-rises and 2 or 3 story new construction
townhouses, and maintain a few of the existing mid-rises for the
elderly.163 All units with three or more bedrooms would have
direct ground access and small semi-private outdoor space.
The old and new units should resemble "homes" with pitched roofs,
entrance porches, balconies, and so on. A low density develop-
ment with extensive landscaping and sprawling greenery could
then transform the present image of the development and make
the site attractive for mixed-income housing.
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Here is a look at some of the planning principles presented
in the Task Force Plan:
1. There must be no visually distinct buildings or areas
for one income group or racial group.164
While this appears to be a desirable and enlightened goal for
total income and racial integration, it is unlikely that
this can be achieved with the existing subsidy programs. In
order to meet this goal would require getting rid of the
public housing units--the most stable form of low-income
housing, because it does not provide for broad income mix or for
market housing. The use of Section 8 appears to be a solution,
but insufficient funds exist to maintain the number of low
and moderate-income units proposed in the Plan. This goal
is therefore unrealistic. Furthermore, the benefits of total
social mix are questionable (see discussion in Chapter 7).
2. There should be no separate areas of the development and
"no sharp visible differentiation between old and new
buildings." Functional and visual continuity should be
provided.165
The Plan proposes that for old and new buildings to have consis-
tent use patterns and massing, it requires the "thinning out"
and demolition of many of the buildings. New townhouses would
then be evenly distributed throughout the site. Design contin-
uity requires brick exteriors and similar materials to be
used for both the new and old buildings.166 Therefore,
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while some of the old buildings are taken down, new ones are
built to resemble the remaining old ones. The distribution
of new townhouses "evenly" across the site would mean addition-
al demolition. This principle calls for the demolition of
many buildings which could otherwise be rehabilitated. It
also makes little sense to create new buildings to look like
the old ones.
3. "A single, connected circulati o 6gystem" should be
provided for the new community.
The proposed street system has streets running through
existing buildings--resulting in considerable demolition.
No clear rationale is made for the radical restructuring of
the streets except to provide a single, long winding street
so that the access points can be controlled for security
reasons.
4. There should be a "continuous and ample flow of green
open space, ... areas behind buildings should be treated
as open, generally unencumbered, common greens."167
These areas are to include "winding paths between clumps of
evergreen or decideous trees, where picnic tables might be
located."1 68 While this conjures up a suburban like
setting, the Plan also states that "the active use by child-
ren and families will be intense enough to warrant initial
sodding rather than seeding of the greens." 1 69 It appears
questionable that the open space will remain "green." Undif-
ferentiated and uncontrolled open spaces behind the buildings
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could lead to security and surveillance problems.
Internal inconsistencies are revealed in the Plan. The attempt
is made to replicate suburban housing: tree-lined streets,
and expanses of green space, but insufficient area appears
to have been provided even with the demolition proposed. One
can more easily imagine "patches" of grass and fields of dirt'
Even more demolition should take place to gain more space,
or a different "model" used than that of suburban housing.
The Plan is also inconsistent with resident preference for
defined open space, as shown by the Resident Needs Survey.
In the Green Book, the present site is decribed as too dense
for successful family living. Except for buildings designated
for the elderly, all seven-story mid-rises will be partially
taken down or totally demolished. Even some of the low-rises
are slated for demolition. One questions the decision to de-
molish and then build new units, unless new space requirements
cannot be accomodated in the existing buildings or they have
been deemed infeasible to rehabilitate. Many of the changes
cited by the tenants in the Resident Needs Survey look as
though they could be incorporated into the existing buildings.
Some of the changes could include creating larger kitchens
and living spaces, vertical and horizontal breakthroughs,
extensive landscaping, inaddition to overhousing families,
are some of the changes that can be made. This can serve to
decrease density without demolition, and make use of the
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existing buildings. Even the Task Force Plan testifies to the
feasibility of rehabilitation and to the adaptability of the
buildings to redesign:
The buildings are of first class construction with rein-
forced concrete columns . . . fortunately, the inter-
ior walls are not load bearing, so that the building
interiors may be gutted and redesigned to provide a
apartments of adequate size . . .
. . . townhouse units are the most difficult to develop
from a feasibility perspective, given today's construc-
tion costs, available housing program guidelines, and
the particular soil condition. 171
The extensive use of breakthroughs and duplex units in the
low-rises as well as the lower stories of the mid-rises
is a logical followthrough of the Task Force's own findings.
Instead, the Task Force Plan calls for the demolition of
822 units, or 55% of the existing units, and construction
of 757 new units.1 72
The intensive work between the Task Force members and their
consultants took place with little input from the larger
Columbia Point community. The Green Book was widely
distributed to those concerned with the redevelopment of
Columbia Point, e.g., HUD, the City and the BRA, as
representing the tenants' position, whereas most of the
Columbia Point tenants remained uninformed as to the Plan's
content. They might have been one of the families surveyed,
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but they had no prior knowledge of a plan proposing demolition
of more than half of the development and the conversion to private
ownership and management.
The BHA Plan
On June 15, 1979, three days after the presentation of the Task
Force Plan, the "Steffian Bradley/BHA Re-Use Program for
Existing BHA Columbia Point Buildings" was presented. This was
an unintentional counter proposal to the Task Force Plan.
The BHA/Steffian Bradley Plan (hereafter called the BHA Plan),
proposed some ideas for creative adaptation and rehabilitation
of the existing buildings more in line with the objectives
and feasibility of redeveloping the BHA site as public
housing. The objectives and feasibility of the study was
limited in scope as it was not intended to present a total
development program for the peninsula and was quickly over-
shadowed by the Task Force plan. The following are the compo-
nents of the BHA plan. 1 73
o The proposed development of a total of 856 revitalized
family and elderly units on the BHA site. This in-
cluded housing for 408 family and 448 elderly house-
holds (See Table 8).
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Table 8: Proposed Units: BHA/Steffian Bradley Re-Use Program
Family Housing
Number of Units Unit Size
69 5 bedroom
80 4 bedroom
104 3 bedroom
151 2 bedroom
4 1 bedroom
408 Units of Family Housing
Elderly Housing
Number of Units Unit Size
224 2 bedroom
224 1 bedroom
448 Units of Elderly Housing
Source: BHA, "Steffian Bradley/BHA Re-Use Program for Existing
Columbia Point Buildings," June 15, 1979.
o Large family units will be provided in the low-rises in
duplexes on the ground floor and small family units will
be provided on the third floor. Some of the mid-rise
buildings will be brought down to 4 stories and will
contain stacked duplexes with separate entrances on the
ground floor for families with children and small apart-
ments on the upper floors for adult families.
o Elderly housing will be contained in 6 seven story buildings
with new elevators, enlarged lobby space, balconies, new
interior treatment and fixtures. Some interior walls will
be moved to create larger units with fewer bedrooms.
o Two elderly buildings will be joined by new construction
and reworked as a single-loaded corridor building. An
interior courtyard will be constructed between the
buildings.
o Demolition would consist of total demolition of 6 seven
story buildings and partial demolition of 4 buildings.
A total of 460 units will be lost through demolition and
188 by consolidation.
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0 All units will be retained by BHA and managed either by
BHA or under contract to tenant/developer entity managing
adjacent housing on other parcels.
o Cost estimates for rehabilitation were $33,284, per
family unit and $28,500 per elderly unit. These were
in contrast to new construction townhouses estimated at
$53,000 per unit.
On the critical issue of demolition, the Task Force plan pro-
posed that at least 820 units be demolished compared with 450
units in the BHA plan. The BHA plan maintains most of the project
as public housing (with low and moderate-income mix) and
an option for contracting out management and services. The
Task Force plan calls for disposition of the majority of the
site to a partnership between the private developer and the
Task Force. In addition, the two plans provided significantly
different approaches in the reuse and rehabilitation of the
existing buildings. The BHA plan proposed a solution for
using the lower stories of the mid-rises for family housing,
and did not propose any major changes in restructuring the
streets and site. From a design perspective, the BHA plan
addressed many of the concerns raised in the Resident Needs
Survey through rehabilitation instead of demolition and new
construction. (See Appendix.)
During this period, BHA had also contracted the services of
Dan Walker of Commonwealth Design, Inc. to estimate the feasibi-
lity of rehabilitation versus new construction. 74 In 1979
a new construction unit at Columbia Point was estimated at
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$66,000, and rehabilitation at an average of $32,900 per unit.
This ranged from $28,000 for an elderly unit, to $37,600 for
a large family duplex unit. Demolition was estimated at $1.55
per cubic foot for total demolition. David Carter, the
Columbia Point Redevelopment Director, took these base estimates
and applied them to the Task Force's proposal for rehabilitation
of 360 existing units, construction of 78 new units and demoli-
tion of 3 buildings for Phase 2. The Task Force's total cost
of construction and demolition came to $17.4 million with an
average cost of $39,646 per unit. The cost per family unit
being $44,891.175
BHA then proposed an alternative plan for Phase 2 by rehabi-
litating 602 existing units (242 more units than the Task Force),
construction of 58 new units (20 units less than the Task Force),
and demolition of 2 buildings (1 building less than the Task
Force). Also using Dan Walker's estimates for construction and
demolition, the total cost for the BHA alternative came to $21
million, but had a lower average cost of $34,953 per unit.
The cost per family unit being $40,683.176 (See Appendix.)
For the whole public housing site (Phase 1A and 2), the BHA
alternative proposed a lower cost per unit and retention of
1,048 total units in comparison to the Task Force's 824 units. 177
The BHA alternative also called for demolishing 456 units compared
with 680 in the Task Force plan. This information presented
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a strong case for rehabilitation as opposed to demolition of
the existing units, but BHA did not actively advocate for their
own plan and as a result, did little to redirect attention away
from the Task Force's plan. The feeling of the BHA staff at
the time was that they were overwhelmed by the Task Force's
plan and could not risk fighting against a "tenant initiated"
plan regardless of the validity of the criticisms.
The August Letter
Discussions continued among the three parties, the BHA, BRA
and the Task Force, focussing on the Task Force plan as the
basis for negotiations. One of the first results of the Task
Force plan was agreement by the parties to the location of
the first phase of development, the easterly portion of the
site. 178 Urban Initiative funds would be committed to
finance this part (Phase 1A) and the parties agreed to try and
obtain Section 8 for existing and new family units within this
phase. An effort would then be made to turn over the units
(approximately 408) to a private developer. Additional funds
also had to be found to transfer ownership and management from
BHA.
When the BHA plan was first presented to HUD, HUD did not
react nor show enthusiasm about it until after the Task Force's
presentation. On August 9, 1979, the Task Force plan was
presented to HUD who gave their response in a letter from
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Edward Pollack, HUD Area Manager to Kevin Feeley, BHA Acting
Administrator. It was noted that the completion of the
developer's kit was behind schedule as agreement to income
mix, market mix, and other issues were over due as of June 30,
1979. The Task Force plan was found inconsistent with other
proposals because of the greater degree of demolition,
the different course of development activity, and HUD "questioned
the economic feasibility and cost of the tenants' plan." HUD
also "questioned the BHA course of action in financing 408
family units through the Section 8 program and then turning
these over to a private developer." Furthermore, HUD had
previously established a September 30th deadline for the
execution of the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC), and
the lack of this would result in the recapture of $10 million
in UI reservation. Therefore, BHA, BRA and the Task Force
were to submit the following no later than August 20th: an
agreed upon plan for parcel 1A, approvable by HUD: agreement
on the extent of demolition, market mix, elderly and family
mix, and a commitment to an acceptable date prior to September 30,
for completion and approval of the developer's kit.
During this period, BHA had also met with HUD officials to
seek a waiver from competitive bidding requirements to permit
the developer chosen for the overall development of Columbia
Point to perform the modernization work. HUD General Counsel
responded that since the development work might include work on
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and improvements withdrawn from the present public housing
project, and a detailed plan has not been approved by HUD, a
decision on waiving the requirements was premature: "Any
proposal for conversion of public housing units to other uses
would have to be based on a specific proposal and justification
... Public housing modernization funds for Columbia Point may
only be used for units which are to be kept in the public
housing inventory." 180
In response to HUD, on August 20, 1979, a three party letter,
known as the "August letter" was signed by Terry Mair, Kevin
Feeley, and Robert Ryan and sent to Marvin Siflinger, HUD Area
Manager, stating the development phasing agreed to: This
included Phase 1A, a schedule of development activities, and
management proposals. No mention was made of overall income
mix, family/elderly mix and demolition figures. These parts
of the development plan were outlined:
o Total redevelopment would result in 1,200-1,500 units of
housing and a rehabilitated shopping mall.
o Large families would be best served by construction of
new townhouses.
o All parcels were to be ecnomically integrated.
o As soon as possible the entire BHA development should
be brought under private management.
o First phase of construction should start at the easterly
portion of the site: with Phase 1A on the BHA site and 1B
on the non-BHA site. Total of Phase 1 will consist of
between 600-920 units.
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o Within Phase 1A, 3 of 8 buildings included would be
totally demolished and one "topped" and 2 buildings
would be designated for the elderly and 2 for large
families.
o One-half of the present Columbia Point families would
be relocated into new or substantially rehabilitated
units as a result of Phase 1A.
o Ownership opportunities for low, moderate and market-
income residents would be evaluated.
A request was then made to HUD to approve the contracts for
site planning, rehabilitation and design work on Phase 1A,
preparation of demolition specifications, and a preliminary
re-use evaluation. The August letter further stated: "We
propose not to proceed past design development stage on the
family buildings until a decision has been reached among all
parties on whether to include these buildings in the developer's
kit, or a decision by HUD to allow 50% moderate income occupany."
It remained unclear whether the family buildings would be dis-
posed of to a private developer unless HUD agreed to substantial
income mix.
Until now, negotiations were difficult in arriving at a con-
sensus on the development plan. But for the first time, the
three parties agreed to some details on the housing site.
Many important issues were still left unresolved, but with the
signing of the August Letter, one can see the convergence of
the BHA, BRA and the Task Force towards privatization of as
much of the public housing site as possible, a change to
private management, full acceptance of income mix, including
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market mix and the use of demolition as a first resort.
It is interesting that the Task Force presented the strongest
position on demolition, total social and economic integration,
a conversion to private management as quickly as possible, and
also supported private ownership of the site. The BHA readily
backed down from their previous position on limiting demolition
and maintaining the site as public housing in the interest of
"1what tenants wanted", that and "if the private sector can do
a better job, why not?" 18 1 The City and the BRA now did not
have to negotiate single-handedly on most of the items which
it had originally proposed in the Boston Plan. The major
differences now between the BRA leaning heavily towards a
larger market-rate family and elderly population, and
whether the Task Force had a role in redevelopment.
The significant change bringing the parties to agreement during
this period was that now the Task Force was fully supporting
the move to private control and ownership of the site in hopes
of becoming partners with the developer. All other issues were
secondary to this. With the August Letter, the three parties
were successful in retaining the UI funds. 18 2
On September 9, 1979, Clyde McHenry, HUD Assistant Secretary
for Public Housing, came to Boston for a decision on spending
UI funds for design and planning work for Phase 1A. At the
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insistence of the three parties, the BRA, the Task Force, and
the BHA, he was backed into a position that UI funds could
be expanded for preliminary design and planning work on Phase
1A, while it was still unclear whether the property would be
retained under BHA ownership. The condition was that some
form of compensation to HUD would be necessary if it came under
private ownership. The total debt on the property would not
be counted towards the purchase cost of the site in case of
disposition, and HUD would just have to "bite the bullet." The
three parties were present at this meeting, in addition to
Robert Ryan, Director of the BRA; the Master; Alan Root,
Chairman of TPC and Myra McAdoo, Executive Director of TPC.
TPC was the only group to comment on the lack of commitment
of the City to low-income family housing with Columbia Point
being another example of displacing poor families.
In the meantime, while the second draft of the developer's kit
was being issued for circulation and comment, the Kennedy
Library opened its doors October 20, 1979. Called a "Boon
for Dorchester..few deny that the library played a part in
expiditing plans to revive the housing complex."183 As far
as its impact on neighborhood revitalization, Michael Traft,
President of the Dorchester United Neighborhood Association,
(DUNA), said, "property values in Dorchester have been on the
upswing anyway. The library is certainly contributing to
that positive development."184
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In a newspaper interview explaining the demand for
new housing development at Columbia Point, Ephron Catlin,
former Chairman of the Peninsula Planning Committee, simply
commented that "there isn't a heck of a lot of land around
Boston." The interviews with tenants showed their concern
about whether low-income tenants will continue to live on the
peninsula. Bernard Sneed said that the residents have made
the institutions feel welcome, but residents remain uneasy
about their institutional neighbors. "There's still fear out
there," Ruby Jaundoo, a Task Force member said, "When U Mass
came in, people thought that this would become dormitories...
Grant you, that the Task Force is part of the planning for
the point. But a lot of political things can take over." 185
The tenants' fears and scepticism can easily be confirmed, in
September, 1979, Columbia Point had a population of only 369
family and elderly households. 18 6 While major construction
was taking place on the peninsula, Columbia Point tenants
continued to live in some of the worst conditions in Boston.
In November the 3rd draft of the developer's kit was released.
The Task Force was unable to get the Phase 1A contract from the
BHA for their design consultants, Carr, Lynch Associates, due
to questions of the firm's qualifications. Steffian Bradley
Associates were given the design and landscape contract for
Phase 1A. The Task Force budget, which was resubmitted to the
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BRA Board for $200 thousand, was finally approved, although
not released. The BRA used the budget as a leverage for reaching
an agreement on the developer's kit.187 In the meantime,
GBCD and Carr, Lynch Associates remain unpaid, the broader
community remained uninformed of the plan, and the project
continued to deteriorate.
When the planning process was broadened to more actively
involve the Columbia Point Community Task Force, the basic
elements of the plan, since the days of the Thompson Plan and
the Boston Plan did not change appreciably, except that the
Task Force wanted a partnership role with the developer.
Demolition, disposition, income mix including market mix, and
substantial reductions of low-income units are all present in
the latest plan disclosed in the draft Developer's Kit.
The BHA, the Task Force and their consultants produced evidence
supporting the feasibility of rehabilitation and re-use of the
existing buildings. The Task Force's Resident Needs Survey
documented the problems with the existing housing, Steffian
Bradley Associates produced a plan which addressed those problems
with creative design solutions. Dan Walker of Commonwealth
Design., Carr, Lynch Associates and David Carter all presented
information showing that comparative costs weighed in favor
of rehabilitation rather than demolition and new construction.
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But all of these were to be disregarded in the final plan. The
resulting design and program remained premised on political and
market motivations and not on inherent problems with re-
habilitating the existing housing.
CONCLUSION
In examining the history of Columbia Point, two important levels
of concern become apparent. First, the events surrounding
the planning for redevelopment, and second, the daily activ-
ities including management, maintenance, and short-term
policies affecting the living condition in the development.
The manner in which the lon-range planning and the immediate
housing needs are addressed are inseparable when it comes
to setermining the future of the housing project.
Over a ten year period, the attention given to planning for
redevelopment, while management and other responsibilities
were shunned, only contributed to the deterioration and decline
of the project. The two processes fed on each other; if
the redevelopment plans assume that public housing is to
be demolished or disposed of, and the low-income population
reduced, the short-range housing practices would reinforce
these objectives. The policies of mothballing the buildings,
the promise to only rehouse existing tenants, and population
attrition, are then consistent with the overall redevelopment
plan. As housing and other services continue to be nealected,
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conditions will decline and provoke more drastic redevelop-
ment solutions from those hostile to public housing.
The 1974 Thompson Plan, the 1977 Boston Plan, the 1979
Task Force Plan and the latest plan in the draft developer's
kit, consistently escalate the pressure and support for
privatization, demolition, and fewer low-income households
after redevelopment. This position was only deviated from
in the BHA modernization effort in 1978, the HUD Task Force,
and the 1979 BHA Plan. But these few efforts were all
short-lived, and did not alter the ultimate course of
redevelopment.
Throughout the history, certain trends emerged which spoke
to the dominance of the City and the private sector, includ-
ing those represented by the Peninsula Planning Committee,
in determining the direction of redevelopment. Even though
the City and the private interests did not own nor have legal
authority over the BHA site, they were able to control the
planning process. The failure of the BHA to perform re-
sponsibly and defend the interests of tenants, left a vacuum
for any major public initiative. BHA's historically poor
relation with tenants also hampered the BHA's ability to play
a significant leadership role. The BHA, moreover, was a will-
ing partner with the City.
The tenant organization at Columbia Point remained uniformed
2r7
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and uninvolved in all of the plans prior to 1978. The
Harbor Park Plan and the Columbia Point Community Task Force
Plan resulted in increased tenant participation in the plan-
ning process, but the major components of the redevelopment
plan, even with substantial Task Force input, did not change
appreciably. The Task Force, instead, with the assistance
of their consultants, took the opportunity to attempt to
become "partners" in redevelopment, rather than to alter
the plan. In their haste to develop a "tenant plan," the
Task Force did little to communicate with the rest of the
Columbia Point residents, therefore the Task Force Plan
cannot be seen as representational.
All the redevelopment plans were premised on attracting
market income tenants and private investment. Therefore,
the question of maintaining and rehabilitating as many low-
income or public housing units as possible was never a con-
sideration. Even when the research and other evidence
pointed to the feasibility of rehabilitation and retention
of the buildings, this data was ignored as the public housing
site was no longer perceived as a low-income housing resource.
The result is that the fedevelopment planning for over the
years did not change very much. The City and the private
interests still dominate the process, and the tenants remain
"corralled" into some scheme. In the meantime, day-to-day
280
living conditions decline precipitously, and none of the
three parties, the City, the BHA or the Task Force were
left to upholding the long-term interest of the low-income
population.
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THE COLUMBIA POINT REDEVELOPMENT PLAN
"In another time, the Peninsula Commit-
tee's proposal to demolish a good
share of the public housing there
could have been a formula for urban
dynamite. But the remaining Columbia
Point public housing tenants have on
their own, already sanctioned just
such a proposal."
--Boston Globe Editorial,
July 26, 1977
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CHAPTER 6:
CHAPTER 6
THE COLUMBIA POINT REDEVELOPMENT PLAN
INTRODUCTION
The Columbia Point Community Task Force Revitalization Plan
became the focus for discussion and continual negotiation by
the three parties on development issues such as income mix,
family and elderly mix, the extent of demolition and the role
of the Task Force in redevelopment. Agreement was reached on
location of the new beach, marina, modification to the Bay-
side Mall, and development phasing.
In late November 1979, HUD was still applying pressure for a
consensus plan to be submitted for approval in order to issue
the developer's kit and release the Urban Initiatives funds.
During this period, conditions continued to deteriorate at
Columbia Point. Central management and senior administrative
staff aware that they were considered incompetent by the
Master's Office knew they would be out of a job as soon as a
Receiver was appointed (February 5, 1980) and were moving to
seek other employment or quietly waiting until their con-
tracts expired. In the meantime, Authority responsibilities
were neglected, resulting in further disorganization and
inefficiencies. It became even more difficult for the
Authority to carry out its normal level of operations.
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The weakening of the Authority's position affected its polit-
ical strength in negotiations on Columbia Point as pres-
sure was put on it to render concessions both to the Task
Force and the City. In lieu of a strong and credible housing
authority, a pervasive view by the Master's Office and others
was that the Authority should "give in" to whatever the ten-
ants wanted, and the City and the BRA remained unyielding on
their position on redevelopment. Preparation of the develop-
er's kit became the avenue for the BHA, the City, the BRA and
the Task Force to reach a consensus.
This chapter contains a brief summation of the current plan
and the perspective of the various actors: the City and the
Boston Redevelopment Authority, the Boston Housing Authority,
the Columbia Point Community Task Force, University of Massa-
chusetts, the Tenants Policy Council and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
THE CURRENT PLAN
The redevelopment plan is revealed in the 3rd Draft Develop-
er's Selection Kit issued on November 16, 1979, by the City
of Boston, BRA and BHA in conjunction with the Columbia Point
Community Task Force. The redevelopment program calls for
1,470 units of new and rehabilitated mixed-income housing,
510,000 square feet of new and renovated retail space, devel-
opment of waterfront parkland, improved public utilities and
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roads on a 106.1-acre development area.
The Housing Development Program comprises the following:
o Income mix will consist of one-third low, one-third
moderate and one-third market-income households for
the family units. (See definition of household income
in Table 8.) Elderly units will be predominantly low
and moderate income.
o Development will take place in two phases. Phase 1 in-
cluded Phase 1A, the easterly portion of the BHA site,
and Phase 1B, the pumphouse land and U Mass property.
Phase 2 included the rest of the BHA site and the adja-
cent Bayside Mall area.
o Phase 1 will contain a total of 690 units of new and re-
habilitated housing. Phase 1A, includes substantial
rehabilitation of 2 elderly buildings, demolition and
partial demolition of 3 mid-rises, substantial rehabili-
tation of 3 family buildings and new construction.
o Phase 1B will take place on the land presently owned by
the City of Boston Public Facilities Department, the Boston
Water and Sewer Commission and the University of Massachu-
setts. This phase will consist of a total of 440 units of
new construction townhouses for families and one mid-rise
containing 100 units of elderly and adult housing.
o Mixed-income housing will be largely financed by Section
8 and be privately owned. A small portion of the BHA
site will be retained as public housing. Section 221(d)(4)
HUD insurance will be used for adult housing: ownership
housing will be funded with Section 235 mortgage subsidy
and Section 234 mortgage insurance; and a UDAG grant will
be used for secondary mortgaging for moderate income
housing. Use of Section 8 rental assistance for low-
income, cooperative housing will be possible with the use
of a UDAG for repayment and establishment of an equity
purchasing fund for sustaining low-income ownership through
equity appreciation.
o Phase 2 consists of development of the remainder of the
BHA site, land next to the shore and behind the Bayside
Mall. Design and detailed development of Phase 2 will
proceed as Phase 1B begins construction. Financial com-
mitments will be in place prior to demolition.1
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Table 9: Housing Development Program for Phases 1 and 2
TOTAL PHASE 1 DEVELOPMENT
Household Income*
Unit Type Low Mod. Market Total
Adult 10 10 80 100
Small Family 60 60 40 160
(1-2 bedrooms)
Larger Family 80 80 30 190
(3-6 bedrooms)
Elderly 220 20 0 240
Total 690
Non-Elderly 150 150 150 450
Elderly 220 20 0 240
690
Source: City of Boston, Boston Housing Authority, and Boston
Redevelopment Authority in conjunction with the
Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc., "Columbia
Point Developer's Selection Kit," 3rd Draft,
November 16, 1979, pp. 3-11, 3-12.
*Low-income households consist of "households with incomes
less than 80% of the median income for the Boston Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area, with most of the low-income
residents expected to be existing residents with incomes of
less than 50% of the SMSA income. Households with income in
the range of 80%-110% of the SMSA median income are considered
moderate income, except that, within the Phase 1A area, house-
holds with incomes between 50% and 80% of SMSA median income
will be considered moderate income. Higher income households
are those with incomes over 110% of SMSA median income for
the appropriate family size." 2 In 1977, the SMSA median
income for Boston was $18,600 for a family of four.
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Table 9: Housing Development Program for Phases 1 and 2
(continued)
TOTAL PHASE 2 DEVELOPMENT
Household Income*
Unit Type Low Mod. Market
Adult
Small Family
(1-2 bedrooms)
Larger Family
(3-6 bedrooms)
Elderly
55
85
95
60
55 130
85
95
20
Total
Non-Elderly 235
Elderly 60
235
20
235
0
Total
Source: City of Boston Housing Authority, and Boston
Redevelopment Authority in conjunction with the
Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc., "Columbia
Point Developer's Selection Kit," 3rd Draft,
November 16, 1979, pp. 3-11, 3-12.
*See footnote on preceding page, "Total Phase 1 Development."
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Total
240
245
220
80
785
705
80
785
On demolition and disposition of the public housing site, the
following is proposed:
The 37.5 acre existing public housing site will become
an integral part of the redevelopment plan for the
Columbia Point peninsula. . . . A portion of the site
will remain in BHA ownership and be redeveloped into
innovative low and moderate-income housing with federal
and state public housing resources. The remainder of
the housing site plus 37.8 acres of tidal land . . . a
substantial portion of the BHA site will be declared
surplus and sold to the joint venture of the designated
developer and the Task Force.3
Deed restrictions will require that the number of low and
moderate-income units be retained in perpetuity and "the price
of the surplus portion of the site would be negotiated with
HUD and will be based on the financial feasibility of the pro-
posed re-use. . . . The price will allow for a reasonable
return to the development entity." HUD will then retire the
debt outstanding against the site and not use that debt in
calculating sale price. Urban Initiatives funds will be used
for demolition on Phase 1A and, depending on final detailed
cost, it may also be used for demolition or site treatment on
the Phase 2 portion of the BHA site. Up to 660 units would be
demolished and one-half to four-fifths of the BHA site dis-
posed of.
In the 3rd draft of the Developer's Selection Kit the issues
surrounding the total number of units in the development,
private ownership, mixed-income housing, demolition and dis-
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position were largely agreed to by the City, BHA and the
Task Force. But disagreement still existed among the parties
on the exact mix of incomes, the definition of income levels,
and the percentage of low, moderate and market housing to be
constructed in each phase. Some of the disagreements on the
Developer's Selection Kit, in addition to a general discus-
sion of the point of view of each of the actors, will be
brought out in the next section.
ACTORS AND POINTS OF VIEW
The City and the Boston Redevelopment Authority
Columbia Point is viewed by the Mayor's Office and the BRA
as a valuable development opportunity because of its attrac-
tive waterfront location and proximity to downtown Boston.
It is one of the last "frontiers" of undeveloped land in the
City. The successful redevelopment of Columbia Point is one
of the primary objectives of the White Administration.
Columbia Point will be declared an urban renewal area, and the
BRA will play the major role of acquiring and packaging par-
cels for the developer or development team. The following
are some of the highlights of the City's position from the
Boston Plan:
Demolition of abandoned public housing and construc-
tion of new mixed-income housing will convert non-
taxable property into tax producing revenues and will
encourage new middle-income and upper-income residents
to the area. . . .
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. . . The marketing of the new housing development will
focus on the growing middle and upper income sector
demand for housing. . . . The proposed Columbia Point
development would be the only middle and upper income
housing in Boston with direct beach access. . . .
. . . At completion, this project will create 400 jobs
annually during the new housing construction, 250 jobs
at the new retail center, and housing units for 4500
people. $200,000 in new property tax revenues will
directly benefit the City's fiscal health.4
The City's Boston Plan originally called for an income mix of:
25% low, 50% moderate, and 25% market-income units, but as
of August 20, 1979, the City changed its position to 23% low-
income, 30% moderate-income and 47% market-rate units.5
In defining income limits, the City attempted to create the
widest spread for the categories of "low," "moderate" and
"market" by using the Section 8 limits of low as 80% of SMSA
median income. "Moderate" income is defined as 80% to 110%
of SMSA median and market as above 110%. This is signifi-
cantly different from public housing income limits with "low"
as below 50% of SMSA median and "moderate" as 50% to 80% of
SMSA median. Therefore, the City's or the Boston Plan by
proposing 50% moderate and 25% market income will result in
two-thirds of the population being above the Section 8 limits.
Their revised plan calling for close to 50% market units and
fewer moderate income units will provide housing for even
fewer households in need of housing assistance. The City's
concept of "income mix" becomes a largely middle and upper-
income "mix" of incomes.
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The Task Force had proposed that "low" income be defined as
less than 50% of SMSA median, "moderate" as 50% to 100%, and
"market" as over 100%, but the City's income definitions were
adopted by the three parties with some modifications (refer
to reference note in Table 9). Nevertheless shifting defi-
nitions continue to confuse the actual picture of income mix.
Since the City's primary concern has been to increase tax
revenues through development of the total peninsula and to
attract private sector interest in the renewal of the
Bayside Mall and the housing site, the feasibility of market-
rate housing has been given considerable attention and re-
search by the BRA. The following are some of the findings
from the BRA's "Evaluation of the Potential for Market Rate
Housing at Columbia Point":
As the market gets tighter, either prices will go up
in sought after locations and/or housing in more
areas will become "acceptable." Since it is pro-
jected that the cost of producing housing on Columbia
Point will result in sales prices higher than the sur-
rounding existing housing, it is imperative that the
peninsula be perceived as more desireable than the
alternatives, or a more acceptable place to live.
If, in fact, the cost to produce rental housing on
Columbia Point (either new or rehab) approaches
$50,000 per unit, the resulting rents would exceed
what the market, to date, has borne in a mixed in-
come development. A below market interest rate on
the mortgage, a nominal land cost, and a 121A tax
agreement below the recently established guidelines
would be required to keep rents competitive. . . .
. . . The problem with doing sales housing as the
first phase of a development which will be testing
an untapped market is one of risk--for both the
developer and the prospective buyers. . . . Sales
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can proceed only after the credibility of a project
has been established. . . .
. . . Renters and purchasers of homes in new develop-
ments in the Boston area have not sought out income
mixed communities. . . . However, according to the
most successful developers of mixed income develop-
ments, they are marketable if they are competitive
or above average in terms of environmental factors,
location and price. . . .
. . . The challenge [at Columbia Point] is to use
these advantages [public improvement and amenities]
to capture the family market. However, as mentioned
earlier, families with children are among the most
risk conscious house hunters. They are unlikely to
purchase in an area suffering from a negative image
until more pioneering households establish the area
and the media reinforces the general acceptability
of it. 6
For all the reasons just mentioned, the difficulty of estab-
lishing market housing at Columbia Point become apparent.
Therefore, the City recommended that, to insure successful
development, new housing should be "physically linked with
U Mass rather than the housing project"; the housing must be
competitively priced; waterfront and public improvements be
in place; and homeownership rather than rental housing be
encouraged. Since family housing is more risky to establish,
early development should appeal to "childless couples as well
as families since they are to be disproportionately repre-
sented in Phase 1." Furthermore, "Phase 1 cannot be top
heavy on subsidized housing, if the image of the peninsula as
the low-income houser of the last resort is to be reversed."
The City then proposed that 42% to 50% of the housing devel-
oped in Phase 1 be market-rate housing so that for marketing
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and investment purposes, Columbia Point would not be viewed
as a "subsidized" community. 8
These findings have led the City and BRA to continue to push
for the fewest possible number of low-income residents pre-
ferably with no increase in the existing number of low-
income residents in either the existing project or in the
new development. The City has interpreted a February 21, 1977
three-party agreement with the Task Force and BHA for re-
housing all tenants who "on or after July 1, 1977" wish to
remain at Columbia Point as only the tenants who remain on
Columbia Point up to the time of development will be guaran-
teed housing (see Chapter 5). Whereas the Task Force has
interpreted the agreement as all tenants on or after July 1,
1977, including the ones who have left since that date because
of intolerable conditions, will be guaranteed housing. Thus
BRA's figures for rehousing is approximately 230, and the
Task Force's figure is more than 450 households. 9
In accordance with the City's Housing Assistance Plan (HAP)
to minimize the development of low-income family housing in
Boston (see discussion in Chapter 2), the City and the BRA
have instead supported increases in housing for the elderly
and childless or adult households. The BRA consistently
calls for more elderly units and fewer units for large fami-
lies than the Task Force and the BHA. In addition to the
293
City's middle and upper-income populations the BRA also
emphasizes housing and services for new and existing in-
stitutions and businesses on the peninsula. The new housing
is potentially attractive to U Mass faculty and staff, em-
ployees of the Boston Globe, the First National Bank, and
others. 11
From the City's point of view, the development of a mixed-
income community would require racial mix as well as a large
market-rate housing component.12 Wealthy white households
will be brought into the development as market rental and
sale housing will be unaffordable to most minority households
(as well as many white households). The City also insists
on racial mix at the low-income level in full awareness that
integrating the low-income component may decrease the total
number of minority households on the peninsula because inte-
gration at other income levels will be unlikely to be
achieved.
The City supports whatever level of demolition is necessary
to make market housing successful. Disposition of a major
part of the public housing site is considered by the City as
an inexpensive source of land for the developer. The BHA
site, $11.2 million in Urban Initiatives and Modernization
funds, the anticipated $11 million UDAG grant, among others,
are all part of the public investment and resource package
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that the City is using to leverage private investments. It
is their hope that with a 1 to 4 ratio of public to private
investment, HUD and other agencies will provide the necessary
matching funds to ensure that sufficient public investments
are provided for the necessary infrastructure, improvements,
amenities, and housing subsidies to get development underway.
The redevelopment of Columbia Point was among the top ten
development priorities of the City, but after experiencing
little progress through the years, the City has become some-
what cynical. Because the City does not own the public hous-
ing site, the City cannot proceed ahead with redevelopment,
even though it controls and sets the policies. But
unlike the tenants and the BHA, who are directly affected by
any impasse, the City can afford to wait for redevelopment to
take its course.
The Boston Housing Authority
The BHA had the least credibility and the weakest negotiating
position of all parties (prior to Receivership). The follow-
ing encompasses the BHA's position on redevelopment:
o BHA supports the creation of a mixed income community as
the only feasible solution in providing low-income housing.
BHA staff is in favor of allowing the BHA site to be
integrated with adjacent land parcels to be privately
redeveloped. (An official BHA Board decision has not
been rendered.)
o BHA would dispose of a major portion (from one-half to
four-fifths) of its site to a developer. As of November
1979, BHA has taken the position that they desire to sell
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and/or lease their property with conditions to maintain
a certain number of low and moderate-income units on the
site. A final decision would be made after a developer
is hired.
o BHA's original position in the BHA/Steffian Bradley plan
proposed demolition of 460 public housing units. In
November 1979, BHA was negotiating with the Task Force for
demolition of 660 units.
o BHA has not supported the Task Force in the number of
low-income residents to be housed or rehoused in the new
development. They have not interpreted the February 21,
1979 Agreement as a commitment to rehouse 450 low-income
tenants.
o In December 1979, BHA originally sought Section 8 funding
for rehabilitating the family units in Phase 1A so that
Urban Initiatives funds did not have to be used. In this
way, the units could then be turned over to a private
developer.
o BHA has been reluctant to spend the Urban Initiatives
funds for any major housing rehabilitation because it
would commit those units to public ownership. While the
monies were originally awarded for rehabilitating family
units, the BHA wanted to expend the funds only for elderly
units, site improvement and demolition. Bu 3 after pres-
sure from TPC, BHA modified their position.
The BHA saw no intrinsic problems with demolition and disposi-
tion as it could not maintain its housing stock in decent
condition. But problems facing the Authority included
reactions from HUD, the Court, TPC and those in favor of pre-
serving low-income and public housing, and problems stemming
from the Authority's own confusion of their precise role in
redevelopment.
The Housing Authority's management policies for existing
housing were clearer than its position on a specific
course of action in redevelopment. The BHA administration
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and staff involved in the negotiations from 1978 on had fully
supported private redevelopment and private management of
Columbia Point, 4 since Columbia Point was to eventually be
disposed of, BHA's housing policies allowed deterioration
and neglect to continue. It was the larger question of re-
development which posed a dilemma. With the Task Force
taking on a greater role in planning and negotiations than
before, the BHA was faced with supporting private redevelop-
ment but being unsure of how much it wanted to relinquish
its responsibilities and ownership rights to a developer if
the Task Force became partners with the developer. There-
fore, the BHA kept vacillating in its position between
maintaining public housing under BHA ownership and control,
and disposing of the BHA site.
According to many senior staff members, the problems of
managing public housing had largely to do with the charac-
teristics of the tenants and, more recently, with the restric-
tions and interferences by the Court in the Consent Decree.
Even though BHA had shown by its own performance that it was
neither capable nor willing to properly manage its housing,
the placing of the Authority under court order made BHA
antagonistic to doing anything which could politically bene-
fit the tenants. But, at the same time, BHA was under pres-
sure to be careful in not taking an "anti-tenant" posture
publicly as this would only confirm the need for the Consent
Decree.
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BHA continued to avoid taking a strong position against
any element in the Task Force plan and at the same time did
not lend support to the Task Force in its dealings with the
City when it came to the number of tenants to be rehoused,
the number of low-income units after redevelopment, or the
mix of family and elderly households. Behind the scene, the
BHA Board allowed their displeasure with the Task Force's
consultants, GBCD, and GBCD's relation to the Court-Appointed
Master to get in the way of negotiations with the Task Force
(see discussion of the Task Force in Chapter 5). As Robert
Whittlesey was the former Executive Director of GBCD prior
to being named the Master, the BHA Board did not want the
Task Force to hire GBCD as their consultant. They attempted
to make sure that the consultants did not get paid after
they were hired, and saw to it that the Task Force did not
gain a partnership role in redevelopment. (During this
period, the BHA Board approved the West Broadway Task Force
co-developer agreement without question or discussion.)
The BHA held numerous meetings with HUD on problems with the
Task Force budget and the "conflict of interest" arising
from the Master's relation with GBCD. BHA also met privately
with HUD to discuss the risks of tenant partnership, speci-
fically that this partnership would in all likelihood dis-
courage any interest from potential developers.
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The BHA had a complex relationship with the City: the BHA
Board and the former Acting Administrator, Kevin Feeley, had
close ties with the BRA and the Mayor's Office and supported
the City's position on redevelopment. At the same time,
pressure from HUD, the Court, TPC and the tenants resulted
in hesitancy on BHA's part in accepting everything
from the City. Despite the close ties with the City, the
BHA did not want to give the impression that it was the City
who was "running the show" since it was BHA who had final
responsibility for its housing site.
While the three parties continued to debate the terms of
redevelopment, certain BHA practices remained intact:
Columbia Point was left to deteriorate until redevelopment;
attrition and non-retenanting of the units continued even
though 140 families were on the Columbia Point waiting list;1 6
and mothballed units requiring a minimal amount of work
remained unoccupied. A site inspection by BHA management
and modernization staff as recently as September 1979 esti-
mated that only $3,000 of work per unit was required to make
many of the vacant family units habitable.17 Another 100
sound elderly units in "move-in" condition also remained
vacant.
Management and maintenance staff continued to be removed
from Columbia Point, either through transfers or attrition,
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creating a "serious and continuing erosion of living condi-
tions" as reported in a BHA staff memorandum.18 In 1980,
BHA staff reported that:
. . . Three full time carpenters are presently avail-
able for all 2,543 units in District V. Of that
total one carpenter is assigned to Columbia Point
on a part-time basis; another is assigned on paper
full-time, but he has been out for a year with a
back injury. When the assigned carpenter is avail-
able, he must spend his time on "emergency" (read
catastrophe) work orders. . . .
. . . According to records, four plumbers are avail-
able for the entire district. One is assigned to
Columbia Point three days per week. Unfortunately
that individual had a nervous breakdown, [and] was
out for some time. . . .
. . . According to the manager, he often has diffi-
culty assembling the basic crew of four [laborers]
for Columbia Point. . . .
. . . Jim Connolly, the first-rate superintendent
who worked with Gibson to restore the development,
has been transferred to Franklin Field. . . .
. . . Problems with craftsmen at Columbia Point are
reportedly a combination of the obvious lack of
skilled individuals in any category and in some
cases low productivity or short working days in
those few instances when individuals are on the job
at Columbia Point. . . .
. . . In addition to the problems with craftsmen,
other management resources have been reduced at
Columbia Point. These reductions have often times
resulted from promotions or other reasonable indi-
vidual actions. The unfortunate result has been a
serious discontinuity in high level management at
Columbia Point.
. . . At the end of Gibson's tenure, work orders
were handled on a same day basis. Now as you can
see from the attached work order backlog list, there
are significant numbers of work orders that have gone
beyond both the 30 and 90 day marks. This sort of
inability to deal with basic repairs rapidly communi-
cates an attitude to residents and can contribute to
the same disrepair and extensive vandalism that char-
acterized Columbia Point a few years ago.19
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By 1980 the Target Projects Program staff no longer existed.
The new District Director, who replaced the Columbia Point
Revitalization Director, relocated his office to one of the
other developments assigned to him. Finally, the Columbia
Point security program was consolidated as part of central
security. In the beginning of 1980, only one manager was
on site, although six months earlier there were three man-
agers, a Revitalization Director and a Relocation Officer.
BHA's dominant attitude was, "why put any effort into
Columbia Point, if it will be redone anyway and if it is not
going to remain under BHA ownership." 20
The BHA has been primarily concerned with development on its
own parcel consisting of 37.5 acres and tidal land but has
been unable to come up with a redevelopment plan or a suc-
cessful rehabilitation program with the $20 million allocated
by HUD since 1975. As the agency accountable for the future
of the public housing site, the BHA has one person planning
for the total site compared with BRA, which has two full-time
staff plus research and design back-up.21 Even the Task
Force employs two fully staffed consultant teams. BHA does
not have an in-house physical planner or designer working on
the site, nor a planner familiar with public housing, housing
programs, modernization, and low-income housing issues.
Instead, the Columbia Point Coordinator, while well inten-
tioned, is doing what he knows best, packaging the publicly-
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owned housing site as a private investment opportunity.
Despite its vacillation on certain issues in redevelopment,
the BHA finally developed its own rationale for arriving at
a private redevelopment solution for Columbia Point. BHA's
capitulation to the interest of the City and the private
sector is revealed in the November 19, 1979 draft Developer's
Selection Kit:
BHA is seeking the most effective way possible to
carry out its mandate of providing "safe, decent,
and sanitary housing for low-income residents."
After years of management and maintenance difficul-
ties with the Columbia Point development, BHA has
become convinced that it is not possible to maintain
1,500 functional low-income units on the Columbia
Point site. . . . It could best fulfill its respon-
sibilities to low and moderate-income families by
participating in the creation of a new, mixed-income
community on Columbia Point. . . . The provision of
low and moderate income units through the private
sector reutilization of much of the BHA property
is seen as an effective action that is specific to
the Columbia Point site and not necessarily repre-
sentative of a city-wide reutilization of BHA housing
resources.23
Privatization is the prescription for Columbia Point, but
BHA would like to calm the fears of tenants throughout the
city who are concerned with the future implications of this
action. Many developments experience "years of management
and maintenance difficulties," but Columbia Point is suppos-
edly different because of its increased attractiveness in
comparison to other sites around the city. The policy which
can be inferred is that, when problems exist within a
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development and private redevelopment is determined as
feasible, BHA will resort to privatization as opposed to
other options which maintain public housing. The existence
of market demand for the housing site appears to be BHA's
central argument for disposition.
BHA as of November 1979 indicated its intention to retain
ownership of only two elderly and two family buildings to
be substantially rehabilitated in Phase 1A; four family
buildings rehabilitated with 1975 Modernization funds on the
easterly portion of the site; and the buildings housing
social services. 24
Among the three parties, BHA's position on demolition has
been the most conservative. This is in part attributed to
HUD's reservations on massive demolition, the Steffian
Bradley Associates' re-use proposal and opposition from TPC
and public housing tenants. The BHA has been somewhat per-
suasive with the City and the Task Force in bringing the
demolition figure from 822 down to 660 units (the most recent
figure in the November draft Developer's Selection Kit),
but demolition of this many units--44% of the existing units
--remains.
BHA fully realizes that the mid-rise buildings which are slated
for demolition contain one, two and three-bedroom units which
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correlate with the demand by low-income households (see
Chapter 2). A majority of the BHA's waiting list of 7,000
1 25households are in need of one and two-bedroom units. But BHA
refused to argue its position based on low-income housing
needs as this would open them up to maintaining the whole
site as low-income housing.
Moreover, the BHA staff in private disagreed with the 660
demolition figure, but they felt they had no power to hold
their ground for minimal demolition because of the pressures
from the City and the Task Force, who remained adamant about
massive demolition. BHA received no help from the Master
whose only response was to allow whatever the Task Force and
their consultants want as long as it's "not too unreason-
able. ,26
Even though BHA has major say in approving or rejecting the
final demolition scheme, it has not been strong enough to
push for selective or minimal demolition. In attempting not
to impede the progress of getting the developer's kit issued,
BHA continues to yield to political pressure and, therefore,
does little to protect the interest of public housing
tenants. BHA's position on demolition, disposition, and its
weak position in redevelopment is unlikely to change, unless
the Receiver, the Court, or HUD intervenes.
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The Columbia Point Community Task Force
The history of tenant participation has been a long struggle
from total exclusion in the 1974 Thompson Plan and the 1977
Boston Plan to inclusion as one of the negotiating parties
in 1979. The possibility of Task Force partnership with a
developer has also been an encouraging sign to some.
Tenants have the most at stake in the future of Columbia
Point; some have been there since the development opened in
1954 and three, even four, generation families are not un-
common. But through the years, thousands of families have
been driven out by the intolerable living conditions. A
population of 6,000 has been reduced to less than 1,000.
Only 340 households remained as of January 1980. 1,100
units are vacant, although there are families on the Columbia
Point and city-wide waiting lists.
While BHA was involved with its own problems, the Columbia
Point Community Task Force attempted to represent the inter-
est of low-income tenants in redevelopment. The following
are components of the Task Force's position:
o Tenants are to be full participants in housing development,
management and the long-term future of Columbia Point.
o In housing which is not owner-occupied or retained by BHA,
the Task Force wants partnership with the developer in a
full or limited partnership.
o The Task Force wants to hold title to land parcels where
it is developed for rental housing.
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o The current housing is too dense and not appropriate for
successful family living. Families should be housed in
two and three-story townhouses. Seven-story buildings
should be demolished or cut down to three stories, except
those used for elderly housing.
o The Task Force's original plan called for the demolition
of 822 units: with 11 mid-rise and low-rise buildings to
be demolished or "topped." Now in the current plan they
have agreed to reduce the demolition figure to approxi-
mately 660 units.
o Originally in the Green Book, the Task Force stated that
"the net loss of low-income housing units should be com-
pensated for by additional allocation of Section 8 funding
from HUD for use through the city." Out of the 1,504
units, more than 800 low-income units will be lost. But
the Task Force has not followed up this demand.
o The Task Force wants the BHA site and the other parcels
to be developed together in each phase of construction to
insure that the City's commitment to low and moderate-
income housing construction on non-BHA parcels is honored.
o The Task Force in its original plan called for an income
mix of 37%% low, 37k% low to moderate and 25% market rate
with low and moderate-income units not to exceed 700
units. Presently it has backed down to the position of
one-third of all family housing to be from each income
group.
o Originally the Task Force had proposed a lower range for
incomes (see preceding sections), but the Task F rce
eventually adopted the BRA's income definitions.L 7
The Task Force originally proposed demolition of 822 units so
as to decrease density, provide a new circulation system and
open space. Their proposed site plan makes it impossible to
retain many of the buildings because of restructured streets,
but the Task Force and their consultants, Carr, Lynch Associ-
ates, refuse to make major changes to save the units. On the
mix of family and elderly housing, the Task Force claims to
place a greater emphasis on providing family housing,
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especially larger family units (three to six bedrooms). Even
so, the Task Force and the BRA figures for large family units
results in a difference by no more than 20 units. 28
The current redevelopment plan proposes only 26% or 380 three
to six-bedroom units for larger families and the remainder,
74% or 1,048 units of one and two-bedroom units for small
families, the elderly and adult-only households.29 The Task
Force's alleged concern for large family units appears to be
an excuse for the massive demolition they propose rather
than any real interest in actually housing more large families.
The Task Force is caught in a position of proposing massive
demolition, especially of the mid-rises, by claiming the need
to create more space for large families, while proposing an
insignificantly larger number of units to warrant the level
of demolition.
At present, 66% of the BHA city-wide waiting list for family
housing are for one and two-bedroom units. 3 0 The mid-rises
contain 1,116 one, two and three-bedroom units. Considering
that the units are undersized, these can be converted into
more spacious one and two-bedroom units to meet the needs of
those on the waiting list. The arguments for demolishing the
mid-rises because they are obsolete in terms of unit size,
in excess of need, or negatively affect the availability of
large family units are not defensible.
307
On the issue of rehousing existing households, the Task Force
has made it their priority to insure that existing households,
in addition to those who lived at Columbia Point up to and
after July 1, 1977 and who have since left, will also be
guaranteed housing after redevelopment. The Task Force has
vigorously fought this issue with the City and the BHA. But
having proposed a 1,250-unit new residential development in
the Green Book (even fewer units than the current plan of
1,470 units), and endorsed substantial income mix, the Task
Force has little, if anything, to offer other low-income house-
holds. During negotiations on income mix when the number of
low-income units proposed equal the rehousing figure for
Columbia Point tenants (450 households), the Task Force's
desire to provide additional low-income family housing is
close to non-existent.
The Task Force's position on massive demolition of more than
half the site, privatization, private management and commit-
ments solely to existing Columbia Point tenants appear very
surprising. The question arises as to how the Task Force
arrived at its position. There appears to be three major
causes: (1) the pressures from the BRA, the City, the BHA
and other parties to continue the planning efforts in the
direction of demolition, private development, and mixed-
income housing; (2) the nature of the Task Force's consul-
tants and their influence on the Task Force; and (3) the lack
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of political sophistication and organization of the Task
Force in upholding the long-term interests of tenants city-
wide.
The pressure from the BRA for a large-scale solution of mixed-
income housing and redevelopment of the Bayside Mall, the
pumphouse and the shoreline continued throughout this period
as the City attempted to implement the Boston Plan. This
need not be described here, except to mention that there was
a constant threat of the City withholding funds for public
improvements until some form of agreement is reached.
The City's control of BHA and their willingness to allow
gross deterioration of the development were feared by the
Task Force. Streets and sidewalk repairs, development of the
shoreline, improvements in public transportation and other
services could only be obtained from the City or with the
City's support. The result of all this was the acceptance of
mixed-income housing as the only "compromise" solution every-
one, including the Task Force, could live with. At least a
commitment to rehouse existing tenants would insure their
presence after the transformation of the peninsula.
The ideology of the Task Force's consultants permeated the
view of the Task Force. The tenants once advocated that
people not be "forced out" of Columbia Point; that daily
maintenance and services be promptly delivered; and opposed
309
demolition, attrition, and other measures which decreased the
low-income population, but the Task Force was now doing
little in the way of addressing these issues. The Task Force,
like all the other parties, opted to place their energy in
long-range planning.
The Task Force received more than ample assistance from Carr,
Lynch Associates, environmental design consultants, and
Greater Boston Community Development, technical and legal
consultants. Let us look briefly at the perspective of the
consultants in aiding the Task Force. The problems of BHA
gross mismanagement and poor maintenance did not become the
focal point for change; these problems were to be remedied
by eventual transfer to private management. Until then,
little would be done to improve existing conditions. The
design consultants emphasized the physical defects of the
site and proposed major restructuring as the only solution to
the present problems. Both firms did little to assist the
tenants with immediate problems. Instead, the focus became
obtaining Task Force partnership with the developer. All
other concerns were subordinate to this goal. The Task Force
was "sold a bill of goods" by their consultants, they were
led to believe the following:
1. Tenants have the "right" to luxury housing.
2. Tenants can obtain luxury housing, if they
take the route of private redevelopment.
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3. Tenants can have decision-making and veto powers,
professional private management and share in the
proceeds, if they became partners with the
developer.
4. Mixed-income housing can work in their interest
by diminishing the concentration of low-income
tenants.
5. The Task Force only needs to be responsible for
rehousing the 450 low-income households in any re-
development plan regardless of the original 1,504
units, the waiting list, and the escalating need
for subsidized housing throughout the city.
6. Since the existing housing is a far cry from
desirable, luxury or market quality housing, mas-
sive demolition and alterations to the site are
necessary. The new community must be physically
"ideal" for it to work as family housing.
7. Cost factors are not a consideration, e.g., the
cost of rehabilitation versus new construction,
because sufficient private investments and public
subsidies can be obtained. Therefore, it is not
important to consider the re-use potential of the
buildings or retain as many of them as possible.
It must also be noted here that the Task Force's primary goal,
according to its Bylaws, is to provide "decent housing and
related improvements for low-income people." Choosing luxury
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market-rate townhouses over the best quality "rehab" of exist-
ing units, and providing housing for middle and upper-income
households, seems inconsistent with its stated goal.
The consultants correctly viewed the problems of public
housing as caused by BHA's failure to be responsive to
tenants' needs; BHA's lack of accountability to the community;
the presence of inadequately trained and qualified staff;
insufficient funds; etc., but their solution is to divest BHA
of its property. As a result, there were no attempts to force
BHA to bring in professional and highly trained management and
maintenance staff and to provide the needed craftsmen, equip-
ment and materials.
Existing tenants received little assistance with their com-
plaints or grievances from the Task Force and their consul-
tants. Minor problems became serious and physical defects
were exacerbated. It was felt that all problems would be
solved, once BHA no longer administered the development. The
simple answer was to seek the necessary agreement from the
other parties and create the incentive for private management
to take over. Both an interim and long-range management plan
were developed to be under the control of a developer and the
Task Force. Likewise, private redevelopment would solve any
other problems stemming from BHA ownership.
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In looking at the consultants' design attitude it should be
recalled that Columbia Point was one of the more desirable
developments in Boston when first constructed. Even though
there were problems (see discussion on design and density
problems in Chapter 4), they were not so serious that they
presented a major obstacle to the well-being of the community.
Even without significant physical improvements, Columbia Point
achieved a 90% occupancy rate until 1970. But the design-
er's fantasy is revealed in the Task Force's proposals to tear
down half the existing housing, reroute all the streets, and
create a suburban townhouse community. The image of "success-
ful family living" is low-rise, low-density housing surrounded
by extensive open space, trees, patios, private backyards,
etc., in other words, the "American Dream of suburbia."
The proposed housing is not typical of housing common to
Boston, such as the three-decker homes or apartments found in
the surrounding area. Instead, the consultants' design pro-
cess resembles one in which the designers design for a vacant
site with little economic or institutional constraints. In
this case, an appropriate design is made for a large parcel
situated on a beautiful shoreline without regard for the ex-
isting buildings. The process starts with the "ideal" and
saves only those buildings which happen to "fit" the ideal
plan, instead of examining the physical, social and management
components which have failed, and proposing a physical design
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solution making use of the existing buildings. For example,
the consultants assume an inherent problem with the mid-rise
buildings. One would have to condemn most of New York City
for "mixing families and high-rises," if one were to condemn
Columbia Point for this. The structures at Columbia Point
are neither "high-rises" nor are they of formidable scale
making them unlivable. The consultants left unexplored the
possibilities of making the mid-rises viable by refusing to
look at management, security and creative design solutions.
The Resident Needs Survey by the Task Force sheds light on
some of the physical changes that should be made to the ex-
isting low-rises. But one must be wary of surveys which
address questions unrelated to costs or constraints, as they
can be misleading. For example, asking residents if they
would like two bathrooms, a duplex, a backyard, wall-to-wall
carpeting, a private entrance, a front lawn, etc., would most
likely result in affirmative responses. Designs based on un-
qualified answers to these questions could result in radi-
cally different housing than what exists regardless of the
present levels of habitability. In this regard, the Carr,
Lynch Associates plan, to quote one participant, is "a poor
translation" of the Resident Needs Survey. Designers often
ignore the relation of management and institutional factors in
determining the quality of a physical space and fall victims
to architectural determinism. It is naively assumed that the
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siting of the buildings and the unit design must be "just so"
or else it will fail. (See discussion in Chapter 1.) Often
the concerns regarding social factors and their influence on
the environment are also misconstrued. Creation of total
racial and income mix, so that poor and minority households
are dispersed within a larger community, is seen as an ideal
solution which can automatically upgrade their class position
in society and improve the social environment.
The Columbia Point Community Task Force was elected with broad
tenant support more than two years ago, but since undertaking
its redevelopment plan, it has failed to maintain contact and
communication with the rest of the tenants. The Task Force
leadership, primarily Terry Mair, has been strong and active,
but little of the Task Force's negotiations and decisions have
filtered out to the community. Community-wide meetings were
not held regularly, substantive tenant input apart from Terry
Mair, a few members of the Task Force, and their consultants
has not been part of the current redevelopment plan. Most of
the tenants were not aware of the proposed demolition, the
problems surrounding income mix, relocation, and rehousing,
or the details of the redevelopment plan. Some tenants did
not even know that the Task Force had developed its own plan.
Not surprisingly, there is a growing awareness on the part
of tenants that basic, safe, sanitary housing provided by a
well managed Authority as part of the conventional program is
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more desirable and more permanent than luxury units. The
tenants are less interested in mixed-income communities, if
good management and maintenance are provided. Contact between
the Task Force and the tenants was also hard to maintain as
tenant complaints, emergencies, and problems of repair and
maintenance were not adequately addressed. Day-to-day prob-
lems are often an important means for communication between
the tenant organization and the tenants.
Recently, the Task Force itself acknowledged the need to in-
form all tenants fully of the redevelopment process and to
seek their input. In December 1979 the Task Force hired a
community organizer to see that the community becomes more
involved in the redevelopment issues.
Other problems stemmed from the Task Force itself having too
much power and control, so that it rarely felt the need to
communicate with the larger community. The BHA contributed
to the Task Force's isolation and their sense of omnipotence
when it came to tenant representation by only approaching the
Task Force, or more often, the Task Force President for feed-
back on official BHA policy. Soon, even the eight-member Task
Force as a whole was not active. BHA should not subvert the
Task Force's legitimate role in representation, but should
act responsibly to assist the Task Force in informing Columbia
Point residents of important issues which affect the community.
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The dominant influence of the consultants, GBCD and Carr,
Lynch Associates, further reinforced the isolation of the
Task Force. Their assistance in providing planning, design,
legal and other technical expertise led to Terry Mair and the
consultants working to the exclusion of other tenants. This
process also led to the leadership's lack of confidence in
other tenants to make decisions as they relied more and more
heavily on their consultants. This is not to deny that tech-
nical assistance is not an important factor in obtaining full
tenant involvement, but unless broad tenant participation is
maintained, as one tenant leader said, "pretty soon the con-
sultants will lead the tenants and not the other way around."
She was also to comment on her experience with GBCD, "they
are very good, but put them in their place or they will take
over the show."31 No matter how well-intentioned the consul-
tants may be, they cannot replace the knowledge or political
insight of those who are directly affected. A strong tenant
organization which can uphold the long-term interests of
tenants can only do so by maintaining contact with the tenant
body.
The University of Massachusetts
The University of Massachusetts was the first major partici-
pant in planning for redevelopment. Beginning with President
Robert Wood's activities during the period prior to the open-
ing of the new Harbor Campus, through the 1973 Columbia Point
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Task Force and the Peninsula Planning Committee, numerous
plans were developed. Commitments were made to the community
and public housing tenants concerning the University's obli-
gation to them (see Chapter 5). When President Wood left,
U Mass involvement ceased and the University no longer assumed
a major planning role for the peninsula.
In the past couple of years, U Mass has been left out of the
process for peninsula-wide planning and also for the planning
of its own site (vacant land adjacent to the pumphouse). In
Fall 1979 when the second draft of the Developer's Kit was
circulated, U Mass was confronted with a plan involving the
use of its site for mixed-income housing and other non-insti-
tutional purposes without having been informed of these
proposals. Fearing that the Legislature could simply transfer
the land at will, U Mass became uneasy about the possibility
of losing its land.
In October 1979, U Mass issued a questionnaire to all faculty
and staff at U Mass Boston to assess their need for new hous-
ing.32 This was an attempt to preempt losing its land by
showing the University's own needs. This survey was a defen-
sive action by the University administration who felt cut out
of the process after having failed to take initiative on the
proper use of its land. Until now, the University had not
only neglected its institutional responsibilities to protect
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its interest in the land but also had neglected its social
responsibilities to maintain its commitments to the public
housing project by not protecting its long-term interest as
a viable low-income community. On December 5, 1979, the U
Mass Board of Trustees voted that the President enter into
discussion with the BRA and BHA on the redevelopment plan.33
In the Spring of 1980, when the BRA issued its Environmental
Notification Form (pursuant to an application for urban re-
newal designation) for the peninsula, the University again
found that the plan precluded the University's interest. The
University made a belated response by seeking legal action.34
On June 18, 1980, a University Buildings and Grounds Committee
recommended that the Board of Trustees state strongly their
objection to the BRA plan to take jurisdiction of land under
a provision that designated it as "blighted."35
The University defended the use of its own land purely for
selfish reasons. Although it had legitimate institutional
interests concerned with expansion and housing needs, it
failed to concern itself with its previous commitments to the
community. On November 20, 1979 a petition to U Mass Chancel-
lor Robert Corrigan signed by U Mass faculty and staff at
College of Public and Community Service expressed concern
about the University's questionnaire and its future role in
planning for Columbia Point:
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We feel strongly that the University can and should
do more than just advocate its own particular
interests in the future development of Columbia
Point. The University must recognize that the
decision to develop a "Harbor Campus" on the penin-
sula precipitated both recognition of the develop-
ment potential of the area and anxiety within the
neighboring communities about the probability of
displacement. . . .
. . . As a public, urban university committed to
providing opportunities to people traditionally
denied them, UMB should not tolerate displacement
of poor people and reduction of the city's supply
of low-rent housing in general, and especially in
its own back yard. This does not mean that the
University should advocate the preservation of
the original 1500 units in the existing project,
but it does mean to insist on the inclusion of
no less than 1500 units of housing for low-income
people in the plans for the area and to oppose the
removal of any existing units before new ones are
assured.36
The petition included among other things that the University
commit itself formally and publicly to:
Public meetings, forums, and workshops must be
set up to provide input and feedback by inter-
ested parties at all points in the planning
process. . . .
. . . The number of low-rent public housing units
included in the final plans must be no less than
the 1500 units of public housing in the existing
Columbia Point housing development.
First priority for rehabilitated and new housing
must be given to present and former residents
of the Columbia Point Housing development.
In response to the petition and the growing concern with the
University's role in protecting public housing, on June 7,
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1980 a conference was held sponsored by the University of
Massachusetts and the Tenants Policy Council. As stated
by U Mass Chancellor Robert Corrigan:
Through the conference we seek to provide an
opportunity for public housing tenants and
advocates, policy makers, and the University
to present their views of the current problems
conderning public housing and the direction
they see for solving these problems. We also
wish to explore the ways in which the Univer-
sity, as an urban institution, can support the
interests of low-income tenants in Boston and
specifically what role the University should take
telative to the developmej of housing on the
Columbio Point peninsula.
At the conference, U Mass was to issue a statement strongly
supporting public housing in the city and no reduction of
public housing units city-wide.3 8
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The University was subject to criticisms from within because
of its failure to protect its institutional interests and
support the interest of low-income tenants. If the Univer-
sity remains an aggrieved party and continues its non-
involvement, it can simply say that the University is not
accountable for the redevelopment plan and its impact on the
poor. If the University becomes an active participant, it
would be obliged to uphold both the University's and the
community's interest.
The Tenants Policy Council
The Tenants Policy Council, the city-wide organization for
all public housing tenants, remained active throughout the
planning for Columbia Point. In the early days TPC directly
articulated the needs of Columbia Point tenants to the BHA
and sought to establish tenant input among the various bodies
planning for redevelopment. When the Columbia Point Task
Force became active, TPC assumed a reduced role, but remained
involved in overall policy issues relating to the BHA, the
Master's Office and the Consent Decree.
In 1977, TPC at its Annual Meeting passed a resolution opposed
to any reduction in low-income units city-wide (see Chapter
5 and Appendix). In 1979 when the Task Force presented its
Revitalization Plan, or the Green Book, and the drafts of the
developer's kits were released, TPC, concerned with the
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implications of demolition, disposition and the loss of low-
income housing units, held numerous meetings with the Task
Force and the BHA to persuade them to take a different course
in redevelopment. TPC sought to clarify BHA's policy on
rehabilitation and demolition at Columbia Point. This re-
sulted in a BHA document outlining the city-wide need for low
and moderate-income housing, demolition as a negative prece-
dent, the need for replacement housing, and the responsibility
of the public sector, and an alternative plan showing the
feasibility of rehabilitation versus new demolition and new
construction.39 (This document was subsequently ignored by
the BHA itself.) TPC held meetings with the Task Force to
discuss the implication of the Carr, Lynch Associates' site
plan on the low-income population, and other meetings were
held with the Task Force and BHA staff on the specifics of
demolition and privatization.
TPC encouraged the Task Force to play an active and informed
role, but TPC differed with the Task Force on certain issues.
In a letter addressed to Marvin Siflinger, HUD Area Director,
TPC clarified its position on the Columbia Point plan:
The Tenants Policy Council, as the city-wide organi-
zation, is responsible for considering the broadest
impact of any policy which may be set by a Local
Tenant Policy Council (formerly known as the Task
Force). The issues of demolition and sale in Colum-
bia Point certainly are appropriate causes for grave
concern on the part of the TPC Board of Directors.
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In behalf of the 7,000+ families on BHA's waiting
list, and because of the impact on about half of
BHA's family developments, the TPC Board of Directors
cannot, and will not, agree to any policy which per-
mits any loss of units by demolition, sale or conver-
sion without a prior commitment to replace all lost
units on a one for one basis and in addition to any
units which would be allocated to BHA through regular
programs.
Demolition as a possible solution for vacant units
in even one development is a dire threat to every
development with relatively high vacancies.
In a city with literally no available housing, and
especially no affordable housing for low, moderate or
middle-income families the permanent loss of public
housing would be criminal. In addition, the impact
of the planned urban redevelopment throughout the
city, condominium conversions, today's economy and
the lack of new family construction are all important
elements which do not s m to be part of the decisions
made in Columbia Point.
The redevelopment plan for Columbia Point was revealed to
the larger population of public housing tenants and those
concerned with low-income housing, but the BHA had still not
addressed the issue of how low-income housing was being pro-
tected. In a letter addressed to Clyde McHenry, HUD Assistant
Secretary for Housing in December 1979, William Hurld, TPC
Board Chairman, and Myra McAdoo, TPC Executive Director,
stated the organization's objections to the Columbia Point
plan and made an appeal to HUD:
The Tenants Policy Council, the recognized, elected,
citywide representative of more than 60,000 tenants
who live in Boston's public housing, strongly protests
the actions calling for demolition and disposition of
the public housing stock, the shrinking of the public
housing inventory, and any actions which would result
in the displacement of low and moderate income house-
holds in the City of Boston. The recent disclosures
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in Boston around the proposed redevelopment of
Columbia Point will have serious implications on
the supply of low-income housing. We appeal to HUD
to stop the processes that would jeopardize the wel-
fare of public housing and low-income residents in
Boston.4 1
The letter stated a need for more than 67,000 low-income
units for Boston. A third of all households are living in
substandard housing, and third of the population is low-
income. The proposed redevelopment plan would result in the
permanent loss of public housing units at a time when Boston's
housing needs were expanding: and the needs of the elderly,
large families, minority households and female heads of
households cannot be ignored, "measures to take away our
housing will not solve the housing problem but can only exac-
erbate already reprehensible conditions. ,42 TPC's position
on redevelopment was the following:
Boston's public housing tenants cannot afford the
careless and wasteful demolition of public housing
buildings. The massive disposition of public housing
properties for private redevelopment purposes is an
irresponsible act on the part of the BHA, and will
result in the net loss of low-income housing oppor-
tunities.
Tenants would like to see improvements made to the
existing stock, the swift reform of an incompetent
and mismanaged BHA, the institution of highly pro-
fessional management, and an expansion of the assisted
housing program. We feel that public housing is the
only avenue that can provide decent and affordable
housing for those in need.
. . . The TPC fully supports the Columbia Point
tenants and the Columbia Point Community Task Force,
in creating a suitable living environment for low and
moderate income households, and we are in support of
increased funding to develop Columbia Point. But we
do not want to see public housing property as a
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"give-away" to the City or the private sector at
the expense of public housing tenants and the low
and moderate income population in Boston. We are
well aware of the attractiveness of the Columbia
Point site, especially the waterfront location, and
the poten al private development opportunities it
provides.4
While the Task Force itself had proposed demolition, dispo-
sition and private redevelopment of the public housing site,
TPC felt that given its legal authority, BHA was the party
responsible for any action in these directions. Further,
BHA was using the Task Force's plan as an excuse for its own
reluctance to deviate from what the City, the private sector,
and even its own staff wanted for Columbia Point:
We feel that the BHA, as, supposedly, the institu-
tion for the provision of low-income housing, has
acted irresponsibly in protecting the interests of
public housing tenants. Until the designation of
a Receiver, BHA will continue the process of
abandoning the needs of public housing residents.
. . . [S]upporting the demolition of 660 units at
Columbia Point is an indication of their gross
negligence and irresponsibility in providing for
the needs of the poor in Boston. 44
TPC also felt that the Task Force was not doing its part to
inform other tenants at Columbia Point of the nature of the
plan, so TPC sought to represent the interest of the majority
of tenants at Columbia Point, other public housing tenants
and the low-income population in general. For public housing
tenants and for those who were cut out of the process, TPC
maintained a clear and consistent position in redevelopment.
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This was to create a certain amount of tension between the
Task Force and TPC. Even though other parties such as the
BHA and the City took this opportunity to exploit the differ-
ences between TPC and the Task Force to weaken the overall
position of tenants, TPC felt that this was not as important
as achieving a responsible approach to redevelopment.
TPC took a strong posture against demolition, disposition and
the loss of low-income units in light of the following cir-
cumstances: first, in the memorandum of agreement between the
BHA and TPC dated March 21, 1972, TPC is delegated as the vehicle
for the views of all tenants.45 Each local tenant body
is given broad autonomy to work to improve living conditions
in the development but TPC has overall supervisory authority
over Task Forces and can overrule them on any particular
matter. Second, TPC believes that the demolition and dispo-
sition regulations issued by HUD, November 9, 1979, (described
in the next section), would show that demolition and disposi-
tion are not warranted; and third, the court order issued for
the Receiver makes no authorization for demolition. The
responsibilities of the Receiver are to "preserve and to
rehabilitate for occupancy by low income persons or families
the maximum number of housing units as are consistent with
the provision and operation of decent and safe and sanitary
housing for all residents therein. ,46
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As the Task Force became more isolated from the community,
and as BHA, prior to receivership, continued to lose its
credibility in defending low-income housing interests, TPC
became the only party to represent the interest of low-income
people.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development
HUD is an important recourse for the low-income population in
upholding their interest at Columbia Point. HUD will ulti-
mately have to approve any redevelopment plan for the BHA
site. The developer's kit, plans for demolition, disposition,
refinancing and subsidy programs all have to be commented on
by HUD Area and Regional Offices and approved by the Assistant
Secretary's office. HUD's position until now has been re-
served and timid on the questions of demolition and disposi-
tion as they have mostly been observers to the planning pro-
cess. HUD has been unwilling to take a firm position until
final plans or the developer's kit are presented for approval.
HUD is unlikely to completely halt the redevelopment process
as it is eager to see the public housing "turned around,"
but neither is it anticipated that HUD would support a solu-
tion which recreates the sensationalism surrounding Pruitt-
Igoe. HUD does not want further delays nor embarrassment in
seeking a solution at Columbia Point. In response to TPC's
concerns, HUD has informed TPC:
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Please be assured that the Department [HUD] is
equally concerned that the needs for assisted
housing in the City of Boston be met, and that
actions are not taken which will adversely affect
either present tenants of the BHA or those people
currently in need of housing assistance.4/
On November 9, 1979, HUD issued its Rules and Regulations
(24 CFR Part 870) on the partial or total demolition of
buildings and disposition of PHA-owned land:
It is HUD's policy to conserve and maintain the
existing stock of low-income housing to the maxi-
mum extent consistent with considerations of need
and feasibility. Unless it can be demonstrated
that a project, or a portion of a project, is ex-
cessive to local needs for low-income housing,
every reasonable effort will be made by HUD and
the PHA to keep the property within the low-income
housing inventory. If the project is not excess
to local needs, but is unsuitable for housing use
because of its physical condition, every reasonable
effort shall be made to return it to a condition
suitable for housing use, through the Modernization
Program or other means. Accordingly, HUD will
limit approval for demolition or disposition to
those cases where such action can be fully justified
in accordange with the criteria set forth under
this part. 40
The primary criteria for determining whether a PHA's request
for demolition or disposition is justified are the following:
1. Current and projected needs for low-income
housing in the jurisdiction served by the
PHA. . . . If there is a local need for low
income housing, the PHA's request for demoli-
tion or disposition of dwelling units shall
include a plan for replacement housing on a
one-to-one basis or as approved by HUD to be
warranted by current and projected needs for
low-income housing, subject to HUD's finding
as to the availability of funds.
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2. The physical condition of the property and,
where pertinent, the feasibility of rehabili-
tation. Rehabilitation shall be considered
feasible if its estimated cost does not exceed
the published prototype cost limit for similar
structure in the same prototype cost area.49
The secondary criteria for HUD's evaluation include the
following in order of importance:
1. location in an area that adversely affects the
life, health or safety of project residents;
2. social conditions affecting the marketability
of the project;
3. the project's density which seriously affects
the marketability of the project;
4. benefits to the project or public interest from
disposition of a limited interest in real estate
e.g., easements;
5. the views of tenants and the local governing
body.50
In addition, HUD's approval of a PHA's request for demolition
and/or disposition is subjected to applicable requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Regulations also
govern aspects of tenants' participation, of PHA's proper
notification to the tenants and tenant organization, and sub-
mission of all comments to HUD.
With a "good faith" application of these criteria, the HUD
regulations make it very difficult for the Columbia Point
proposal to be approved. The arguments by the various
parties, the BHA, the BRA and the Task Force, up until now
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do not appear to meet the criteria for either demolition or
disposition. Their arguments have been concerned with the
following: the "image" of the housing and not its use poten-
tial; the "marketability" of the housing to upper-income
groups and not to low-income tenants; and the benefits of the
plan to encourage private development interest as opposed to
any "limited" public good. The units have not been found in
excess to need nor infeasible to rehabilitate. On the con-
trary, an overwhelming need for low-income housing has been
documented by the Columbia Point and the BHA overall waiting
lists and the housing assistance needs for Boston (see Chap-
ter 2). All the studies to date have shown the feasibility
of rehabilitation as opposed to demolition and new construc-
tion (see Chapter 5). In 1979, rehabilitation was estimated
at $28 to $37 thousand for a substantially modernized unit
at Columbia Point, compared with $66 thousand for a new con-
struction unit (excluding demolition costs).51 As to the
secondary criteria, density at Columbia Point has been shown
to be lower than average for developments in Boston (see
Chapter 4) and even in its present condition, the project
remains marketable to public housing eligible households as
shown by the waiting list. HUD's last criterion, the "views
of tenants and the local governing body," e.g., the Task
Force, the City, and the BRA, appears to be the only criterion
met by the BHA in proposing demolition and disposition. In
the manner demolition and disposition have been proposed,
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the parties have acted as if the last criterion was the most
important!
The HUD regulations issued in November were not to become
effective until December 10, 1979. In the meantime, the BRA,
the BHA and the Task Force revised the third draft of the
Developer's Selection Kit (November 19, 1979) which mentioned
demolition of up to 660 units, and disposition of a substan-
tial portion of the BHA site, in order that the fourth draft
(issued January 14, 1980) not mention any figures for demoli-
tion and disposition.52 Even though the plan had not changed,
the parties did not want to specify the details on demolition
and disposition because of the HUD regulations. Instead, a
strategy was adopted by the parties for HUD to approve the
Developer's Selection Kit without the BHA having first defined
the extent of demolition and disposition. Only with a devel-
oper aboard would the final decisions on demolition and dis-
position be made. Late in the process, these figures would
be submitted to HUD for approval, HUD would then be under
pressure to approve the plan. 53 Moreover, since neither the
BHA nor the City had any intention of proposing a replacement
housing plan, forcing HUD into approving the plan at the last
minute would facilitate this problem; it will then be con-
venient for HUD to say that no extra funds were available and
none were allocated for replacement housing at Columbia
Point.
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Other factors also influence HUD's point of view on demoli-
tion and disposition. BHA's proposed use of the UI funds
does not follow the normal guidelines for modernization: the
use of funds for rehabilitation, deferred maintenance, site
improvement, etc. Instead, the current plan proposed a major
use of the funds for demolition. The UI program, initiated
specifically to seek alternatives to demolition, thereby
poses the question of massive demolition as an eligible item.54
The request would have to be approved by the Area Office and
the HUD Assistant Secretary's Office.
Private redevelopment which maintains a commitment for a
certain number of subsidized low and moderate-income units
can only be achieved with massive subsidies from HUD for a
combination of programs: Section 8 new construction and
substantial rehabilitation, Section 234, 235, a UDAG grant,
in addition to public housing subsidies, and continuation of
HUD payment for debt service. There are limits to the avail-
ability of such funds. HUD should clearly question the
feasibility of massive demolition and disposition of public
housing and then refinancing low and moderate-income new con-
struction and substantial rehabilitation housing through
other programs. With the limited funds available, even if
HUD could commit funds through normal allocations or from the
Secretary's discretionary funds, it would seem a wasteful
process to achieve substantially fewer low-income units after
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redevelopment. Serious problems exist with the logic of
demolishing sound buildings and then requesting funds for
new construction, since this would cut into normal pipeline
allocations that could produce additional housing elsewhere.
Just as HUD is reluctant to commit new construction alloca-
tions to Boston when large numbers of vacancies exist in
public housing, it would appear that they would be reluctant
to demolish sound units and provide new units in the same
location.
Close to 5,000 new low and moderate-income units are required
at a time when fair share allocations for Boston are extremely
low.55 Approximately 130 new Section 8 units are allocated
for all of Boston for Fiscal Year 1980, with one-half for new
construction and the other half for substantial rehabilita-
tion.56 Providing even a hundred new low-income units at
Columbia Point will require a substantial commitment from the
Secretary's discretionary fund.
Economic feasibility and cost efficiency would hopefully
govern HUD's decision on demolition. A careful assessment of
the rehabilitation cost for the units "to return it [them] to
a condition suitable for housing use" as stated in HUD's demo-
lition regulations would be necessary. This is clearly
distinct from the attainment of "luxury" quality housing,
which is explicitly not the objective of the Urban Initiatives
program.
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Demolition and disposition continue to be of central concern
to HUD, but the agency has chosen not to intervene because
"it does not want to get involved in local decision making."57
Thus, HUD has only applied pressure for a consensus among
the three parties. This posture might appear appropriate for
HUD, but there are those who are concerned that if HUD con-
tinues to stand aloof, plans and developments would progress
so far that HUD would have to "go along" with an approval or
face the pressures of halting a process that took consider-
able negotiation, resources and energy by the three parties.58
HUD has been kept considerably abreast of the redevelopment
plan, but it has not given the parties much direction to
insure that the plan conforms to the specific regulations for
demolition, disposition, replacement housing, and for preser-
vation of low-income housing. In the meantime, the parties
proceed with little regard for HUD's regulations.
HUD's indecisiveness on clamping down on the BHA and the City
to pursue a reasonable approach at Columbia Point only rein-
forces the belief among the residents that there are no
possibilities for improvements short of private redevelopment.
HUD's inaction to make sure that the UI funds are used by BHA
to immediately rehabilitate occupied and vacant apartments
and to provide the needed repairs, further contributes to the
delay in any improvements in living conditions for existing
residents.
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CONCLUSION
Even though the view of the City, the BHA and the Task Force
differed, the parties arrived at a consensus on the draft
developer's kit. To summarize, the City and the BRA remained
committed to their original plan and pushed to keep the main
elements intact. Interestingly, the City's current proposals
for massive demolition and disposition of public housing,
private redevelopment, and a significant decrease in the low-
income population were not only a continuation of their
previous position, but were also the results of the City's
unsettled fear about whether a market for upper-income housing
and private investment actually could exist on the peninsula.
The results of BRA's own housing market study left doubts
that market housing was feasible given the negative "image"
of the peninsula, the high cost of new construction, the
reluctance of families to move to an area perceived as
"risky," the problems of making a mixed-income development
attractive to upper-income groups, and the amount of public
investments which would be necessary to leverage sufficient
private interest. These and a host of other problems had to
be addressed prior for a market to be established.
The more it appeared that market housing would be difficult
to achieve, the more adamant the City became in pushing for
drastic solutions for the public housing site to guarantee
future development success. The City's plan retained its
"idealized" version in the Thompson Plan and the Boston Plan,
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even though the workability of the plan became questionable,
Therefore, the City's position in negotiations, e.g., its
arguments for greater numbers of market-rate units and for
more elderly and adult-only housing, served to undercut low-
income housing interests, even when it became uncertain that
the City's goals were attainable.
The BHA was caught between going along with the City's plan
or fulfilling its mandate to provide low-income housing.
Members of the BHA Board, administration and staff on the
whole supported the City's plan, but the BHA had to find a
credible justification for this position because of its
accountability to HUD and to the Court. BHA was further con-
fronted with TPC and others opposed to BHA's proposed actions.
Deviating from its own consultants' findings (who supported
rehabilitation), BHA used the excuses of the Task Force's sup-
port for private redevelopment and of pressures from the City,
the BRA and the private sector who needed BHA's support
for demolition and disposition of public housing. BHA was
not interested in protecting the public housing tenants, as
evident in BHA's long-range plan as well as short-term
housing policies for Columbia Point.
The Task Force was unable to conceive of a redevelopment plan
which was fundamentally different from what the City wanted.
The Task Force plan, developed with the assistance
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of GBCD and Carr, Lynch Associates, accepted the basic prem-
ise of the Thompson Plan and the Boston Plan and merely added
the role of the Task Force as partners in redevelopment. This
point of view first assumes that the Task Force will be suc-
cessful in obtaining not just partnership, but significant
status as co-equal partners with a developer; and second,
that if this is achieved, the plan would benefit the low-
income population.
The Task Force attempted to make a case for "good family
living" by proposing its own set of reasons for demolition
and disposition of public housing, but this only served to
play into the hands of the City, the BRA and the private
interests. In the end, the Task Force's figures for income
mix, family and elderly housing mix, demolition and disposi-
tion differed little from the City's. A significant loss of
low-income housing opportunities remained.
Without contact with the rest of the Columbia Point community
the Task Force did not maintain a perspective which benefited
the low-income population as a whole. The Task Force's plan,
like the City's, reflected a narrow and selfish concern with
who is to gain from redevelopment. In this case, a small
number of tenants who remain after redevelopment will receive
"luxury" quality units and will be able to share in the pro-
ceeds from private development.
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The University of Massachusetts, having been a major partici-
pant in the planning process, found itself left out of the
planning for even its own site. Late in 1979 U Mass sought
to become involved again, only to find concern within its own
community that U Mass's participation in the planning should
reflect not only valid institutional needs but also the needs
of the public housing community. From the previous Trustee's
statement in 1973, U Mass' support and commitment to the hous-
ing project was raised again in 1979, resulting in U Mass
taking a position in support of no reduction in the number of
public housing units in the city.
When the City relinquished any concern for providing low-
income housing opportunities at Columbia Point or elsewhere,
the BHA was entangled with the Court over its basic ability
to manage and maintain public housing, and finally, the Task
Force shirked its responsibility to represent the interest
of tenants. TPC tried to hold the parties accountable to
their institutional mandates. The impact of redevelopment on
the Columbia Point tenants, public housing tenants, and the
low-income population city-wide became the concern of TPC.
TPC was in favor of no demolition of public housing without
replacement housing, no disposition of stock and no decrease
in the number of low-income units. TPC continued to strongly
support public housing as a vehicle for providing low-income
housing. TPC also called for the swift rehabilitation and
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occupancy of the units at Columbia Point and for improvements
to be made for present and future public housing residents.
Having experienced years of problems with Columbia Point and
suffering from the lack of any recent successes in public
housing, HUD was "laying low" in directing a course for re-
development. HUD did not feel it appropriate to be involved
with the detailed negotiations and "local" issues. Therefore,
it did little to see to it that BHA abide by the HUD demoli-
tion and disposition regulations. Thus, without HUD's
active and firm involvement throughout the process, decisions
may be made which are unacceptable to HUD--but by then it
will be too late.
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THE IMPLICATION OF REDEVELOPMENT
"Whether it's 10, 20 or 5 that
should be torn down, who knows?
I think it's ridiculous to keep
all the buildings up as physical
eyesores."
--Andrew Olins, Special
Assistant to the Mayor
for Housing, speaking
on Columbia Point,
19761
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CHAPTER 7:
CHAPTER 7
THE IMPLICATION OF REDEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
Once consensus is reached on program mix, demolition,
disposition and other development issues, we will find a
proposal for a significant social experiment in tenant and
developer partnership in redeveloping a major public housing
site for mixed-income housing. It becomes clear that rede-
velopment will come at a high cost to those who have been in
the greatest need for housing. A critical appraisal of the
implications of redevelopment has not been undertaken by any
of the three parties, nor by HUD.
Even though the plan has not been finalized, the progress
made on the draft developer's kit is sufficient for
drawing some conclusive statements about the implications of
the plan.
This chapter seeks to assess the impact of the most recent
redevelopment plan on the low-income and public housing popu-
lation. This includes discussions of four factors: (1)
mixed-income housing, (2) private redevelopment, (3) demoli-
tion and disposition of public housing, and (4) the physical
design of the site.
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THE CONSENSUS PLAN
The implication of redevelopment from the third and fourth
draft of the Developer's Selection Kit are summarized below:2
1. Reduction of Low-income Units
The proposed plan would reduce the total number of public
housing units by more than 790 units, or more than half
of the existing 1,504 units. This is a reduction of 7%
of the City of Boston's supply of federally-aided units
for low-income families. More than 700 units would be
provided for households above the Section 8 income limits
for moderate and market housing at a time when 7,000
households are on the public housing waiting list. The
evidence instead points to an appropriate need for in-
creased numbers of low-income family and elderly units
(see Chapter 2).
2. Massive Demolition of Sound Public Housing Units
Demolition is being considered for close to 660 units,
close to half of the existing stock.3 Ten to 15 of the
mid-rises and 7 to 12 of the low-rise buildings will be
demolished or partially demolished. Both mid-rises and
low-rises will be demolished to provide for new construc-
tion units in the same location. In analyzing the rede-
velopment plans, the cost advantages for rehabilitation
as opposed to new construction were ignored. Creative
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redesign and rehabilitation solutions by Steffian Bradley
Associates, and cost studies by Dan Walker and David
Carter demonstrated the exciting potential for re-use of
the existing buildings, but these were all overlooked in
the latest proposal (see Chapters 5 and 6). Instead, the
proposed site plan shows well-maintained, renovated and
occupied buildings to be torn down or "cut" for reasons
as capricious as the buildings blocking the view towards
the pumphouse and the U Mass site.4
3. Permanent Loss of Low-income Units
Public housing units demolished or disposed of will be
permanently lost. No plans have been made for replace-
ment housing. According to HUD regulations, the BHA is
required to prove that the units are in excess to local
need prior to demolition or disposition, or present a
one-for-one replacement housing plan, but BHA has refused
to do this. Moreover, the existing buildings have not
been shown to be infeasible to rehabilitate. The loss of
low-income units is also contrary to TPC's resolution
stating "complete and active opposition to any action
which would result in any reduction in the total number
of occupied or unoccupied rental units administered by
the BHA . . . unless compensated by the addition of at
least an equal number of new rental units--either through
subsidized housing or other housing program."5
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4. Disposition of Low-income Housing Resource
One-half to four-fifths of the BHA site of 37.5 acres
of developable land in addition to another 37.8 acres of
tidal land will be given away or sold to the developer.
Even though the final size of the parcel to be disposed
of has not been decided, BHA is willing to declare the
land as "surplus."6 The surplusing of land at Columbia
Point is in question as to conforming with the HUD regu-
lations. Privatization will also result in the loss of
an irreplaceable and necessary social resource. The
inherent problems of privatizing public housing, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, will make it more difficult to meet
low-income housing needs.
5. Transfer to Private Ownership
Private ownership by a developer of most of the BHA site
is proposed. BHA will maintain ownership of only 7 to 10
of the 30 buildings as it is reluctant to retain any more.
BHA will keep only those which it is required to: 2 to
3 buildings housing social services, 4 buildings already
rehabilitated with 1975 Modernization funds, and 2 elderly
and 2 family buildings to be rehabilitated with the Urban
Initiatives funds. Private management is also proposed
as an adequate solution to the present problems. While
the parties continue to pursue a private redevelopment
solution, the example of King's Lynne and similar attempts
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(see Chapter 3), show an overstatement of the benefits
of this approach.
6. Inefficient Use of Urban Initiatives Funds
A total of $11.2 million Urban Initiatives and Moderni-
zation monies will be used only for demolition, rehabili-
tation of the social service buildings, site work and
rehabilitation of four buildings. The BHA is unwilling
to spend major program funds for housing rehabilitation
on its site because it would commit those units to BHA
ownership. In other words, an "effective" solution to
the problems of public housing appears to be getting rid
of the buildings so that BHA no longer has ownership and
maintenance responsibilities. The proposed use of the
Urban Initiatives funds, of spending excessive funds for
rehabilitating very few units to achieve "luxury" quality
housing, is also inconsistent with the HUD Urban Initia-
tives Program guidelines which state that:
The goal of the rehabilitation is to make all
necessary changes to bring the physical struc-
ture up to an acceptable condition. This may
entail the revision of unit sizes and changes
on project design . . . to bring the project
up to non-luxury code standards. [Emphasis
added.]'
7. Unrealistic Density Figures
The redevelopment plan proposes a density of less than 20
units per acre on a 106.1-acre site. The 1,470 units on
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82.2 acres which comprise the residential site will
result in less than 18 units per acre. This is in con-
trast to the density in areas of Boston which averages 40-45
units per acre, and 35 units per acre in Dorchester and South
Boston. The existing housing on the BHA site is 38 units
per acre, already in the low to mid-range of densities of
BHA's family developments (see Chapter 4). The plan for
a "utopian" suburban, beachfront, townhouse setting is
unrealistic and misleading; it inhibits the development
of an urban site and artificially constrains the provi-
sion of additional low and moderate-income housing. The
1,470 proposed units is less than what presently exists
on 37 acres. There appears to be no rational basis for
the proposed density in each of the plans, as it has
ranged from 4,000 units in the Thompson Plan to the pres-
ent low of 1,470 units.
8. Lack of Alternative Plan
The securing of financial resources and commitments has
not been made. The development of any new low and
moderate-income housing is solely contingent on funding
for Section 8, Section 235, a $11.3 million UDAG, and
other grants. It is highly unlikely that some or all of
these funds will be forthcoming. In the meantime, no
alternative plans have been proposed to redevelop the BHA
site as viable public housing or low and moderate mixed-
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income housing. Urban Initiative funds are already being
committed to improve only a minimal portion of the site
in anticipation of other funds--but, if these don't come
through, the presence of low-income households on the
peninsula will be jeopardized.
9. Displacement Pressures
Mixed-income housing will not only decrease the number
of low-income units at Columbia Point, but displacement
and gentrification pressures will be present in the sur-
rounding communities of Dorchester and South Boston. The
opening up of a market for upper-income households on the
peninsula in the form of condominiums, sale housing and
luxury rental units will mean that the already tight
housing market in existing neighborhoods will be exacer-
bated. The income mix proposed for Columbia Point does
not conform to the current mix in Dorchester or South
Boston. For both these neighborhoods, the median family
income is less than the City's average, and the percentage
of households below the poverty level is greater than the
City as a whole.8 An unmet need for low and moderate-
income housing exists, but once the area is perceived as
attractive to wealthier households, market pressures will
diminish the supply of housing for neighborhood residents.
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10. Columbia Point as a Precedent
Many BHA developments are in an equal or greater state
of deterioration than Columbia Point. Without major
efforts in seeking alternatives to demolition and dis-
position, an unfortunate precedent will be set; BHA can
readily be expected to opt for demolition and disposi-
tion when sufficient pressure is applied from the City,
the BRA and the private sector. Columbia Point has
become of central concern to public housing tenants;
rehabilitation and demolition are seen in a city-wide
context because of the BHA's role as a main provider of
subsidized housing.
MIXED-INCOME HOUSING
It is commonly argued that mixed-income housing is the solu-
tion to Columbia Point, just as it is the answer to the
nation's low-income housing "problem." By breaking up the
concentration of poor people, a development can be transformed
into a "healthy" social environment unencumbered by the prob-
lems of chronic unemployment, large numbers of single-parent
heads of households, large numbers of children, the presence
of crime and vandalism, etc. While this may be the typical
explanation given for redeveloping Columbia Point, in reality,
mixed-income housing was initiated for other underlying
reasons: (1) U Mass wanted a compatible residential commu-
nity as their neighbor and not a low-income project; (2) the
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BRA wanted a total change of image so that property values
could increase and development opportunities be expanded on
the peninsula; (3) income mix would also bring about racial
mix, so that others besides poor, black and minority families
could live on the attractive site; and (4) BHA would will-
ingly be relieved of its financial and managerial burden of
maintaining its largest and most stigmatized housing project.
In seeking a solution to Columbia Point, the parties could
have proposed mixed-income housing without lessening housing
opportunities for the poor by supporting a stable low and
moderate-income mix for the BHA site, and other mixed-income
housing for the non-BHA parcels. The City, the BRA, and the
BHA instead, wanted a substantial decrease in the number of
low-income households after redevelopment. They were able to
propose this under the guise of mixed-income housing. The
Task Force, with the assistance of its consultants, was led
to believe that income mix was also in the tenants' best
interest. The Task Force thought it was somehow possible to
achieve "no separate areas by income or racial group."
In accepting the idea of "total" income mix, an artificial
proportional limit on the number of low-income units is
established. The redevelopment plan proposes limiting
low-income units to one-third of the total development. No
rationale is given for this, nor is the proposed income mix
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comparable to the mix in the surrounding area. Successful
housing for low-income residents is dependent on the support
and livability of an environment for them and not on pre-
determined decisions arbitrarily established by largely unre-
lated standards including density, development size, housing
type, income mix, etc. (see discussion in Chapter 1 on HUD's
Residents' Satisfaction Study). The parties did not under-
take any study to assess the numbers of low-income units which
could be supported on the total peninsula, nor did they pro-
duce evidence showing a lack of low-income housing needs to
justify any reduction in the original 1,500 low-income units.
Complete or "ideal" income mix cannot be achieved program-
matically; funding sources and subsidy programs play a major
part in physically differentiating the site according to
ownership, housing type, unit size and subsidy levels. It is
unlikely that sufficient housing resources are available for
the subsidized components if Section 8 and programs other
than public housing are used to achieve full income integra-
tion. Total income mix is not practical nor obtainable.
The pursuit of this objective only results in further reduc-
tions in the number of low-income units. Attempting to
"disperse" or distribute low-income units evenly throughout
the site means that public housing is essentially discarded
as a viable vehicle for supplying low-income housing, and an
opportunity is foregone to develop any appreciable number of
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subsidized housing in an area. Therefore, while appearing to
be an embraceable concept, income mix is fraught with serious
problems when carefully analyzed.
The Task Force, as well as the BHA, have been misled as to
the attractiveness of mixed-income housing. Any hope of full
income as well as racial mix is unrealistic and naive, since
institutional constraints will connote some general geographic
location of subsidized units, if housing programs are to be
used at all. If the Task Force and the BHA are concerned
with the welfare of the low-income population, proposing
greater and more effective utilization of Urban Initiatives,
Modernization and other public funds on the BHA site, and ob-
taining low and moderate-income housing commitments on the
non-BHA sites both for public housing units lost through
rehabilitation or consolidation, and additional units, would
bring the greatest return. To make the best use of avail-
able subsidies and provide for the greatest numbers of low
and moderate-income households, the public housing site would
have to be rehabilitated for low and moderate-income house-
holds, and funding obtained for new subsidized housing, in-
cluding public housing, Section 8, Section 235, 236 and
Chapters 705 and 707 housing for the adjacent sites. Condo-
minums, market rental and ownership housing would be developed
only on non-BHA owned land and could be economically inte-
grated using Section 8 and low and moderate-income coopera-
tive housing.
352
Mixed-income housing should be viewed as a desirable alterna-
tive only if low-income housing opportunities are increased,
as opposed to decreased. The present proposal for Columbia
Point results in increased housing opportunities for middle
and upper-income groups. There is a direct correlation be-
tween the number of low-income units lost and upper-income
units gained, even though the area of the residential site
has been more than doubled from 37.5 acres to 80.1 acres.
In addition to the concerns raised about the impact of income
mix in reducing the quantities of low-income units, certain
social ramifications are also present. Effectively, the low-
income population is being told that the existence of a
cohesive and functioning community is contingent on upper-
income households being brought in to "turn around" the
development. A belief that a "culture of poverty" exists,
and that poor people need "role models" for upward mobility
is still the opinion of many who support mixed-income housing.
Accordingly, the pressures for income a d1 social mix are
applied one way: to integrate low-income housing develop-
ments and low-income neighborhoods, while segregated upper-
income and exclusive areas are tolerated. Moreover, the focus
and pressures for integration take on a racist character as
'race" also becomes a dominant mode for housing policies (see
discussion in Chapter 1 on "racial balancing" and "fair
share" housing).
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In contrast to much of the prevailing literature, the report
prepared for HUD on "Residents' Satisfaction in HUD-Assisted
Housing" (described in Chapter 1), suggests that the benefits
of social mixing in subsidized projects are often illusionary
or overstated. It was found that: "the more other residents
in the development were perceived to be similar to oneself, the
higher the level of satisfaction with other residents and
with living in that development."9 This was true for ques-
tions about similar child-rearing ideas, similar interests,
similar education and similar beliefs about right and wrong.
This finding led to a recommendation to HUD that: "A re-
examination of policies fostering deliberate socio-economic
mix be undertaken. . . . Presently available findings suggest
that mixing households having widely different moral beliefs,
life styles and education should be avoided within a single
development."10
Comments from some of the residents who were surveyed included
statements such as:
I would like to say that I think college people are
real snobbish. There are more college people in
this place. They seem to think they are so much
better than everyone else. I wasn't raised this way.
The people around me are like pigs, very sloppy.
They throw garbage around our yard and step on our
plants. They throw rocks and snowballs at our house
and cut our screens.
The first comment shows a response to the imposition of
another income group with a different educational background
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and lifestyle, the second, of a response to disruptive and
irresponsible tenants. Both comments typify the responses
to groups which tend to cause problems in low-income communi-
ties.
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) study, "A
Social Audit of MHFA Housing," looked at sixteen MHFA devel-
opments comprising 3,200 households. The following research
question was constructed: are tenants in housing develop-
ments with a mix of income levels more or less satisfied than
tenants in developments that are more homogeneous with respect
to income mix and racial mix?l2 The study concluded that in-
come and racial mix are secondary factors in determining
tenant satisfaction:
The basic fact appears to be that income mix,
surely, and racial mix, very probably, have no
significant effect on satisfaction; whatever con-
ceivable effect they migt have is overwhelmed and
completely overshadowed by more basic factors of
design, construction, space facilities, location,
maintenance and management. 1 3
Housing, housing services and broader issues represented the
relevant realm in assessing tenants' satisfaction, instead of
social mix:
In its first year or two, MHFA stimulated the pro-
duction of a significant amount of housing of a very
high quality. . . . Broad income mix "works" in these
MHFA developments, producing higher levels of satis-
faction at all levels--market income, moderate income,
and low income, principally because these develop-
ments are superior in design, construction and
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management. Income mix as such does not seem to
be an important determinant of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction.14
Income and racial mix per se cannot improve the housing or
the environment in lieu of proper management and maintenance.
The MHFA study also found that "perceived income mix and per-
ceived number of minority families in the development were
not correlated with satisfaction." Often a fallacious assump-
tion is made of identifying communities which are poor and
minority as being "problem" communities.
An associational relation is not the same as a causal rela-
tion; the predominance of low-income and minority households
with poor living conditions and substandard housing is a
reflection of their diminished economic status in society and
the denial of housing and other opportunities to them and not
because poor and minority people cannot live in decent and
well-maintained housing. We have seen many examples of well-
designed and properly run housing developments for low-income
households even when the population is predominantly minor-
ity--because the deciding factors of management, social
services, maintenance, and so on, are adequate. Within a
context of satisfactory housing and housing services, resi-
dents are then able to contribute to the social maintenance
and control of their community. For example, a conclusion
which states that there are inherent social or community
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problems in maintaining Columbia Point for a low-income popu-
lation is usually an excuse for why satisfactory housing
services have not been provided.
Housing experts and others are quick to dwell on the problems
of homogeneous low-income communities while they overlook the
social problems resulting from mixed-income developments.
Often, new social relations develop from class integration.
This, combined with traditional management practices, may
either jeopardize the tenancy of low-income residents or
compound their problems by the threat of non-conformity to
established management rules which are in keeping with a dif-
ferent lifestyle. Single women with children experience
great difficulty in taking care of their children while work-
ing or seeking employment. Instead of being provided appro-
priate services for day care or child supervision, and
employment opportunities, the women are usually subjected to
more oppressive conditions in mixed-income communities where
their social status is labeled as deviant and their children
are surrounded by unachievable affluence.
Unanticipated problems experienced by the low-income residents
have already emerged in the King's Lynne development. 15
Because low-income households were to be totally integrated
in a mixed-income development of one-third low, one-third
moderate and one-third upper-income households, during the
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transition from America Park to King's Lynne, social services
were provided to assist former public housing tenants make a
"successful transfer" into the new development. A study
evaluating the King's Lynne social service program found that
the program's "underlying objective appeared to be to help
residents change lifestyles and behavior so that vandalism,
crime, lack of rent payment and other such problems would be
considerably decreased or eliminated. . . ."16
At King's Lynne, new management policies were established:
children are prohibited from playing in front of their homes,
are restricted to back yards and designated play areas,
and often must have parental supervision at these play areas;
cars cannot be repaired on-site; the exterior of the build-
ings cannot be decorated; and so on. Something as simple as
not being allowed to repair one's car within the development
seems reasonable only if one can afford to take the car to a
garage for every minor repair.
While many of the management rules were acceptable given a
middle-class community, some rules posed a threat to tenants
who did not have any alternatives in dealing with their par-
ticular situation. Perhaps the most threatening factor to
the low-income single parent is the fear of eviction due to
their children's behavior. The following is from "Management
Notes," a newsletter distributed to every tenant by the King's
358
Lynne Management Office:
It is truly unfortunate that each newsletter must
begin with this same message. This office has been
supplied with various names of youths who do not
seem to be able to cope with the regulations of
King's Lynne. . . . I have spoken with several of
these youths and have stressed the point that they
are endangering their rights to remain a resident of
this development as well as the right of their fami-
lies. . . . If you do not want to remain a resident
of King's Lynne apartments, the Management Office
will know soon enough by your actions, and will take
every necessary step to assist you in leaving.1 7
Low-income tenants, in particular single women with children,
lived under the perpetual fear of eviction or the pressure to
move. In some cases families were evicted from King's Lynne,
but many families also voluntarily left King's Lynne because
of the strict rules which were set for the mixed-income
development. They had difficulty making the transition due
to their continuing problems with unemployment, school prob-
lems, family stress and instability--let alone their chil-
dren's behavior. Management regulations regarding personal
conduct and property imposed a new mode of behavior on low-
income residents when basic economic and social conditions
had not improved. The reprimanding of an individual "prob-
lem" family is understandable, but not if a significant
portion of the low-income population is negatively affected
by management rules being imposed.
The social reformer's dream may appear to have been fulfilled
in the experiment at King's Lynne. But despite similar
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housing conditions and the inability, at quick glance, to
distinguish the low-income units while driving through the
site, the class differences do reveal themselves after a
short time. It may be in furnishing the new unit that low-
income residents have to "make do" or find it difficult to
fix up their units appropriately; and it may be in lifestyle
differences where poor kids stay home in the summer and the
wealthier ones go off to summer camp. Other psychological
and social problems also develop from residents of different
class backgrounds living in such close proximity to each
other. Often, low-income families feel a great sense of
inadequacy in their inability to materially provide for their
children the way middle-class families are able to. Proxim-
ity may heighten class differences without providing any
real means for "social mobility" among the poor.
In looking at the other side of the picture of what upper-
income households have to gain from a mixed-income housing
development, we find that as housing conditions are improved
to attract market-rate tenants, the physical housing features
and amenities become important, and not income mix. After
all, how many market-rate tenants are willing to relocate and
pay market rents just because they want to live next to poor
people? In the case of Columbia Point, they will only seek
those opportunities if the conditions, e.g., housing standards,
beach access, proximity to downtown Boston, etc., become more
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desirable than other options. At King's Lynne, a swimming
pool, tennis courts, an indoor gym, a club house, and hand-
ball courts were provided to create the incentives for upper-
income households to want to live there. In order to attract
a wealthy clientele, mixed-income housing must be made
sufficiently more attractive than other housing on the market.
This has meant a high public subsidy for other than low-
income housing (see discussion in Chapter 3).
The belief that successful housing for the rich lies in
attractive housing conditions, but for the poor, it lies in
them becoming part of a mixed-income housing solution, is a
double standard. There are those who argue that in order for
the poor to have upgraded housing conditions, they must depend
on the status of the rich who can leverage quality housing
and other services. Since mixed-income housing will be
better constructed and serviced because it has to meet the
needs of upper-income households, the only solution for pro-
viding better low-income housing is within a framework of
mixed-income housing. This argument resembles a point of
view already familiar to low-income residents: that wealthy
households should be encouraged to move into or "gentrify"
the slums in order for improved city services and other
amenities to be provided to those areas!
The "right" of the poor to adequate housing should not be
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replaced by solutions which seek only to reproduce the in-
equalities within society by providing upper-income housing
at the expense of the poor. Mixed-income housing is a "bag
full of tricks" and should only be supported if it substan-
tially increases low-income housing opportunities and in-
creases the economic and social security of the poor. Any
lessening of a commitment to public or low-income housing in
the name of "income mix" should be avoided.
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
The three parties have all agreed on the following: the need
to have a developer or development team for the total penin-
sula including the housing project, and to place the housing
project under private management as soon as possible.
The reasons for private ownership and management will be
briefly summarized: The City wants to see major private
investments to change the trend of only public institutions
locating on the peninsula. Major new development of the
Bayside Mall and the housing sites is the primary objective.
Incompetency and mismanagement by BHA has led tenants to a
position of supporting a swift transfer to private management
and private ownership as long as the Task Force becomes co-
developers or partners with joint decision-making powers and
rights to a share of the proceeds. The BHA is defensive of
their management capabilities, despite their lack of a track
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record, but BHA is willing to concede to contract management
and turning over title of their property in order to see a
successful development process underway. Having already
taken management staff and work crews off the site in antici-
pation of a private developer redoing the site, BHA has
chosen to interpret its responsibility for providing decent
and affordable housing as including the passive acceptance
of private redevelopment.
The benefits to the private sector are immense: private
interests, as represented by the bankers, businessmen and
investors, on the Peninsula Planning Committee have always
been very clear as to their intent on redevelopment. Public
housing provides a cheap and inexpensive source of land--a
scarce commodity given the diminishing stock of developable
and relatively low cost land in Boston. As in Pruitt-Igoe,
the location, land costs, and public tenure have been criti-
cal factors for developers. Given the right conditions, a
lot of money can be made from redeveloping Columbia Point.
At both Columbia Point and Pruitt-Igoe, the private sector
pursued privatization relentlessly and did little to encourage
the housing authorities to upgrade its housing through the
normal process of rehabilitation. The "concerned" parties
did not want better housing as much as they wanted "better"
people.
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The Task Force, in its eagerness to have control over the
future of Columbia Point, conceded to a private redevelopment
as long as it can get a piece of the action. The Task Force
is confident that constraints can be placed on the partner(s)
to maintain a certain number of low-income units after rede-
velopment, and minimize the risks of resell. What remains
unanswered is how the Task Force plans to address the lack of
funds for other subsidy programs (now that a minimum number
of public housing units will be retained), and the long-term
consequences of what a partnership arrangement will bring.
The problems with syndication and limited partnership raised
in Chapter 3 have not been resolved. By concentrating its
energies on defining a strong organizational role during and
after redevelopment, the Task Force has overlooked the serious
consequences of privatization.
The Columbia Point Community Task Force is presently com-
prised only of low-income tenants. After redevelopment, it
will represent all residents who live on the peninsula. The
consequences of a mixed-income population, including middle
and upper-income households, becoming members of the Task
Force have not been given much thought. The willingness of
middle and upper-income people to defend the interest of the
poor is doubtful. When low-income households become the
minority in the new mixed-income development, the tenant
organization will take on a dramatically different character.
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Market tenants, whether in luxury townhouses, condominiums,
or rental units will have different interests from those
living in subsidized units.
An analogy for what may take place at Columbia Point after
redevelopment is the experience of the South End during the
period of urban renewal (see discussion on the South End in
Chapter 2). Community organizations comprised of indigenous
residents were originally active in advocating for the con-
struction of subsidized housing and other concessions from
the City because of the extensive loss of low-income housing
in the area. But after the processes of gentrification and
recycling in the neighborhood, the new membership of middle
and upper-income residents were not interested in seeing any
more subsidized units constructed in the area. It is not
surprising that community organizations which represented
wealthy homeowners concerned with property values lobbied at
the City Council to close the South End Urban Renewal Project
and went to court to prevent the construction of any more
subsidized units.
The risks are high for existing Columbia Point tenants and
other low-income tenants if the property is first taken from
a stable form of public ownership, then transferred to a
private developer/Task Force partnership, and finally, the
composition of the Task Force is changed to include middle
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and upper-income residents. This can only appear as a "death
wish" for low-income residents, despite the "safeguards" the
Task Force may attempt to provide.
More importantly, the above discussion assumes a strong Task
Force presence after redevelopment, but even this may be in
question. In the current negotiations, the Task Force has
been unable to obtain partnership status or have a significant
role in decision making because of resistance coming from the
City, the BRA and the BHA. The Task Force has been strongly
pushing for private redevelopment, private ownership and
massive demolition when it has not obtained the requisite
guarantees that low-income tenants will have substantial input
once redevelopment is underway. The Task Force has not even
been able to get the City and the BHA to guarantee housing to
those families who on July 1, 1977 were living at Columbia
Point and who have since moved (see discussion on the Febru-
ary 21, 1979 Agreement in Chapters 5 and 6). The City and
the BHA still insist that only those who remain up to the
time of redevelopment will be provided housing.18
As the final figures on income mix, demolition, and disposi-
tion are being decided, the Task Force is still at the
beginning of its battle for partnership status, joint
decision-making powers, a share in the proceeds, and for re-
housing a certain number of low-income tenants. Opposition
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to a strong Task Force role in redevelopment is coming from
all parties, including HUD. The City and the BRA have always
sought to restrict the involvement of low-income people at
all levels of decision making. And BHA and HUD do not want
the tenants to have extensive control over redevelopment
because this would be unattractive when soliciting for a
developer. 19
The Task Force has "gone out on a limb" in buying into pri-
vate redevelopment while anticipating a strong and valid
role for low-income residents. The whole plan hinges on
tenant partnership or co-developer status, and if there is
none, the tenants would have lost everything. But even if
the Task Force could achieve a powerful and influential
role, redevelopment could still occur with little regard for
low-income needs. The many problems with a private redevelop-
ment approach present great risks. The Task Force must be
able to adequately handle the relocation problems when re-
development is underway and protect the rights of households
to return. It must be able to protect the low-income units
negotiated for by obtaining the necessary long-term subsidies.
The Task Force must have the political muscle and resources
to: maintain low-income units, obstruct the sale of the
development if it occurs, work out any cash flow problems,
and inhibit market forces from transforming Columbia Point
into a totally luxury housing development.
367
The fundamental problem with privately redeveloping public
housing is the irreconcilable goals of providing attractive
and affordable family and elderly housing for low-income
residents, and obtaining this from the private sector. No
matter how well one can finesse the system to make subsidized
housing advantageous for the private sector to build, own and
manage, developers will do so only as long as profit margins
are maintained, and if the presence of low-income households
does not diminish the attractiveness of the development to
their market clientele. If not, privately owned low-income
housing can revert to market housing at minimal cost to the
owner. The lack of sufficient long-term housing subsidies,
and the inability to maintain a "desirable" social environ-
ment for market tenants, e.g., problems with youth, would
make it difficult for the owner to achieve the necessary
rental income. This could lead to a situation where low-
income units are converted to market units before financial
and social deterioration set in.
The argument is made that because of enhanced financial
capacity and professional experience, the only means of pro-
viding "luxury" housing for the poor is through the private
sector. But this approach brings the risk of a permanent
loss of low-income units if sufficient incentives are not
maintained and if low-income residents do not conform to an
acceptable mode of middle-class behavior.
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A further implication of privately redeveloping Columbia
Point is the precedent it would set both locally and nation-
ally. Given the various interests which will profit from the
privatization of public housing, it will be an enticing road
to follow regardless of whether the poor will benefit. Every
time the public sector can't manage its housing stock, an
opportunity is ripe for demolition and redevelopment. There
are "expensive" private redevelopment solutions which hold
the parties accountable in maintaining the initial commitment
to low-income housing by replacing all low-income units, or
"cheap" solutions, which will provide a significantly fewer
low-income units after redevelopment. "Cheap" solutions will
become the rule, especially if the site is attractively
located; developers won't put up with the low-income con-
straints because they want to build market or mixed-income
housing, and housing authorities can then make their excuses
about the lack of funds and their inability to properly manage
low-income units.
DEMOLITION AND DISPOSITION
The impact of demolition and disposition of public housing
at Columbia Point will be severe. As already illustrated,
the loss of close to 800 public housing units through rede-
velopment, disposition, and demolition is a significant
number given the current housing need. The magnitude
of loss is even greater when considering what it
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would cost to build the same number of units today.
Demolition and disposition must have HUD approval. The HUD
regulations give a fair assessment of the relative impor-
tance of physical and social factors in considering demoli-
tion and disposition, but one of the weaknesses of the regu-
lation is an option for HUD to commit the necessary funds for
replacement housing (see Chapter 6 and Appendix).
Based on the criteria established by HUD, the units slated
for demolition at Columbia Point cannot be demonstrated as
in "excess to local needs," as there is a critical low-income
housing need in Boston (see Chapter2). Those who argue that
the units are in "excess" because they are currently vacant
only show that they support attrition as a legitimate prac-
tice. The units are vacant largely because of the unwilling-
ness of the BHA and BRA to move in households from the waiting
list. Hundreds of sound units requiring a minimal amount of
"fix up" remain vacant because of this.
The regulations stipulate that if there is a local need, the
request for demolition should include a one-to-one replace-
ment housing plan or a plan warranted by the current and
projected needs for low-income housing in the locality "sub-
ject to HUD's findings as to the availability of funds." This
is a highly contentious part of the regulations, as it could
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let the parties argue against replacing lost units because
of the lack of funds. But before this claim can be made, BHA
should at least attempt to make provisions for a replacement
housing "plan." But the record shows that BHA has not even
tried to replace one unit at Columbia Point. BHA has simply
contended that HUD does not have the available resources.
The "availability of funds" can be interpreted to include
other resources--if not through HUD, then through the State
housing programs such as Chapters 705 and 707, MHFA programs,
or programs through the City. Any combination of these
funding sources should bring about a one-to-one replacement
housing plan. Citing a lack of funds is, therefore, only an
excuse for the BHA and the City's reluctance to develop any
additional low-income housing.
If HUD permits a "zero" replacement housing plan, it must
justify the following: funding an $11.3 million UDAG for
Columbia Point to subsidize private redevelopment, including
secondary mortgages for moderate and market homeownership;
providing funding for Section 235, 236 and other moderate-
income housing programs; and permitting the demolition of
sound housing units when the replacement housing needs of the
low-income population have not been met. HUD could draw from
the HUD Secretary's discretionary budget to provide for re-
placement units, or at the very least, require the BHA to sub-
mit a plan for consideration.
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The other criterion for evaluating the redevelopment proposal
is the feasibility of rehabilitation. According to the
BHA/Steffian Bradley Plan and estimates by Dan Walker,
rehabilitation has been shown to be more cost effective than
new construction. The Carr, Lynch Associates plan also
showed that rehabilitation is feasible, even though decisions
based on the design of the site made the consultants propose
the rehabilitation of a limited number of units. David
Carter, the Columbia Point Coordinator, also worked out demo-
lition and cost figures and showed lower costs per unit as
more of the units were saved from being demolished.20 (See
Chapters 5 and 6.)
In looking at the HUD regulations, the following other condi-
tions do not appear to justify demolition or disposition as
proposed by the three parties:
1. The project is not located in an area where the surround-
ing condition on the peninsula or in the surrounding
neighborhood "adversely affects the life, health or safety
of project residents." (This is a different criterion
than if one had to evaluate the project's impact on the
surrounding neighborhood.)
2. The marketability of the project is not severely affected
by social conditions as applicants still remain on the
waiting list in spite of the present condition of the
project. If HUD makes "every reasonable effort" to
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"return it to a condition suitable for housing use,"
those on the waiting list will be able to move in and
the development will undoubtedly attract other applicants.
3. High density has been claimed by all three parties as a
condition justifying demolition of all mid-rises (except
those for the elderly) and even some low-rises. This
claim has been made under the assumption that families
should not live in the mid-rises--not even on the lower
floors. The lack of recreational and parking spaces are
secondary reasons for demolition. But neither the pres-
ence of the mid-rise buildings nor density have been
shown to significantly affect the quality of living condi-
tions at Columbia Point in the past, whereas the factors
of poor management and maintenance have. As already dis-
cussed, density at Columbia Point cannot be considered
high in comparison with other developments in the City.
And in relative terms, the building height and density
at Columbia Point are insignificant when contrasted with
typical apartment living in urban areas. Households with
children in New York and other cities have not found
building height and density to be insurmountable obstacles
to good family living. The rigidity with which physical
design standards are applied at Columbia Point are un-
necessary and unrealistic. They seem to speak more to
the political stance of their proponents in advocating
demolition and disposition than to actual problems with
the physical design of the buildings.
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4. Demolition and disposition will not result in any "dedi-
cation for public use," e.g., easements, or right-of-way.
This argument cannot be made by the supporters of the
redevelopment plan.
5. The fifth and last criterion to be used by HUD in evalu-
ating the proposal are the views of tenants and the
local governing body. Most of the tenants at Columbia
Point have not been made aware of the recent plan for
demolition and disposition, even though it is backed by
the Task Force. Tenants should be informed prior to the
final proposals to HUD. Furthermore the city-wide
tenants' organization, TPC, has stated its opposition to
the plan.
According to HUD, it "will limit approval for demolition or
disposition to those cases where such action can be fully
justified in accordance with the criteria. . . ." It will be
interesting to see how HUD can support the plan given its own
espoused position.
To summarize, demolition and disposition are not justified
at Columbia Point because of the following: a local need
exists for low-income housing; rehabilitation has not been
determined infeasible; a one-to-one replacement housing plan
has not been proposed; the project is not located in an
adverse neighborhood; the marketability of the project is not
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severely impacted; no "public benefits" will derive from
demolition; and there remains some divergence of opinions
among the actors. In not conforming to HUD regulations, the
plan represents an abdication of public responsibility by
proposing demolition and disposition.
In refuting a fundamental claim by the BHA and the City that
unavailability of funds from HUD and the lack of other re-
sources account for the inability to redevelop the BHA site
for low-income housing, or to provide for replacement housing,
the following argument can be made: HUD has already invested
more than $8.6 million for rehabilitation, systems moderniza-
tion, and services, in addition to committing another $10
million. A substantial portion of the funds have been spent
for infrastructure improvements as recently as two years ago
for modernizing the power plant and overhauling the entire
electrical and heating distribution systems to the buildings.
Now these buildings are being proposed for demolition. This
would appear to be a waste of public resources. The remain-
ing debt on the property stands at more than $26 million in
short and long-term notes, which will have to be paid by the
public even after the site is converted to private ownership.
In addition, another $10 to $20 million will have to be com-
mitted by HUD for a UDAG and other housing programs, along
with funds from the State and City for public improvements,
e.g., streets, marina, shoreline development, transportation,
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etc., to support private redevelopment of the site. The con-
tradictions are apparent. The costs are high for avoiding a
reasonable approach which addresses the housing needs of the
low-income population. Those who speak of a shortage of
public resources to redevelop the site as public housing or
low-income housing have failed to justify why substantial
public resources will be committed for a private mixed-income
housing solution where the benefits will largely go to upper-
income households who are not in need of housing assistance.
THE PHYSICAL SITE
The Columbia Point plan must be assessed as to whether the
proposed environment will be supportive of the needs of low
and moderate-income residents. The plans proposed by the
City and the Task Force assume the development of Columbia
Point as a low-density, suburban site in order for it to
be successful for family living and attractive to market
tenants. The most thorough plan developed thus far has been
prepared by Carr, Lynch Associates for the Task Force. Com-
ments will be directed at this plan as it has become the
basis for detailed discussion of the site plan and the design
philosophy can be viewed as representative of the final plan.21
The Task Force plan is modeled after King's Lynne, a suburban
site of townhouses surrounded by vast green space, located
in the outskirts of the town of Lynn. Redevelopment is not
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seen as resembling other urban neighborhoods in Boston or
surrounding cities, such as Cambridge. The design and plan-
ning concepts embodied in the plan are taken from the
"American dream," suburban imagery as discussed in Chapter 5
under the Task Force plan. The association of King's Lynne,
which is 25 miles outside the city, with Columbia Point is
misleading. Different financial and institutional opportuni-
ties, as well as a different community exists at Columbia
Point. It is hard to imagine the development of a valuable
urban site as low-density townhouses with sprawling green
spaces. This will serve to inhibit the development of all
but luxury housing. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the
success of a suburban typology superimposed in an urban con-
text on a diverse community.
Columbia Point today, even with the remaining population of
approximately 1,000 and the deteriorated living conditions,
is similar to most urban neighborhoods in the level of social
interaction and community life. This is shown by a highly
interactive social environment among the residents, an
existence of residential street life, neighborhood activities,
and other signs of community cohesion. Even though all signs
of interaction among residents are not necessarily positive,
efforts should be made to recognize and encourage appropriate
forms of social interaction rather than to deny all forms of
interaction. The proposed plan is overbearing in its attempt
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to obliterate all semblances of the existing community, both
socially and physically. By denying the present residents
and new residents the richness and diverse quality of an
urban neighborhood environment, and by massive destruction
of existing buildings and rerouting of streets, the plan
reflects more a reactive response to the present deteriorated
conditions at Columbia Point than a reasonable approach
towards redevelopment.
What is being proposed are monotonous townhouses of question-
able quality (given the high cost of new construction) which
must conform to some rigidly established design criteria.
The plan takes as its basic assumption that successful family
living can only take place in two and three-story single-
family houses, townhouses and garden apartments. Each indi-
vidual unit must have a front entrance, a back entrance with
a private yard, direct ground access, pitched roofs, and all
the images of "home.",22 While many of these features are
attractive, they are inaccurately presented as essential.
In reality, many factors such as the quality and accessibility
to open space, management, maintenance, security, unit size
and condition, the quality of individual or common entrances
may be more important to the success of a residential commu-
nity than whether the unit has a formal front and back en-
trance or direct ground access. It is proposed that all
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three-bedroom units or larger must have direct ground access
and that all mid-rise buildings be demolished or cut to three
23
stories (except for elderly buildings). These rigid rules
result in the inability to re-use existing low and mid-rise
buildings in a number of creative ways. Stacked four-bedroom
units cannot be rehabilitated into three-bedroom units because
of lack of ground access. Small families are not able to be
housed in mid-rise buildings in any way. Given these con-
straints, it is no wonder that the redevelopment plan results
in such a high amount of demolition.
Maintaining Columbia Point as a predominantly family-oriented
development can be achieved without massive demolition and
restructuring of the present BHA site. In certain areas
adequate open space and other amenities must be provided, but
the rehabilitation and re-use of the existing low-rise and
mid-rise buildings can create appropriate family units. Many
design solutions for the rehabilitation of the low-rises have
already been proposed which would seem to warrant their re-
tention, even though the plan proposes demolishing some of
the low-rises.
The mid-rises present multiple opportunities for rehabilita-
tion as elderly housing, as housing for adults and small
families, and for mixed-use purposes. Community space, ser-
vices, congregate facilities, activity areas, and even
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retail/commercial space are some of the re-use possibilities
for the ground and first floors of the buildings. Lobbies
can be expanded and large glass panels installed to light up
and open up space for community facilities and services on
the first floors. For both low and mid-rise buildings,
volumes can be added, such as porches, balconies, patios,
including built additions and extensions so that the present
stark quality of the buildings can be substantially altered
without having to resort to demolition or to token gestures
such as "pitched" roofs to create an image of a residential
community.
The new street and circulation system proposed results in
long, winding stretches of streets without any bisecting
street. Intersections are not used as interfaces between
different parts of the site, since the design is intended to
make formidable any penetration of the site by unwanted in-
truders. The streets are thus more accessible to vehicles
because of their length, and are in effect hostile to pedes-
trian traffic and activities. Even when pedestrian paths
are provided, they are not located in the appropriate places,
and are not associated with the major streets. The circula-
tion, in effect, denies appropriate street life activities
common to residential neighborhoods. Streets are well located
and are an asset when they serve as meeting places, when they
provide visual access to other parts of the site, and when
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they serve the function of efficiently directing pedestrian
movement.
Streets at Columbia Point should be planned as urban streets
to embody specific functions: a place for residential social
interaction, visual accessibility, a focal point for limited
activities and for directed and purposeful movement. Corners,
intersections, and pedestrian paths should be used to enhance
the desired street life and connect different circulation
systems and activities, e.g., pedestrian path connections at
an active corner of the site. Circulation systems should
also enhance such site attributes as landscaping, internal
vistas, and vistas toward the ocean. Variables, such as the
scale of the street, size, length, texture, etc. should help
to define the character of the street as residential, or active
and should define the nature of the traffic flow. Street
surfaces or clearly demarcated pedestrian paths should
extend through the site and relate the various centers of
activities.
The plan for a "continuous and ample flow of open space" will
result in serious problems in maintenance, security surveil-
lance, control and efficient use of space. The plan contains
rehabilitated and new construction units along the street
edges with vast common green space located in the middle. The
use of the open space is not very well defined either as
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private space or semi-public space. Thus, it opens an on-
going argument as to who, tenant or management, is responsible
for its maintenance, which will be an extensive ongoing cost.
The following are some of the anticipated problems that will
result from the proposed site plan: the uncontrolled flow
of open space will create vast visual and physical wastelands
behind the residential buildings, instead of the pleasant
image of large open spaces that was intended. The undefined
use of the space will result in improper uses, such as active
recreational uses behind buildings, teenagers hanging out,
etc. The location of open space almost totally enclosed by
buildings (even with the occasional attempt at visual pene-
tration) will cause problems of personal safety and security.
These spaces provide insurmountable opportunities for per-
sonal attacks and assaults. Undifferentiated uses for the
open space will also create problems of surveillance and
territoriality, since the publicness or privateness of the
green spaces in relation to immediate residents, neighbors,
and the larger community or public is not defined.
A hierarchical classification of open space from private back
yards, to tot lots, playgrounds, sitting areas, playing
fields, to semi-public or public beaches appropriate for the
site is a superior method of planning and siting usable open
space rather than the anonymous allocation of large plots of
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green space as planned. These should be structured in terms
of specific activities, e.g., active and passive uses, and
according to age and population groups. Greater definition
of the types of activities will determine the success of the
open space, not just an increase in the amount of open space.
Even without the overriding problems of management and main-
tenance or inadequate funding, Columbia Point from its
earliest days suffered because of its isolation as a multi-
bedroom facility with nothing else but housing, schools, and
people to characterize it as a community. Even low-income
communities in other parts of Boston had substantially more
resources, a more diverse living environment, and more geo-
graphic access to employment opportunities. The redevelop-
ment of Columbia Point as another bedroom community, with
the only difference being its mixed-income nature, will not
create a substantially improved environment. The development
of diverse, mixed-uses within the physical site as well as
greater access to the larger community are needed. Something
as simple, but important, as local stores and shops for
personal service have not been provided for in the plan. The
diversity of stores: sub-shops, food stores, laundromats,
cleaners, hair dresser/barber shop, etc., which characterize
other urban communities are also important at Columbia Point.
The proposed site plan and the physical design fall short of
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creating a suitable living environment. Instead of a plan
which is supportive of the needs of low and moderate-income
households, we find one which solely attempts to justify the
demolition, disposition, and lessening of low-income housing
opportunities proposed by the City and others.
CONCLUSION
The evidence points to the serious consequences of mixed-
income housing, privatization, demolition and disposition
of public housing and the proposed physical design on the low-
income population. We must question the motives and interest
of the local, state, and federal government to willingly
commit substantial resources and funding for private owner-
ship while unwilling to do so under public ownership.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
"For what has happened to Columbia
Point, I put 60% of the blame on the
desk of Andy Olins for the Mayor's
housing policy towards the poor, 20%
on the BHA for following along, and
20% on the tenants: 10% for tenants
because they do create a certain
amount of the problems and 10% for
stupidity, because they'll believe
anything said to them and take the
crumbs."
--Joanne Ross, Formyr tenant
of Columbia Point
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
The research presented in the previous chapters strongly
supports the conclusion that public housing is a vital hous-
ing resource which must be preserved for low-income use.
With the increase in local housing needs and a housing crisis
which impacts severely on the poor and minority populations,
the privatization of public housing will result in further
displacement of low-income people. This study challenges
the assumptions that private redevelopment, mixed-income
housing, demolition and disposition are the appropriate solu-
tions to Columbia Point.
The current redevelopment plan for Columbia Point offers
neither a satisfactory or compensatory solution to the low-
income population who have and will be affected. If the
present redevelopment plan is implemented, a drastic decrease
in low-income housing opportunities, including the loss of an
attractive housing site from public tenure, will herald a
second generation "Pruitt-Igoe." To summarize, redevelopment
will reduce the total low-income units by 800 or more, 660
units will be demolished; and a major portion of the site will
be disposed of.
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Even though a number of low-income tenants, at least those
who manage to remain, will receive new or rehabilitated
housing, this does little to insure the future of low-income
housing on the peninsula. While it has been shown that the
BHA failed to maintain public housing at Columbia Point during
the last 10 years, it is a mistake to conclude that public
housing is inherently unable to house people adequately.
With private redevelopment, ownership and subsidy programs
can change and any commitment to low-income housing will be
tenuous at best. In spite of the constraints which can be
placed on the developer, principal reliance on Section 8 and
Section 236 allocations will jeopardize the presence of low-
income residents. Funding for the programs is not only
limited and difficult to obtain, but is also highly volatile
and unstable. This could result in market-rate and luxury
housing as the only housing to exist after redevelopment.
Many arguments are made for a decrease in the number of low-
income units after redevelopment, but these have not been
substantiated. No financial analysis has been made nor does
proof exist that low-income people are incapable of sustaining
a viable community. Let us look at some of the underlying
assumptions of the plans: The early plans maintained most
of the public housing units and proposed a substantial number
of new units above and beyond the existing public housing
units to accommodate the mixed-income housing components. The
387
1974 Thompson Plan proposed a 4,000-unit development, with
one-fourth or 1,000 units to be low-income housing, because
this figure represented the number of existing households
living on the peninsula. The number of low-income units
proposed in each subsequent plan was to decrease at a rate
approximating the number of low-income households remaining.
Due to attrition, this resulted in a rapid drop in the number
of low-income units included. Since low-income families were
to comprise only one-fourth to one-third of the new develop-
ment, the number of existing low-income families became the
multiplier for the overall residential community. Through
the years, the proposed development decreased from 4,000 units
under the Thompson Plan in 1974 to 1,800 under the Peninsula
Planning Committee's plan, 1,500 under the Boston Plan in
1977, and to 1,470 units under the current plan.
As of September 1979, 369 households were living at Columbia
Point. The redevelopment plan proposed 335 units, or 25% of
the units for low-income families.2 With the addition of
moderate and market housing units, the redevelopment plan
results in less than the 1,504 original units. The number of
low-income family units to be provided is based solely on the
number of existing households and not on any valid criteria
which address the numbers which can be maintained on the site.
The plans cannot simply be judged by the number of low-income
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units they purport to provide. The Thompson Plan proposed
1,000 low-income units but could not specify where the sub-
sidies could be obtained. Louise Day Hicks, the City Council,
the BRA, and the BHA in 1977 considered a totally low-income
development, but it was to be all elderly. In the most
recent plan, the proposed number of low-income units is also
deceptive. The definition of "low-income" varies according
to the subsidy programs, and income mixing within the low-
income category will result in a resident population substan-
tially different from the typical public housing population.
"Low-income" has been generally defined as households with
incomes of less than 80% of the SMSA median income for
Boston: "moderate" as 80% to 110%; and "market" as above
110%. This results in two-thirds of the family households
being above the Section 8 limits. Therefore, a household
making $21 thousand annually in 1979 is considered moderate-
income3 This must be contrasted with an income mix which
considers "low-income" as public housing eligible households
which are below 50% of SMSA median ($9,700); "moderate"
as above public housing and below Section 8 ($15,500), or
50% to 80% of SMSA median income; and "market" as above
Section 8 limits or above 80% of SMSA median income. This
results in the majority of units being provided to house-
holds in need of some form of housing assistance. Equating
the existing public housing population with the new "low-
income" population is a dissimilar comparison. Of the
339
710 proposed "low-income" units, less than half will be
for families, and only 190 units will be for larger families
(three or more bedrooms). The remaining units will be 280
elderly, 65 childless households, and 175 small families (one
to two bedrooms).4  The units proposed for low-income elderly,
small families and childless households are important factors
deliberately used to decrease the number of larger family
units and inflate the overall number of low-income units.
The phasing of construction may also affect the final yield
of low-income units. Phase 1, which will take more than a
year for completion, will result in only 80 low-income, small
family units (one to two bedrooms), and 95 low-income larger
family units (three to six bedrooms).5 The present plan does
not even rehouse all of the existing family households nor
meet the July 1, 1977 commitment to families in residence
on that date, let alone add new low-income households in
Phase 1. Phase 2 will commence only after completion of Phase
1, and proposes mostly new construction. Any funding for low-
income housing may be jeopardized in the three to four years
it will take for construction of Phase 2. Low-income units
are also proposed for Phase 3, but for both Phases 2 and 3,
they are so far in the future that funding has not even been
discussed. The plan may call for 710 total low-income units,
but the results may be quite different.
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Other factors which deterred the provision of a significant
number of low-income units included predetermined density
figures; these corresponded to whatever lifestyle was in
vogue at the particular time. The Harbor Park Plan proposed
high-rise, high-density towers on the waterfront. The Boston
Plan focused on the growing middle and upper-income sector
demand for housing and proposed a complex of luxury condo-
miniums directly related to the new marina.6 And now with
the Carr, Lynch Associates' plan, low-density "suburban"
housing is popular. In all cases, density was assessed inde-
pendent of what an 80-acre housing site could accommodate in
an urban setting.
None of the plans attempted to provide the equivalent number
of low-income units on the BHA site or on the adjoining par-
cels, nor do the plans address the economic feasibility of
rehabilitating as many units as possible into suitable "non-
luxury" housing. Availability of low and moderate-income
subsidies was not a consideration in determining the number
of subsidized units to be provided. This is illustrated by
the Peninsula Planning Committee's Land-Use Options which con-
sidered rehabilitating significant numbers of public housing
units, but then discarded this option. Instead, an option
was selected which retained the fewest number of low-income
units (588), and which reflected the number of existing house-
holds. The PCC's "housing" option contained fewer low-income
units than their "institutional development" option.
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Even in the later plans, the retention of as many subsidized
housing or public housing units as possible was not attempted.
The parties wanted the fewest number of public housing units,
especially larger family units, to exist after redevelopment.
Public housing would house the elderly, but family housing
would largely be provided through the Section 8 and other
subsidy programs. As a result, the number of low-income family
units would be further constricted, as funding for these pro-
grams, in comparison to public housing, would be difficult to
obtain.
In minimizing the low-income component within a mixed-income
housing development, the implicit concerns for market housing
could be maintained. Therefore, the City guaranteed housing
only to existing tenants. Since only a small number of tenants
could be expected to remain, the City's housing guarantee was
a token gesture which could serve to curb public protest
against overt displacement and bring about a largely middle
and upper-income "mix" after redevelopment. Instead of an
enlightened decision for any real income mix, mixed-income
housing was, therefore, a purely political strategy.
To the extent that publicly held property could change
hands and public financial resources obtained to benefit
the private sector, a "mixed-income" scheme was also a small
concession. Mixed-income housing could justify major public
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investments which would be hard to ask for in a luxury housing
development. Public investments could be made available in
the form of transportation, shoreline and street improvements,
parks and recreation facilities, and other amenities which
would create a residential environment with a high market
value. In addition, an urban renewal designation, special
tax status (121A), and other funding, e.g., a UDAG, housing
construction and mortgage subsidies could help lower develop-
ment costs. Any consideration of the needs of the low-income
population would be but a fallout of the overall redevelopment
process. An improvement as simple as rerouting bus lines to
Columbia Point to provide for greater transportation service
has not been made for existing residents. But a whole transit
system, including the construction of a new MBTA Red Line
station, will be provided for the new community.
The numerous plans for Columbia Point contain essentially the
same elements: a drastic reduction in the number of low-
income units; the undermining of public ownership and the
public mandate to provide low-income housing; and the use of
major public resources to benefit middle and upper-income
households.
A look at the history of planning at Columbia Point discloses
the trend of powerful forces backing a private redevelopment
solution; this is primarily manifested in the initiatives of
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U Mass, the Peninsula Planning Committee, the BRA and the
City. The attention given to this public housing site has
been unequaled. The parties were not concerned with the wel-
fare of the poor--that Columbia Point would remain and be
upgraded into a well-run, functioning low-income community,
and would become a desirable neighbor to the institutions.
These goals were superfluous, as a prior decision had been
made to dramatically change the economic, racial and cultural
characteristics of those who were going to live on the penin-
sula.
Regardless of housing needs and the feasibility of rehabili-
tating and improving the housing project, the City had long
since pursued a city-wide housing policy antagonistic to the
poor. The inability of the BHA to provide decent housing also
contributes to the lack of any City commitment to housing the
low-income population. Nor should the fact that four of the
five BHA and BRA commissioners are mayoral appointments be
forgotten.
In many of the redevelopment plans the assumption is made
that Columbia Point is beyond hope of revitalizing as a viable
low-income community. The belief stressed is that any attempts
at revitalization would fail and the project would only revert
back to its present condition. This argument appears to be
plausible, but it has never been proved to be true. Prior to
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proposing massive demolition and disposition, responsible
efforts should have been undertaken to revitalize Columbia
Point as public housing, and to meet the need of the resi-
dents for effective management and maintenance services.
The BHA modernization effort was an inadequate attempot at
upgrading the development, but this, as documented, was well
within the range of being competently and professionally
handled by appropriately trained personnel. One needs only
to look at the successful modernization undertaken by other
housing authorities to know that it can be done properly.
This failure of the modernization program cannot be attributed
to the presence of low-income households, but to BHA's lack
of necessary expertise in construction management and housing
rehabilitation and to its fear of any innovative or creative
solutions to its problems. The BHA should, at the very least,
have learned how to effectively handle its weakness during
these years. But the actions of the City, private interests
and the BHA itself precluded any serious attempts to provide
decent and affordable housing for existing Columbia Point
residents, let alone propose a redevelopment plan which could
address the needs of other low-income households. Even the
areas of security, tenant selection, tenant services, manage-
ment and maintenance have not been adequately addressed.
"Reasonable efforts" to keep the project within the low-income
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housing inventory, and "to return it to a condition suitable
for housing use, through a modernization program or other
means," as required by HUD, have not been undertaken, prior
to proposals for demolition and disposition. There has not
been a systematic documentation of the source of the problems
which have led to the deterioration of Columbia Point in only
the last seven to nine years of the project's 25-year history,
nor an explanation of why the project could function adequately
at full capacity for well over 15 years, given the "insur-
mountable" problems in design, density, and location which
the critics so simplistically claim are the problems today.
To say that Columbia Point can't work because it is low-income,
or because of its physical design and isolation, are mere
speculations, not facts, and are arguably untrue.
It is ironic that, after more than 10 years of planning for
Columbia Point and the production of numerous studies, the
policies adopted by the parties on demolition and rehabilita-
tion are in conflict with the actual findings in the studies.
As discussed above, the Boston Plan, the Task Force Plan, the
BHA/Steffian Bradley Plan all speak to the sound construction
of the buildings and the possibilities for easy rehabilitation.
The Task Force's Resident Needs Survey reveals some of the
physical design changes which could improve the existing site,
and Dan Walker of Commonwealth Design and David Carter of
BHA show the cost advantages of rehabilitation over demolition.
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The internal logic of the plans differed with the resulting
actions calling for massive demolition and major restructuring
of the site.
The discrepancies cannot be attributed solely to faulty reason-
ing. Instead, the evidence is subordinated to the political
motives of the parties who forge ahead with their program
regardless of their own consultants' findings.
Sufficient evidence already exists to draw conclusions in
favor of rehabilitation as the primary mode of upgrading con-
ditions. No more studies are needed, just the application of
some consistent logic in formulating a housing revitalization
program.
What we see at Columbia Point is a relinquishing of the man-
date to provide decent housing for the poor. The call for
privatization, mixed-income housing, demolition and disposi-
tion cannot be viewed as the sole recourse for Columbia Point
after "all else has failed," but rather as an aggressive
strategy to appropriate essential housing resources from the
poor.
It is not surprising that the "ideal" conditions for the
development of market housing at Columbia Point require no
more than the massive demolition and disposition of public
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housing; a competent developer to take over the housing site
and adjoining land; the use of marketing techniques; major
public investments; and so on. This is exactly what is being
proposed in the current plan. While the Mayor's Office and
the BRA may support a redevelopment plan which substantially
reduces the presence of low-income households at Columbia
Point, BHA and the Task Force are self-defeating in backing
such a position. The BHA has been a pawn for the City and
the Task Force has been a willing victim. Neither benefit
if the long-term interests of low-income tenants are not up-
held. BHA has its institutional integrity at stake, and the
Task Force cannot single-handedly protect the interest of
existing tenants if redevelopment conditions are hostile to
a low-income presence. A danger exists with a plan that only
rehouses existing families. As attrition resulted in a de-
crease of 130 families per year beginning in 1970, it is not
hard to see that the commitment to rehouse only the remaining
residents is a small concession for the City to make.8 Having
to plan for fewer and fewer low-income families makes it easier
to propose greater disposition of the public housing site.
Low-income families throughout the city who cannot obtain
decent units at Columbia Point are deprived of their right to
housing. The small number of luxury units which will result
from redevelopment cannot be viewed as a "gift" to a select
group of low-income tenants, as valuable public housing
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property will be disposed of for use by other income groups.
Given the existing need, an argument can be made for re-
taining 1,500 low-income units at Columbia Point, or at
the very least, the low-income units rehabilitated on-site
or replaced at another location should total 1,500 units.
It is understandable that neither Columbia Point nor any
single housing site can meet the City's total low-income
housing need, but a redevelopment solution should not deepen
the housing crisis. The planning for Columbia Point and
other publicly held sites must benefit low-income tenants to
the fullest extent or housing problems will further aggravate
the living conditions for the poor in the City.
A Redevelopment Plan must be seen as unacceptable if it
neglects the interest of public housing tenants, families on
the waiting list, those who have moved from Columbia Point
because of intolerable conditions, and other low-income fami-
lies in need of housing in Boston.
In addressing the rationale of the various parties in support-
ing the redevelopment plan, a decrease in the number of low-
income units is often justified by the following: a small
number of low-income units which meet luxury housing standards
in a mixed-income community is a far superior alternative to
any public housing revitalization attempt. The trade-off for
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"quality" housing units in a superior living environment is
the quantity of low-income housing provided. The seemingly
well-intentioned and laudable objectives of the three parties
for full income integration, and the belief that all units
should be similar, has led to serious problems. Given a
mixed-income community, a certain housing quality mist be
achieved to attract market tenants. The result is that all
housing on the peninsula must conform to market-rate or luxury
housing standards.
The BRA and the Mayor's office uphold market-rate housing
standards because this would provide for the marketability
and interchangeability of the housing stock and redress the
stigmatization of Columbia Point. The BHA supports this
because of their own inability to manage the development, and
is eager to relinquish all responsibility for one of their
msot troubled projects by seeking an acceptable solution.
The Task Force supports market quality housing because they
feel that low-income households have a right to live in the
same housing as upper-income groups.
No matter what the perspectives of each party may be, the
results are the same. The plan calls for elaborate physical
redesign to achieve full integration of all existing and new
housing into one development--requiring radical restructuring
of the existing site. One of the major consequences is that
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housing which could be either rehabilitated or preserved would
be slated for demolition because it does not meet the standards
of low-rise, low-density, luxury, "suburban" housing. Non-
luxury, standard housing which is well-managed and maintained
no longer becomes a housing objective.
In addition, cost effective criteria are subsumed under the
desire for luxury housing. The result is that $11.2 million
of Urban Initiatives and Modernization funds will go primarily
for the rehabilitation of 74 family and 160 elderly units in
Parcel lA, and for demolition. 9 Of the total family units,
including 74 rehabilitated and 10 new construction units, only
84 public housing eligible units will be provided. Of this,
only 30 units for larger families (three to six bedrooms) will
be made available. These are small gains at a tremendous
cost to the public. This comes to an expenditure of approxi-
mately $70 thousand for each rehabilitated family unit, if
we estimate a generous $30 thousand for rehabilitating each
of the 160 elderly units. This is an expenditure which is
hard to justify, given the scarcity of funds for housing in
Boston.
The debate on "luxury" housing versus "standard" housing for
the poor must be viewed within an historical context. It is
too simplistic to postulate, as liberal housing advocates
often do, that poor people have a "right" to luxury housing.
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Or, as the Task Force has stated in response to criticisms
raised about the impact of their proposed plan on the low-
income housing stock: "the Task Force believes that low-
income tenants deserve to live in a 'suburban' like environ-
ment as much as those of moderate and upper income."11
The "right" to housing cannot embody a static view of housing
'quality." Real housing gains and concessions for the poor,
including the question of housing quality, are won only in so
far as they are successful in solving part of the housing
crisis for the poor. Given the realities today, even those
who well-meaningly argue for "luxury" housing as the standard
for the poor cannot avoid the impact of high costs or fewer
units to be provided after redevelopment. Nor can they defend
units which can be feasibly rehabilitated being demolished
and replaced with expensive, butnot necessarily better con-
structed, units.
Unfortunately, the limited housing subsidies available are a
reflection of society's lack of support for low-income or
mass housing. Until this picture is changed in the political
arena to increase public funding and financing, the determina-
tion of housing "quality" must be astutely calculated to deal
with the political and economic realities of housing the poor.
Something as basic as "good," standard and decent housing
which can encompass new design standards, management practices,
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innovative solutions for rehabilitation, and the provision of
a supportive social environment, can go a long ways towards
social and political empowerment of the poor. Housing, per
se, is neither so complex nor so problematic that it becomes
unmanageable or unlivable because it does not meet "luxury"
housing standards. Residential communities, including low and
moderate-income communities, are successful for many reasons,
and luxury housing standards are not crucial factors.
Judging a housing site by its marketability to upper-income
groups does not necessarily speak to the quality of the hous-
ing stock, nor to the nature of the social environment. In
other words, attractiveness to a market clientele may not
account for many factors which make a community desirable
for low and moderate-income households. For example, communi-
ties such as East Cambridge, Jamaica Plain, Dorchester, and
the North End, "work" for many reasons--few of which may
resemble upper-income communities.
To require that the new low-income housing on the peninsula--
to be accomplished through massive demolition and disposition--
be comparable to what market-rate tenants would pay $700 to
$1,200 per month for is political suicide. Low-income tenants
cannot afford to lose the battle because they are fighting
over luxury housing standards, especially when there are clear
examples of desirable and well-run public housing throughout
the country.
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To decide in favor of private redevelopment and massive demo-
lition when rehabilitation is feasible, or in favor of dispo-
sition of public housing property just to gain a few units of
luxury housing for the poor as a "right," is an enormous price
to pay--one which is not without serious consequences both
locally and nationally.
Luxury housing is neither a reality nor a necessity for low-
income people, especially when utilizing massive public funds
would deprive other low-income families of housing. It is
not only wasteful, but irresponsible, for the government to
spend such sums on luxury units, even if they are to be occu-
pied by the poor.
Cost conservation would appear to be an important factor in
achieving a mass housing solution, unless, of course, there
is no longer a mass housing commitment. Decent and affordable
housing is quite different from luxury housing; the cost to
the public sector, and the impact on the public housing and
low-income communities by the substantial loss of low-income
units, is not warranted. Tampering with luxury and mixed-
income housing schemes in place of providing suitable low-
income housing can only be seen as against the interests of
low-income people.
An initial look at the events surrounding Columbia Point
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appear similar to other struggles over the control of land.
The lines are drawn, the politics are well-played, and one is
clear about the intentions of the major actors in transforming
the peninsula. The struggle of tenants to determine their
future closely parallels other community struggles for influ-
ence and control. But what has been unique in the case of
Columbia Point has been a major battle lasting more than 10
years over a public housing site. Even today, it is far from
being resolved. The fate of Columbia Point will be of major
significance as it has become the symbol of society's commit-
ment to the future of public housing. Columbia Point has
become the testing ground for a solution to one of the most
devastated developments in the country. Many important les-
sons can be learned from this experience.
While we see the empowerment of a tenant organization in
successfully gaining means to architecture, planning and
technical assistance, we also see the pitfalls of an isolated
leadership reinforced by the manipulative and patronizing
posture of their consultants and the BHA. The consultants
played a dominant role in the decision making, and "led" the
tenants, instead of the other way around. The consultants,
the BHA, and the City were content and pleased to be dealing
with a small group of tenants they could influence, without
having to reach out and inform the larger Columbia Point
community when major issues were at stake.
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The parties, the BRA, the BHA, and the Task Force, all had
illustrious ideas about creating a beautiful new community,
but little knowledge about dealing with the existing problems
the tenants were facing. The parties, by primarily concerning
themselves with planning for redevelopment, as opposed to day-
to-day operations, did not attempt to address the immediate
needs of the residents. Thus, the continuing problems of the
vacancies, lack of repairs, security, and maintenance per-
sisted, further contributing to the arguments for more drastic
redevelopment plans as the years went by. One of the most
important lessons learned by the Columbia Point experience is
that the relinquishing of day-to-day responsibilities by the
housing authority in delivering basic services is a sure road
leading to rapid deterioration--creating irreparable condi-
tions which can most easily bring forth solutions calling for
demolition and disposition.
While the BHA and the City initially called for the mothballing
and closing of buildings, and refused to re-tenant more than
1,000 units,12 the Task Force itself played a role in allow-
ing this process of attrition to continue. Some leaders were
fearful of new tenants moving into rehabilitated units while
others continued to live in existing, substandard housing.
So, instead of seeking a just solution, the BHA's policy of
no "move-ins" was condoned by the Task Force. 13 As tenants
left the development, units would remain vacant and welded
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shut. This further diminished the number of households which
had to be rehoused or guaranteed housing in the new develop-
ment.
It is ironic that the history of the tenants' struggle shows
that, in comparison with the early plans which had no formal
mechanism for tenant input, the present plan proposes the
greatest loss of public housing units. A misguided and self-
serving tenant organization cannot fulfill the role of pro-
tecting the low-income housing interest. Nevertheless, there
is hope that the Task Force will see beyond its narrow
interest, move to inform and involve tenants in the current
plan, and start to see its relation to the larger public
housing community.
It is here that it is important to examine the perspective of
GBCD, the consultant organization to the Task Force. GBCD,
like many housing groups, advocates the value of community-
based, decentralized housing as a solution to low-income hous-
ing needs. While this has worked successfully in certain
cases with community churches and nonprofit-sponsored housing,
it is questionable that this can be a far-reaching solution
for housing the poor on a scale like public housing. Private
partnership is suggested as an alternative, but while it may
be appropriate in developing various forms of subsidized
housing, the cost may be greater than the gain when applied
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to public housing. It is doubtful, for example, that the
King's Lynne experiment can be reproduced any place else,
especially in the City of Boston. It was a highly politicized
and dangerous process for tenants to engage in and questions
arise as to its economic feasibility as massive public sub-
sidies per unit will probably never be provided again.
While community or privately sponsored low-income housing can
be made to work successfully, there are inadequate available
funds to sustain housing on the scale of the public housing
program. Funding for Section 8 is limited and obtained poli-
tically. Even today, individual communities across Boston are
lobbying with the City and the Mayor for scarce housing funds
which barely match the level of funding for public housing.
There exist major problems with private tenant partnership
and private management of public housing. The level of finan-
cial commitment needed and the volume of housing that has to
be maintained will be much greater than what local community
and tenant organizations can provide. Section 236, Section
221(d)(3) and other programs continue to default with the risk
of sale and resale to private landlords. Meth Union tenants
are part of a pilot program designing an approach to tenant
management and ownership, they hold property valued far in
excess of the mortgage, but which they can benefit from only
by selling. The question of available funding may be tenuous
and private market gains cannot be realized unless the non-
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profits or tenant organizations participate as traditional
landlords and investors. Some can perform successfully and
maintain subsidized housing, but usually this requires out-
standing financial and management skills and strong political
muscle.
Housing the poor need not be such a difficult task requiring
complex financial arrangements and teams of special consul-
tants each time a building goes up! The long-term solution
of housing the poor in a city the size of Boston must be a
dual strategy which reforms and expands the public housing
program--so as to achieve competence and excellence in an
agency such as the BHA; and continues the efforts in develop-
ing community-sponsored housing. The two should work to-
gether for the greatest gain to the low-income population.
This feat of making public housing work--even with the convo-
lutions of city and national politics, cannot be so difficult
since the program works in New York and other large cities.
Public housing in Boston houses 10% of the population and 26%
of the low-income households and 27% of the low-income minority
households in need of housing assistance. The long-range
objective of a mass housing solution can be better realized
with the reform and change in the institution of public hous-
ing than by any other effort--especially given the unstable
Section 8 and other rental subsidy programs which house the
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poor at great cost to the public sector. Public housing and
community-based housing development must be seen as compatible
enterprises, both of which are necessary given the political
realities of existing funding programs. While the Task Force
and their consultants may be correct about the failures of
the BHA up until now, their strategy of supporting private
redevelopment, demolition, disposition, and Task Force partner-
ship brings with it many risks.
Perhaps most devastating has been the breakdown of the insti-
tution supposedly protecting low-income housing interests:
the BHA has been shown to be incapable not only of delivering
basic services, but also of long-range planning. In the mean-
time, HUD has been too "chicken" to put their foot down on
this nonsence. Neither BHA nor HUD up until now had the guts
to stand up to the City and the private interests and to re-
direct the development of Columbia Point in a responsible
manner.
In the many years of planning for redevelopment, BHA did not
undertake any major initiative to upgrade and improve condi-
tions for existing residents. What little was done at
Columbia Point came to a crashing halt as management pulled
work crews and staff from the development. The BHA, as has
already been discussed, poorly and improperly spent the TPP
money and had never really developed its own plans for the
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site. Having taken a back seat to first what U Mass, the
City, and the private sector wanted, and then what the Task
Force wanted, it has been caught in the position of neither
defending the real interest of the tenant population nor of
fulfilling its responsibilities to HUD. Not having any cre-
dence in anyone's eyes, the BHA has been vulnerable to the
whims of the most influential forces for private redevelopment.
The argument that the BHA cannot do anything to redress the
present housing conditions short of waiting until the redevel-
opment effort is underway is fallacious. With the allocation
of UI monies, the BHA thinks only of leveraging private funds
instead of attempting to improve its housing. Deviating from
the UI modernization guidelines, the Authority is reluctant
to spend the money for rehabilitating vacant units for occu-
pancy or for modernizing the occupied units. Thus the money
is sitting until a private redevelopment solution is reached.
With each passing month, the money devalues at a rate of 1%.
From the initial grant, the money has lost more than a quarter
of its original value. But the most important fact is that
the tenant population still remains neglected.
The BHA has also interpreted the UI allocation as a final
allocation--as if no more funds would ever be appropriated by
HUD. But, while it is true that it would be impossible to
totally redevelop Columbia Point with the UI monies, it is
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difficult to comprehend a course of action which views the UI
funds as the "be all and end all" of future funding for the
project. The succession of Modernization, TPP and UI awards
showed, if anything, that multi-year allocations were being
committed. Nationally, there was an interest in turning
around Columbia Point, therefore, multi-year funding aver-
aging $5 to $7 million per year was being provided by HUD from
various program sources. This would have been continued if
the funds were adequately spent by the BHA.
If the Target Projects Program, Modernization, Urban Initia-
tives, and other supplemental funds were expeditiously
appropriated for rehabilitation, site work, needed repairs and
services, it is conceivable that a substantial portion of
Columbia Point could have by now been redeveloped as public
housing. It would then require smaller allocations to redo
the remainder of the site. But beyond overhauling the mechani-
cal systems and roof work, the BHA did not pursue a viable
housing rehabilitation plan with the monies.
One cannot be too surprised with HUD's reluctance and skepti-
cism in providing additional funding to BHA--as funding is
usually contingent on some level of satisfactory performance.
If funds for Columbia Point were put to good use, HUD would
most likely have increased their commitment yearly, instead,
HUD has learned its lesson by refusing to release the UI
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monies or allocate additional funds until such time as a
reasonable and acceptable plan has been developed.
It is estimated that Columbia Point has by now lost more than
$20 million in supplemental funding, in addition to costs
incurred, and foregone purchasing power, by not spending the
money expediently and efficiently. HUD continues to feel the
acute embarrassment of successive major funding awards to a
housing authority which cannot seem to develop adequate plans
for its sites--in other words, the experience of Columbia
Point is like "egg on their face." 14
It is hoped that the historic court order for receivership
will create the environment for an opportunity to redress some
of the serious problems in BHA's operations. Perhaps at this
time, a change in direction can deal with the concrete manage-
ment and maintenance problems which are the primary reasons
for the decline of Columbia Point and other developments.
Scapegoating these problems on "density," the presence of low-
income tenants, insurmountable design problems, and the need
for private management and mixed-income housing, has diverted
attention away from the real question of providing satisfactory
housing and housing services to the poor.
But if the pattern of events continues with the Receiver
aboard, low-income tenants will still be faced with massive
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demolition and loss of public housing units--an alternative
even HUD had hoped to avoid. Implementation of the current
redevelopment plan will not guarantee long-term stability for
low-income housing, and would in the long run commit HUD to
higher costs. HUD commitment to multi-year funding for
public housing would be more cost effective, even if upfront
grants are made, than the use of Section 8, Section 236, and
a UDAG--all of which must be allocated from HUD anyway.
The cost of substantial rehabilitation and site modifications,
along with the necessary management reforms, coordination of
social services and security, in the creation of a stable
housing environment for a mix of low and moderate-income,
public housing eligible households would be a far wiser in-
vestment for HUD. Redeveloping Columbia Point as public
housing would result in low and moderate-income units for
the residents of Boston and herald the direction for upgrad-
ing and preserving public housing. This would bring about
recognition of society's commitment to house the poor.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are directed at the Boston
Housing Authority, the entity responsible for the past and
present housing conditions and for the future of Columbia
Point. This research was conducted prior to the appointment
of the Receiver, nevertheless, the recommendations are
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relevant to the present administration. In light of the
Receiver's responsibility charged by the Court to "preserve
or to rehabilitate for occupancy by low-income persons or
families the maximum number of housing units as are consis-
tent with the provision and operation of decent, safe and
sanitary housing," it is hoped that the Receiver would under-
take a careful reevaluation of the past policies of the
Housing Authority at Columbia Point in order to seek a solu-
tion which is in the maximum interest of the low-income popu-
lation. It is incumbent on the BHA that any plan for
Columbia Point protects the long-term interest of existing
residents, public housing tenants and the low-income popula-
tion in Boston.
The 15 recommendations proposed herein are derived from
examining the Columbia Point case, but are applicable to pub-
lic housing in general; the issues of demolition, disposition
and private redevelopment are also facing other BHA develop-
ments. The final recommendation proposes an alternative to
the current redevelopment plan for Columbia Point.
Recommendation 1:
Private redevelopment and disposition of public
housing should be avoided at all costs and measures
should be undertaken to substantially upgrade and
preserve Columbia Point for continued public owner-
ship and operation as low-income housing.
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Rationale:
While privatization is an option for the development of new
subsidized housing, this should not be seen as a desirable
option for existing public housing. This alternative leads
to a decrease in the supply of low-income units after rede-
velopment, and the uncertainty of long-term maintenance of
low-income housing due to inadequate subsidies, termination
of subsidy programs or the threat of resale of the develop-
ment. Moreover, it is questionable that with the current
decrease in housing subsidies and funding programs a developer
could better maintain a significant number of low-income units
than a reorganized housing authority.
In tracing the history of Columbia Point, the push for pri-
vate redevelopment reflected the desire of the City and the
private sector to increase their return on property tradi-
tionally removed from market circulation rather than a commit-
ment to house the poor. If Columbia Point were transferred
into private hands, it remains unclear even according to the
City and the BRA, that housing could be marketable for upper-
income groups because of the project's stigmatization. It is
both negligent and futile to redevelop the BHA site for any-
thing other than low and moderate-income, public housing
eligible households.
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Recommendation 2:
Private redevelopment should only occur on the City-
owned and non-BHA-owned sites on the peninsula.
BHA should take a firm position that low-income
housing be included on adjoining sites with at
least one-third low and one-third moderate-income
units.
Rationale:
New low, moderate and middle-income housing could most readily
be developed on the U Mass, Boston Water and Sewer and the
Bayside Mall sites to create a mixed-income community. The
development of additional low and moderate-income units are
necessary due to the City's housing needs and for any re-
placement units from loss sustained on the BHA site.
Recommendation 3:
Given its legal mandate, the BHA should take full
responsibility for upgrading Columbia Point for low-
income use rather than abdicating its role by par-
ticipating in a trilateral decision-making body with
the Columbia Point Community Task Force and the
Boston Redevelopment Authority. Columbia Point
tenants should be fully involved in the planning
process, but the BRA and the City should not have
"equal say" in determining the future use of the BHA
housing site.
Rationale:
As documented by the case study, BHA, throughout the planning
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for Columbia Point, has yielded to the influence of the
Mayor's Office, the BRA and the Peninsula Planning Committee.
The BRA has been unable to fulfill its mandate to provide
decent low-income housing when taking leadership from city
officials who explicitly want to make Columbia Point a home
for upper-income households. The February 1979, Three Party
Agreement between the BHA, the BRA and the Task Force came
about solely because of the ineffectiveness of the BHA in
proceeding with any credible plan of action--a sign of its
weakened role in defending the interest of low-income tenants.
While tenants should become full participants in the planning
for revitalization, BHA should not concede to the views of
the tenants' consultants nor the City in their proposals for
massive demolition and disposition of public housing. BHA
cannot simply relinquish its responsibilities by following
blindly along, it must fully recognize and correct its fail-
ure at Columbia Point.
Joint decision making is necessary for a concerted effort to
redevelop the whole peninsula, but the public housing site
can and should be a discrete entity within a larger mixed-
income community; therefore the BHA should be held accountable
for its own site.
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Recommendation 4:
Income mix should only be attempted on the BHA site
within the bounds allowable for low and moderate-
income mixing under the public housing program.
Mixed-income housing should only be supported if
it increases housing opportunities for the low-
income population such as in the integration of low-
income units with moderate and market units to be
developed on non-BHA properties.
Rationale:
Mixed-income housing has not been shown to be a crucial nor
positive factor in improving either tenant satisfaction or
low-income housing environments. In addition, all of the
plans for mixed-income housing at Columbia Point have pro-
posed significant reductions in low-income housing opportuni-
ties. Achieving low and moderate-income mix is possible
under the existing program, but to seek a mixed-income hous-
ing scheme which jeopardizes the existence of public and low-
income housing is not an acceptable solution.
Housing subsidies, including public housing, needed for the
maintenance of low and moderate housing tend to segregate
households by income. Therefore, complete income mix is not
achievable even though it may be a stated goal. Income
segregation in public housing must be seen as no more a seg-
regating factor than housing in the private market or in
upper-income communities. Moreover, the arguments for income
419
mix, and often racial mix, have been used primarily in attack-
ing low-income communities rather than to desegregate upper-
income communities. To allow mixed-income housing to be a
factor in decreasing housing opportunities would result in
serious repercussions to the low-income population, including
questionable benefits to the small number of tenants who will
be rehoused. In the end result, mixed-income housing is not
necessarily desirable. In the current plan, low-income units
would also be replaced one-to-one by market units.
As presented in the research, the income mix ratios proposed
were politically derived to minimize the presence of the
poor, thereby having no relation to the creation of a suitable
living environment for low-income residents. Given the trade-
offs proposed in the latest redevelopment plan, income, social
and racial mixing are not as important as supplying housing
to those in need.
Recommendation 5:
Decent and affordable low-income housing in a stable
community should be the BHA's housing objective and
not luxury housing for the poor.
Rationale:
Research and development in providing attractive, well-
designed housing and responsive management can provide im-
proved living conditions for the poor. Many examples of well-
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run and well-managed public housing projects exist nationally.
Even Boston has its own examples, such as Mary Ellen
McCormick, Lenox, Camden and South Street. The concept of
"luxury" housing has no place in a housing solution because
luxury housing for the poor has not been a reality, it is a
carrot held in front of liberal housing specialists and sus-
ceptible tenants to distract them from a realistic mass
housing solution. Promising a handful of Columbia Point
tenants luxury housing or the "American Dream" is a means of
coopting them from seeing that their interest lies with the
larger public housing community.
Despite all the clamor about the failures, a stable housing
community at Columbia Point is possible because the records
show that the project did function adequately for more than
15 years. The residents were able to feel a part of their
community when management and maintenance services were ade-
quate prior to the early 1970s.
Recommendation 6:
Demolition should not be considered as an option for
Columbia Point. Creative rehabilitation and redesign,
changes in occupancy policy, e.g., overhousing, and
reducing residential density without demolition
should be undertaken.
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Rationale:
Numerous plans and studies, including the BHA/Steffian
Bradley plan, estimates from Dan Walker, and even the Task
Force's plan show the redesign potential of existing build-
ings and the cost effectiveness of rehabilitation over new
construction. The reports from the consultants laud the
soundness of the existing buildings and show that rehabilita-
tion is feasible given the non-bearing interior walls. The
physical condition of the units themselves does not justify
demolition. Duplexes, vertical and horizontal breakthroughs
are all possible, in addition to changes in occupancy poli-
cies, such as underhousing by providing more bedrooms per
household to compensate for the small size of the units. Be-
cause the major systems have already been overhauled, many
units require a minimum cost for rehabilitating for occupancy.
Nevertheless, the options are many for redesign. An emphasis
on site work, landscaping, and creating a suitable mix of
uses on the site should be a major focus of revitalization.
This study shows that despite the findings, the parties chose
to forego rehabilitation in favor of massive demolition.
Therefore, alternatives have not been fully considered prior
to the latest proposal to demolish 660 units. The density
recommendations should also not be taken at face value; they
have little credibility if the plans range from a proposed
density of 1,400 to 4,000 for the total development. These
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have also been shown to be political decisions not determined
by what the site can realistically accommodate.
Residential density can be reduced without the need for demo-
lition by adaptive re-use or by consolidation of units to
create larger apartments. Diversity in housing type could
also be accomplished by substantial rehabilitation and by
constructing new units on the site.
Recommendation 7:
In the event that any proposal is made for any
demolition, the BHA should request funding from
HUD to commission an independent study to deter-
mine the causes leading up to the deterioration of
Columbia Point, the consequences of such demolition
on the low-income housing supply, and if any alter-
natives to demolition warrant consideration.
Rationale:
The Receiver, the Court and TPC should have an accurate pic-
ture of the events leading to the necessity for such drastic
actions in order to ascertain whether there was a deliberate
failure to maintain or improve the housing project so that
demolition would be the only feasible alternative.
The consequences of demolition are particularly important in
light of the BHA's policy regarding rehabilitation or demo-
lition of other housing projects. An independent evaluation
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of the alternatives to demolition would help to insure that
demolition is, indeed, a "last resort."
Recommendation 8:
Replacement housing on a one-to-one basis should be
provided on the BHA site or on adjacent non-BEA
site as a result of any decrease in the 1,500 low-
income units at Columbia Point. BHA should under-
take the preparation of a replacement housing plan
along with representatives of HUD, DCA, the Mayor's
Office, TPC and the Task Force to develop a plan which
cuts across jurisdictional areas.
If, for any reason, full cooperation is not reached
nor adequate financial resources available in devel-
oping a satisfactory one-to-one replacement housing
plan, BHA should reassess any reduction of units on
its site through demolition or other means, and con-
sider other options to insure that no units will be
lost. Every effort must be made to provide 1,500 low-
income units through rehabilitation and new construc-
tion.
It is proposed that the following criteria are met in
a replacement housing plan:
1. A one-to-one replacement housing plan be provided
on or off-site for each unit lost through demo-
lition, disposition, breakthroughs, consolidations,
re-use, e.g., for social services, or for any
other reasons.
2. Replacement units shall be additional low-income
public housing units and/or low-income subsidized
housing units comparable to public housing to be
provided above and beyond the normal allocations
for Boston.
3. If subsidized housing_other than public housing is
proposed, e.g., Section 8, it must meet the full
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criteria for public housing in terms of low-income
eligibility, and a 40-year commitment or reserva-
tion for long-term financing.
4. Bedroom distributions of the replacement units
shall be consistent with low-income housing needs
in the city.
The following replacement housing plan is proposed:
1. HUD to commit new construction reservations for
public housing and low-income subsidized housing
to compensate for lost public housing units.
2. HUD and BRA-owned vacant properties appropriate
for residential use shall be committed for the
development of low-income housing.
3. The City and the HUD shall increase Boston's
Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) above the current
three-year plan for low-income rental housing and
prospective homeownership to compensate for lost
public housing units.
4. State resources through DCA and/or MHFA shall also
be considered a resource for replacement housing.
5. If other sources are not sufficient, exploration
should be made for City or State bonding for
financing additional low-income housing--this may
involve the development of a City housing agency
or expansion of the BHA to encompass this work.
Rationale:
Given the current and projected need for low-income housing
in the City, the total number of units should not be allowed
to decrease. The numbers on the BHA family as well as the
Columbia Point waiting list alone justify the need.
It is far too easy to simply propose massive demolition, but
unless there is some form of accountability from the City,
State and Federal government to replace these units, it is
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also irresponsible and negligent.
decrease in low-income units must be carefully assessed as to
the cost for replacing those units.
Recommendation 9:
A replacement housing plan should be in the imple-
mentation stage prior to demolition or any expendi-
ture of funds for Section 8, Section 234 and 236,
the UDAG, and other funding.
Rationale:
This is to insure that a reasonable effort is underway to re-
place lost units lest other housing is developed in lieu of
low-income housing. Tenants have been most concerned that
commitments are carried out prior to demolition, as all too
often, such as in King's Lynne, low-income units are lost in
between the initial and final implementation stages. Or worse
yet, the site could remain vacant.
Recommendation 10:
BHA should place priority on the daily operation and
management of Columbia Point by professional and
competent staff to meet the needs of the residents
and attain some standards of maintenance and
management.
Rationale:
The abandoning of BHA management and maintenance services and
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Thus demolition or any
letting the project go to waste in hopes that a private devel-
oper or private manager will take over operations, only com-
pounds the problems for the residents. Day-to-day management
and services and the responsiveness of management to tenants
are important factors in making the project livable. The
poor quality of management has served to drive out tenants
from the development, and problems of attrition, disrepair
and deterioration will continue this process unless abated.
It is not sufficient for BHA to provide staff and personnel
who are solely "well-intentioned" in their desire to upgrade
Columbia Point because this has produced little results in
the past. Professionally competent and experienced personnel
backed by solid support and cooperation from BHA's central
office are necessary for any successful attempt at a "best
effort" in improving conditions.
Continued deterioration in the development has led to pro-
posals for demolition and disposition. A priority placed on
planning for redevelopment while neglecting the immediate
needs of the residents is of disservice to the public housing
community.
Recommendation 11:
The remaining $11 million in Urban Initiatives and
Modernization funds should be expended for housing
rehabilitation as soon as possible for existing and
new low-income tenants.
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Rationale:
The BHA has held on to these funds to leverage private invest-
ment. In the meantime, the funds have devalued over a
quarter of their initial value and existing units remain in
disrepair. BHA has been reluctant to expend these funds for
fear that any investment in the buildings will commit the
unit to the public inventory by extending the ACC. Therefore,
BHA has been finding ways of sinking the funds into other
items aside from housing rehabilitation. This is a gross
misuse of HUD funds.
Recommendation 12:
BHA should lift the "freeze" on tenant assignment
to vacant units as many of the units are in satis-
factory condition and require little work. These
units should be rehabilitated and retenanted so that
attrition does not continue and additional family
and elderly households can be provided housing.
Rationale:
Rapid attrition since the early 1970s has made it all the
easier to redevelop Columbia Point without large numbers of
low-income units to be provided after redevelopment. This
can easily be corrected. From BHA site inspections in 1979,
many units were found to be in need of a minimum amount of
repairs, these should be retenanted as soon as possible.
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Recommendation 13:
Housing guarantees should be made to all existing
tenants and future tenants, as well as to all tenants
who resided at Columbia Point on July 1, 1977 and who
have since moved due to the intolerable conditions.
Rationale:
The City has always supported the fewest possible number of
guarantees--contending that those as of July 1, 1977, who
vacated their units should not be entitled to rehousing. The
tenants have maintained that the agreement signed in February
1979 provides those tenants the right to rehousing. BHA has
not as yet taken a position on this matter. If BHA does not
protect the interest of the tenants, attrition will result in
an insignificant number of Columbia Point tenants who will be
guaranteed housing after revitalization. New families who
move in must be guaranteed rehousing.
Recommendation 14:
BHA should request from HUD substantial funding to
insure that Columbia Point is publicly redeveloped
to provide for at least 1,500 public housing eli-
gible units on the BHA site or at another location.
BHA should request an extended schedule of funding
from HUD through the Modernization program, discre-
tionary funds, and increased operating subsidies.
Rationale:
With the Receiver on board, additional funding to BHA is
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needed for responsible management and rehabilitation to re-
verse the trend of neglect. Substantial funding from HUD is
imperative for revitalizing Columbia Point as low-income
housing.
Recommendation 15:
A redevelopment plan calling for the creation of at
least 1,500 low-income units in a mixed-income resi-
dential community should be supported as an alter-
native to the current plan for Columbia Point:
Rehabilitation of the existing BHA site (37 acres)
can result in 1,000 "good" units for public housing
eligible households through substantial rehabilita-
tion and redesign. From the initial 1,500 units,
1,000 units of well-designed and well-maintained
units can be achieved by reducing the density in the
buildings without the need for demolition. Within
the BHA site, 200 to 300 of the units can be
newly constructed to create a mix in housing type.
2,400 additional units of mixed-income housing should
be developed on the non-BHA-owned parcels: the U
Mass site, the Boston Water and Sewer site, the
Bayside Mall site and other City-owned land. This
should include 800 units of moderate-income housing,
800 units of market housing, and 800 units of low-
income housing for replacement housing for the 500-
unit reduction on the BHA site, and for additional
units.
The total development would result in a 3,400 unit
mixed-income community which maintains a commitment
to low-income households. The planning for services,
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stores, site improvements, recreation, employment
and other needs can make Columbia Point a diverse
urban neighborhood with its own identity and charm,
while providing housing for approximately 12,000
people.
Rationale:
The current redevelopment plan in the third and fourth draft of
the Developer's Kit has been shown to be a clear abrogation
of the BHA and the public responsibility to provide low-income
housing commensurate with the original commitment at Columbia
Point.
During the course of its tenure, the past BHA administration
indisputedly failed to provide for the needs of low-income
tenants. The elements of demolition, disposition and private
redevelopment in the plan reflected the position of the BHA
at the time as how best to extricate itself from its re-
sponsibilities at Columbia Point.
The arrival of the Receiver has at least symbolized a "reform
administration" or a "last ditch" effort to salvage public
housing. Therefore, a conscientious attempt to provide for
the long-term recovery and preservation of public housing
cannot take the form of continuing the present trends at
Columbia Point. If the Receiver goes willingly along with
the current plan, or does not initiate action to protect the
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long-term interest of low-income people, the institution of
public housing would once again fail to make in improvement
in the lives of its tenants.
The elements of an alternative plan described above would
insure the continuity of a low-income presence in an attrac-
tive community without the wasteful and inexcusable demolition
and disposition of public housing. The plan provides for
adequate replacement housing, an expansion of low-income
units, income mix, a reasonable urban density and a neighbor-
hood which is comparable to the size of other neighborhoods
in the city.
The BHA could maintain its charge to provide for its constitu-
ency, instead of solving the upper-income housing problem at
the expense of the poor. Private investment and development
opportunities could still be provided on the peninsula; suffi-
cient latitude for any number of private subsidized housing
schemes can exist on non-BHA sites without infringing on the
rights of the low-income population to at least 1,500 units
of housing. A justifiable goal of a "social experiment" is
the creation of a residential community which is inclusive of
low-income households and not one which solves the housing
problem by getting rid of them.
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INTRODUCTION 1. BASIC PRINCIPLES
In May 1977, the Peninsula Planning Com--
mittee staff produced and distributed
a document, "Columbia Point Land Use
Approaches," which described three
directions for the future growth and
development of Columbia Point. Following
review and continuing analysis of these
development options, this composite
plan has been developed to solicit
consensus among Committee members con-
cerning a more specific course of action.
The organization of this report reflects
three major areas of attention and
study in plan development, presented
in three sections -- a statement of
the plan's fundamental elements,
assumptions about public sector policies
and investment requirements and a des-
cription of private development oppor-
tunities. A summary relating these
three issues, and indicating the poten-
tial investment and employment impact
of the plan, represents the concluding
section of the report.
The principles described in this section
represent the base of assumptions about
development direction from which the
Composite Plan proceeds.
1.1 HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
Substantial new housing development
geared toward mixed income occupancy
is an essential factor in the overall
development success of Columbia
Point. Within this emphasis, the
commitment to assure housing for
the existing tenant population will
be sustained, with the successful
execution of Phase I (420 units)
of the modernization program and a
significantly restructured management
system providing the departure point
for additional development.
1.2 RETAIL DEVELOPMENT
Bayside Mall offers an optimum location
for new retail development or revitali-
zation, because of positive site
qualities of visibility and accessi-
bility, and because of exhibited demand
for better located and more competitive
retail services by neighboring popu-
lations. 100,000-150,000 square feet
of retail space here could be supported
successfully by populations within a
1 - 1 1/2 mile radius.
1.3 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
A strong institutional presence should
be maintained on the peninsula because
of the generally positive impact of
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2. PUBLIC POLICY AND
INVESTMENT ASSUMPTIONS
Initiative and activity in private
development depends upon a set of basic publiz
policies and investments to produce a
suitable and functionally adequate support
environment. Funding from local, state
and federal government sources must be
involved in improving or adding to necessary
public structures. Assumptions about the
focus and scope of public actions on
Columbia Point are described in this
section.
2.1 UTILITIES
2.1.1 WATER
Capacity of the existing system is
inadequate to serve major scale new
development beyond presently planned
U/Mass expansion and JFK Library
construction.
An increase in capacity, involving
cleaning and relining of a length of
trunk line and construction of a new
distribution line, is a prerequisite
to private development at the level
proposed in this plan.
Estimated cost: S1,500,000*
Expansion of the existing local water
distribution system on the peninsula will
be necessary to serve presently under-
developed land parcels. Cost may be
partially assumed by private developers
involved, and will vary depending upon
specifics of proposed development.
* See Appendix for references on cost
estimates used here and elsewhere in
the text.
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present and proposed institutional
uses upon land values, community
quality and development potential.
Continued development of the U/Mass
Harbor Campus within the perimeter road,
establishment of the JFK Library and
development of the State Archives should
be pursued, and the development of
a cultural center or other additional
institutional uses should remain
possibilities within the existing
area of primarily institutional land
use on the eastern end of the peninsula.
1.4 DEVELOPMENT OF PUMPHOUSE
AREA: MIXED USE
A mix of commercial uses (including
a hotel facility, conference center,
restaurant facilities, and retail and
student services) supporting nearby
institutional and residential uses
would be appropriate in this location.
In addition, a community center
providing services to the residential
population would serve as a link to
the University and other institu-
tional uses.
1.5 BEACHFRONT DEVELOPMENT
The exceptional site qualities of
Columbia Point, related to waterfront
access and views of the island and down-
town skyline, should be utilized both
to provide areas for recreational and
open space use, and to provide the
amenities of a waterside location for
new residential development. These
site advantages are also a major
attraction for certain kinds of site-
specific commercial uses (e.g. hotel,
restaurant) which are seen as alter-
nate uses for waterfront development.
1.6 CIRCULATION IMPROVEMENTS
Provision for improved access to develop-
ment parcels on the peninsula is
necessary to stimulate a meaningful
level of private development activity.
Immediate public planning attention and
investment should be directed toward 474
T-stop improvements and toward vehicular
access improvements related to existing
roadway modifications. Later modifications
to internal street systems will become
necessary as development plans are defined,
with costs supported by both public and
private investment.
1.7 JOBS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Significant employment opportunities are
associated with both new commercial and
residential uses and with the continued
growth of existing commercial and
institutional uses. Aspects of new
development to be emphasized include
environmental fitness as well as employ-
ment intensity and potential for career-
related skills development. On the job
training in some instances may be tied
to degree-granting educational programs,
and can make an important contribution
to the economic development needs of both
the local community and the total city.
New construction also will create immediate
job and training opportunities.
1.8 A DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM
A special purpose entity is required to
direct future planning and development
activities on the peninsula. Its structure
and function should be designed to insure
the active involvement of all with a
direct interest in the peninsula's future,
and to provide for a continuance of the
public/private partnership that has charac-
terized the work of the Peninsula Planning
Committee. It should have the authority
to adopt a plan and see to its execution;
and to raise funds through bonding as well
as from federal and state funding sources.
It should complement the city's broader
community development efforts in the
peninsula area and not absorb or compete with
them.
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Boston Housing Authority Proposal
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STEFFIAN - BRADLEY/BHA REUSE PROGRAM FOR
EXISTING BHA COLUMBIA POINT BUILDINGS
484
Summary of Construction Program and Estimated Costs
A. Family Development
69 5 bedroom units
80 4 bedroom units
104 3 bedroom units
151 2 bedroom units
4 1 bedroom units
Total 408 units in family development
Buildings which remain 3 story will contain duplexes
on ground floor with separate entrances and
small flats on third floor
Buildings which are brought down from 7 stories to
four stories will contain stacked duplexes
Buildings which remain seven stories will contain
duplexes with separate entrances on the
ground floor (thus combining the first and
second stories) and small apartments on the
upper five floors accessed by key elevator
(see illustration)
B. Elderly Development (Building #'s 18, 3, 12, 20, 26, 27)
224 2 bedroom units
224 1 bedroom units
Total 448 units in elderlydevelopment
Building #'s 12, 20, 26, and 27 would have new
elevators, enlarged lobby space, balconies,
new interior treatment and fixtures and repositioning
of some partitions to create larger units with
fewer bedrooms
Building #'s 18 and 3 would be joined by new
construction and reworked as a single-loaded
corridor mode, new elevators, lobby space, and
balconies
All units would be retained by the BHA and managed either by
BRA or under contract to tenant/developer entity managing
adjacent family development. The BHA would explore with HUD
the possibility of restructuring a substantial portion of
the debt on the BHA site ($27 million) around these rehabili-
tated units, thus reducing price of remainder of site.
A n r--
P C I N T D E V E L O P M E N T
OT
BUILDING NUMBER. PLAN.-
.DEMOLITION KEY
60
-- -- - -
-- Total Demolition
-- Reduction in Height
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Before (above) and after (below).
A view down Montpelier Road .today,
and tomorrow, after the proposed
changes are completed.
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A plan depicting the major proposed
site changes. Except for three
buildings housing the elderly, all
7-story structures are cut down to
two and three stories.
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Rehabilitation
- No treatment
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Mao 6. PROPOSED TREATMENT OF EXISTING BUILDINGS (4th Draft, 1980) 0 300 600 feet
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DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Office of The Assistant Secretary for
Housing-Federal Housing
Commissioner
24 CFR Part 870
(Docket No. R-79-600]
PHA-Owned Public Housing Projects-
Demolition of Buildings or Disposition
of Real Property; Policy and
Procedures
AGENCY: Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: HUD is issuing a final rule
adding Part 870 to provide policy and
procedures regarding partial or total
demolition of buildings and partial or
total disposition of land of PHA-owned
public housing projects.
EFFECTIVE DATE: December 10, 1979.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Wayne Hunter, Office of Public
Housing, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 451 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20410, (202) 755-
6460. This is not a toil-free number.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On
December 27, 1978, the Department
published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (43 FR 60301) to specify
requirements pertaining to the
demolition or disposition of public
housing property. A subsequent Notice,
published on April 16, 1979, (44 FR
22472), extended the public comment
period to May 16, 1979.
A total of 54 comments were received.
Each comment was carefully
considered. The following is a summary
of the comments received and the
changes made to the proposed rule.
Some comments reflected a
misunderstanding of HUD's intent in
publishing a rule on this subject.
Contrary to the apprehensions
expressed in'those comments, this rule
does not signal a relaxation of
standards or encouragement for
reducing the stock of public housing.
HUD's intent is to codify its present
policy of maximum conservation of
existing public housing.
This rule provides that demolition or
disposition shall be used only as a last
resort, in those special situations where
it can be convincingly demonstrated
that continued operation as low-income
public housing cannot be justified.
Approval for demolition or disposition
can be given only by the Assistant
Secretary for Housing. Decisions will be
based on thorough documentation
submitted by the PHA and careful
review by HUD staff.
The second sentence of 1 870.2 has
been revised to provide that this rule is
not applicable to the sale of dwellings to
homebuyers under any homeownership
opportunities program.
In response to several comments, the
definition of "demolition" (§ 870.3) has
been modified to make it clear that the
term includes partial demolition of a
single building, if razing of dwelling
units or nondwelling space results. The
definition of "disposition" has also been
changed to indicate that the
determination of what constitutes
"normal operation of the project for low-
income housing and related purposes" is
governed by the ACC.
The policy statement of J 870.4
remains consistent with that stated in
the proposed rule. A number of
commentors argued that this statement
was too vague and objected to
qualifying language, such as "every
reasonable effort." HUD has
nevertheless determined that the
provision is a sound policy statement
and serves as a basis for the more
precise formulation of criteria set forth
in J 870.6 of the final rule.
A significant change has been made in
the first sentence of J 870.5. The parallel
provision of the proposed rule stated
that written HUD approval shall be
required for demolition or disposition.
The final rule specifies that only the
Assistant Secretary for Housing may
approve demolition or disposition.
Several commentors recommended
that J 870.5 go into much greater detail
as to the content of the supporting
documentation to be submitted with the
PHA's request for HUD approval of
demolition and/or disposition. HUD
does not consider this necessary or
appropriate. Detailed procedural
instructions will be covered in a HUD
Handbook which will be distributed to
all PHAs. The requirement for a
relocation plan for displaced tenants has
been placed in this section, a more
appropriate position than the section on
criteria, where it was placed in the
proposed rule, and language has been
added to require the PHA to pay the
actual reasonable moving expenses of
displaced tenants. The Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970, mentioned by some commentors, is
not applicable.
The provision on criteria (§ 870.7) has
been extensively revised, in response to
comments which advocated a stricter
and more precise approach. Some
commentors expressed the view that
demolition should not be permitted
when the need for low-income housing
exceeds the availability of low-income
units. Others said that, while factors
A Q r
other than housing need may deserve
consideration, the proposed rule would
allow HUD to give excessive weight to
them.
In-response to these concerns, the
final rule distinguishes between primary
and secondary criteria (§ 870.6). The
primary criteria relate to local needs for
low-income housing and to the physical
condition of the property. Other
factors-such as location, social
conditions and density-are relegated to
secondary consideration.
In connection with the needs criterion,
some commentors argued that the
provision on replacement housing
should be strengthened by eliminating
the condition regarding availability of
funds and stipulating that the
replacement housing must be over and
above development levels planned
without reference to the proposed
demolition and/or disposition. The final
rule modifies the replacement housing
provision to specify that the
determination as to the availability of
funds will be made by HUD.
The final rule tightens the second of
the two prim arycriteria as it pertains to
the feasibility of rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation will be considered
feasible if its estimated cost does not
exceed applicable prototype cost limits.
This final rule eliminates consideration
of the availability of rehabilitation
funds.
The secondary criteria (J 870.6b)
listed in the final rule are modified
versions of some of the criteria listed in
the proposed rule. Those pertaining to
social conditions and density have been
limited by specifying that they may be
considered only with regard to project
marketability. The criterion relating to
disposition of limited interests in real
estate (I 870.6b(4)) is expanded to
include reference to benefits to the
public interest, as well as to the project
itself. The criterion in the proposed rule
concerning the effect on the surrounding
neighborhood and wider community,
was deleted as being too vague. Such
factors are covered under location.
social conditions and the last of the
secondary criteria-consideration of th,
views of tenants and the local governin
body.
Another major area for comment wa
the section on tenant participation. A
number of commentors argued that
tenants should have veto power over
proposals for demolition and/or
disposition, rather than the advisory rc
indicated in the proposed rule. Several
commentors advocated that HUD
impose an elaborately detailed. unifori
procedure for tenant participation. The
tenant participation section of the fina
rule (J 870.7) retains the approach set
forth in the proposed rule, but adopts
the suggestion of some commentors th
. 65368
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the PHA be required to submit to HUD
copies of writen tenant comments and
recommendations, rather than a mere
summary of them. This approach to
tenant participation is consistent with
the Department's present general policy
on the subject, as similarly expressed in
requirements for the Modernization
Program.
The proposed rule's provision on
waiver of tenant participation
requirements in the case of emergencies
has been deleted. A situation posing an
immediate threat to life, health or safety
might warrant expeditious action
including HUD waiver of certain
procedures under this part. Tenant
participation requirements were not
meant to be singled out for such waiver,
as the requirements to be waived would
depend on the individual situation.
Some commentors felt that HUD
should make special provision for
technical assistance to the tenants or
tenant organization. HUD cannot
provide special funding for this purpose.
The PHA might, however, provide such
funding, to the extent consistent with
requirements pertaining to permissible
expenditures of operating funds and
modernization funds.
One commentor pointed out that the
proposed rule rhade no reference to
historic preservation requirements. This
omission has been rectified by § 870.8,
which specifies compliance with both
environmental and historic preservation
requirements of Federal law.
The provision on A-95 clearance
(§ 870.9) has been changed to conform
with existing HUD regulations governing
the thresholds for A-95 review (24 CFR
Part 52). Some commentors argued for a
threshold of fewer than 100 dwelling
units as specified in the proposed rule,
or for elimination of any threshold. The
Department believes, as stated in
I 52.102(a) of the HUD regulation, that
the thresholds identified in paragraph 7,
Part I Attachment A of OMB Circular
Ncr A.95 are appropriale. The final rule
thus requires Clearinghouse review for
requests to demolish or dispose of 50 or
more dwelling units in urbanized areas
as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census, and for requests to demolish or
dispose of 25 or more dwelling units in
all other areas.
Some commentors advocated
elaboration of § 870.10, with regard to
procedures for disposition of property
determined to be excess. One
commentor recommiended that HUD
restrict use of sale proceeds to housing
or certain other types of public
purposes. Section 870.10 merely reflects
a provision of the ACC, and no
requirements inconsistent with that
ACC provision may be adopted. HUD
believes that, If any further procedural
guidance on this point is needed, it
should be included in a Handbook.
A Finding of Inapplicability respecting
the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 has been made in accordance
with HUD procedure. A copy of the
Finding of Inapplicability is available
for public inspection during regular
business hours at the office of the Rules
Docket Clerk, Office of the General
Counsel, Room 5218, Department of
Housing and Urban Development 451
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20410.
Accordingly, 24 CFR is amended by
adding Part 870 as set forth below.
PART 870-PHA-OWNED PUBLIC
HOUSING PROJECTS-DEMOIUTION
OF BUILDINGS OR DISPOSITION OF
REAL PROPERTY
Sec.
870.1 Purpose.
870.2 Applicability.
870.3 Definitions.
870.4 HUD policy.
870.5 PHA request for HUJD approval.
870.6 Criteria.
870.7 Tenant participation.
870.8 Environmental and historic
preservation requirements.
870.9 A-95 clearance.
870.10 Disposition of excess property.
Authority: Sec. 7 of the HURD Act; 42 U.S.C.
3535(d).
1 870.1 Purpose.
This part sets forth requirements
concerning requests by public housing
agencies (PHAs) for HUD authority to
demolish buildings or dispose of real
property of PHA-owned, low-income
public housing projects.
1870.2 ApplicabMty.
This part applies to PHA-owned., low-
income public housing projects which
are subject to Annual Contributions
Contracts (ACCs) under the United
States Housing Act of 1937. It does not
apply to the Section 23 and Section 10(c)
Leased Housing Programs or the Section
23 and Section 8 Housing Assistance
Payments Programs; nor does it apply to
the sale of dwellings to homebuyers
pursuant to and in accordance with the
rules and procedures for any HUD
homeownership opportunities program.
§ 870.3 Definitions.
"Demolition" means the razing of one
or more buildings of a public housing
project, or the razing of a part of a
building comprised of one or more
dwelling units and/or nondwelling
space.
"Disposition" means the conveyance
by a PHA. pursuant to sale or other
transaction, of any interest in the real
estate of a public housing project (e.g.,
fee title, leasehold, right of way or
easement) and the Improvements
located thereon, except for leasehold
interests incident to the normal
operation of the project for low-income
housing and related purposes, as
permitted by the ACC.
§870.4 HUD policy.
It is HUD's policy to conserve and
maintain the existing stock of low-
income public housing to the maximum
extent consistent with considerations of
need and feasibility. Unless it can be
demonstrated that a project, or a portior
of a project, is excess to local needs for
low-income housing, every reasonable
effort will be made by HUD and the
PHA to keep the property within the
low-income housing inventory. If a
project, or a portion of a project, is
determined by HUD as not excess to
local needs, but it is unsuitable for
housing use because of its physical
condition, every reasonable effort shall
be made to return it to a condition
suitable for housing use, through the
Modernization Program or other means.
Accordingly, HUD will limit approval
for demolition or dispositioi to those
cases where such action can be fully
justified in accordance with the criteria
set forth under this part.
§ 870.5 PHA request for HUD approval.
Written approval by the Assistant
Secretary for Housing shall be required
prior to any transaction involving either
demolition or disposition or both. To
obtain such approval, the PHA shall
submit a written request to the
appropriate HUD field office. The
request shall include a description of the
property involved, a statement of the
proposed PHA action and additional
supporting documentation pertinent to
the criteria prescribed in 1 870.6 and
other applicable requirements. If
demolition or disposition of any
occupied dwelling is proposed, the PHA
shall also submit a plan for relocating
displaced tenants to other decent, safe
and sanitary housing within the tenants'
means. The relocation plan shall provide
for the PHA to pay the actual
reasonable moving expenses of
displaced tenants.
§ 870.6 Criteria.
a. Primary criteria. HUD will rely
primarily upon the following criteria in
determining whether a PHA's request
for demolition and/or disposition is
justified under the policy stated in
1 870.4:
(1) Current and projected needs for
low-income housing in the jurisdiction
served by the PHA, taking into account
497
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both demand and supply factors. If there
is a local need for low-income housing.
the PHA's request for demolition or
disposition of dwelling units shall
include a plan for replacement housing
on a one-to-one basis or as approved by
HUD to be warranted by current and
projected needs for low-income housing.
subject to HUD's finding as to the
availability of funds.
(2) The physical condition of the
property and, where pertinent, the
feasibility of rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation shall be considered
feasible if its estimated cost does not
exceed the published prototype cost
limit for similar structure. in the same
prototype cost area.
b. Secondary criteria. In addition to
the primary criteria for determining
whether demolition and/or disposition
is justified. HUD will consider the
following additional factors:
(1) Location, in terms of any
conditions in the surrounding
neighborhood that adversely affect the
life, health or safety of project residents.
(2) Social conditions which have
seriously affected the marketability of
the project.
(3) The project's'densify, in terms of
population density and needs for open
space for recreation, parking or other
purposes, which have seriously affected
the marketability of the project.
(4) Benefits to the project or the public
interest from disposition of a limited
interest in project real estate (e.g.,
easement, right of way or dedication for
public use).
(5) Views of tenants and the local
governing body.
5870.7 Tenant participation.
a. Before submission to the
appropriate HUD field office of a
request for demolition and/or
disposition, the PHA shall provide
written notification to the tenants of the
project and the tenant organization, if
any, of the proposed request, and afford
them a reasonable time to submit
comments, including suggested
alternatives, concerning the proposed
action of the PHA. The PHA shall give
full and serious consideration to the
comments submitted by the tenants. The
PHA shall provide HUD with copies of
all written comments and alternatives
submitted to the PHA by, or on behalf
of. tenants and/or the tenant
organization as well as the PHA's
position concerning each comment and
alternative.
b. When the PHA submits the request
to the appropriate HUD field office, it
shall notify the tenants of the project
and the tenant organization, if any, that
the submission has been made and that
a copy of the request, including
supporting documentation, is available
for their review.
c. After HUD's decision on the PHA's
request, the PHA shall notify the tenants
of the project and the tenant
organization. if any, of the decision.
§ 870.8 Environmental and historic
preservation requirements.
HUD approval of a PHA's request for
demolition and/or disposition shall be
subject to applicable requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 and the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966.
1 870.9 A-95 clearance.
With respect to any request for
demolition or disposition of 50 or more
dwelling units in urbanized areas, as
defined by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census, or 25 or more dwelling units in
all other areas, the following
requirements are applicable: (a) At
least 45 days prior to the submission of
the PHA's request to HUD, the PHA
shall transmit a copy of the request to
the. appropirate State and areawide A-
95 clearinghouses for comment
(b) The PHA shall transmit all
clearinghouse comments with the
request to HUD. If comments are not
received by the PHA within the 45-day
period, the PHA shall submit a
statement indicating that the
clearinghouse(s) was notified and no
comments were received.
(c) If the A-95 review comments
contain any finding of inconsistency
with State, areawide or local plans or
non-compliance with environmental or
other applicable requirements, the PHA
must indicate how it proposes to resolve
the finding or provide justification for
proposing to proceed with the requested
action despite the finding.
§ 870.10 Disposition of excess property.
Where HUD approves the disposition
of real property of a project, the PHA
shall, in accordance with the
requirements of the ACC, determine
such property to b'e excess and shall sell
it as soon as practicable at a public sale
for not less than the fair market value
thereof, unless another method of
disposition is approved by HUD. The
proceeds of sale or other disposition
shall be applied as directed by HUD in
accordance with the ACC.
Issued at Washington. D.C., November 1.
1979.
Marilyn Melkonian,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Housing,
Fedeml Housing Commissioner.
(M Doc. 79-4407 Fed 1-6-79; :45 ami
sBLUOo COoE 4210-01M
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TENANTS POLICY COUNCIL
99 BEDFORD STREET
BOSTON, MA 02111
(617) 542-0620
OCTOBER 17, 1977
ANNUAL MEETING
70 ST. BOTOLPH STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
RESOLUTION
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE TENANTS POLICY COUNCIL, REPRESENTING
MORE THAN 60,000 TENANTS OF BOSTON PUBLIC HOUSING DOES
HEREBY EXPRESS ITS COMPLETE AND ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO
ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN ANY REDUCTION IN THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF OCCUPIED OR UNOCCUPIED RENTAL UNITS NOW
ADMINISTERED BY THE BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY.
THE TENANTS POLICY COUNCIL OPPOSES ANY REDUCTION OF
RENTAL UNITS IN PUBLIC HOUSING, AT ANY DEVELOPMENT,
OR IN SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, FOR ANY REASON, UNLESS
PREVIOUSLY COMPENSATED BY THE ADDITION OF AT LEAST AN
EQUAL NUMBER OF NEW RENTAL UNITS - - EITHER THROUGH
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING OR OTHER PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAMS.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE CARR,LYNCH REDEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR COLUMBIA POINT
The Columbia Point Community Task Force has established some laudable objectives
for the redevelopment of the Columbia Point peninsula:
* the creation of an attractive, mixed-income family housing environment
at Columbia Point;
* a redevelopment plan which will provide decent and affordable housing
to meet the current residents' needs as soon as possible;
* the maintenance of a substantial commitment to provide housing for
low-income households consistent with the commitment embodied in the
initial development of public housing at Columbia Point.
While the BHA fully concurs with and supports the above objectives, an evaluation
of the Carr-Lynch redevelopment plan reveals the proposed plan to be inadequate
in certain of its key planning concepts, resulting in problems with the site
plan and the physical design solutions. Because of these deficiencies, the Carr,
Lynch plan falls short of creating a desirable mixed-income living environment
which will be supportive of the needs of low and moderate income residents.
The Carr,Lynch plan in essence proposes the redevelopment of Columbia Point
as a suburban site and as a bedroom community in the City of Boston. The design
concepts employed are drawn from the "American dream", suburban imagery of
single-family homes and low-density townhouses. The plan even proposes picnic
tables to be strewn randomly throughout the site. The site plan results in
vast uncontrollable open green spaces located behind the housing, winding,
tree-lined streets for easy vehicular access, pedestrian paths criss-crossing the
interior of the site, and massive demolition of existing buildings to provide for
the construction of new townhouses. The site plan may be familiar in a suburban
middle- and upper-class homogeneous community. It is difficult, however, to
visualize the success of this suburban format superimposed on an urban context
and the imposition of a monotonous, suburban life-style on a heterogeneous
population in an urban area like Columbia Point.
Columbia Point is an urban site with redevelopment potential resembling more the
South End and the North End than suburban sites such as Newton or Lincoln. The
frequentanalogy of associating the redevelopment of King's Lynne in Lynn,
Mass. (formerly America Park) with Columbia Point is misleading at best and
fails to recognize the contextual differences in the fact that Columbia Point is
located in the City of Boston and not 25 miles away in a very suburban portion
of Lynn. Substantially different community, financial, and institutional opportunitie
exist at Columbia Point . Columbia Point must be redeveloped as an urban site
if it is to remain viable for low and moderate income residents.
Columbia Point today, even with the remaining population of approximately 1,00
and the deteriorated livino conditions, is similar to most urban neighborhoods
and communities in the level of social interaction and community life. This
is evidenced by a highly interactive social environment among residents, the
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the existence of residential street life, neighborhood activities and other
signs of attempts at community cohesion. Though all signs of interaction
among residents.are not necessarily positive, redevelopment efforts should
be made to recognize and encourage appropriate forms of social interaction
rather than to deny all forms of interaction. The Carr,Lynch plan is overbearing
in its attempt to obliterate completely all semblances of the existing
community, both socially and physically. By denying the'present residents
and new residents the richness and interactive qualities of an urban
neighborhood environment and by massive destruction of existing buildings
and rerouting of streets, the plan reflects more a reactive response to
the present deteriorated conditions at Columbia'Point than a reasonable
and responsible approach towards redevelopment.
The purpose of this evaluation is to discuss some of the design concepts and
assumptions in the proposed poan, and to suggest criteria for the redevelopment
effort. A viable mixed income family community at Columbia Point must provide
the highest level of support for the low and moderate income population and
fulfill the objectives established by the Columbia Point Community Task
Force.
The following issues will be addressed:
1. Rehabilitation and re-use of buildings
2. Stre and circulation systems
3. Use of open space
4. community development
5. management and maintenance
Rehabilitation and Re-use of Buildings
The Carr,Lynch plan proposes a rigid adherance to certain abstract design
principles. The plan takes as its basic assumption that successful family
living can only take place in two and three story single-family houses,
townhouses and garden apartments. Each individual unit should have a front
entrance, a back entrance with a private yard, direct ground access, pitched
roofs, and all the images of "home". While many of these features are attractive,
they are inaccurately presented as essential for successful family living.
In reality, many factors such as the quality and accessibility to open space,
management, maintenance, security, unity size and condition, the quality
of individual or common entrances may be more important to the success of a residenti
community than whehter the unit has a formal front and back entrance or direct
ground access. The Carr, Lynch plan proposes that all three bedroom units
or larger must have .-direct ground access and that all mid-rise buildings be demolishe
or cut to three stories (except for elderly buildings). These rigid rules
result in the inability to reuse existing luw-and mid-rise buildings in a number of
creative ways. Stacked four bedroom units cannot be rehabilitated into three
bedroom units because of lack of ground access. Small families are not able to
be housed in mid-rise buildings in any way. Given these constraints, it is no
wonder that the CarrLynch plan results in such a high amount of demolition.
Proposal:
Maintaining Columbia Point as a predominantly low-rise, family-oriented development
can be achieved without massive demolition and restructuring of.the present BHA site.
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In certain areas selective demolition is necessary to provide adequate open
space and other amenities, but in other parts of the site the rehabilitation
and re-use potential of existing three and seven story buildings should be
much more thorougly explored. Substantial rehabilitation of existing low- .
rise buildings into duplexes is an appropriate way of housing large families,
but modifications can be made to house smaller families more -than adecuately
in stacked apartment falts in the three story buildings.- Successful family
living in most urban areas does not have to adhere rigidly to all the design
concepts contained in the Carr,Lynch plan.
The mid-rise presents multiple opportunities for rehabilitation as, elderly
housing, as housing for adults and small families, and for mixed-use
purposes. Community space, services, congregate facilities, activity areas,
and even retail/commercial space are some of the re-use possibilities for
the ground and first floors of the buildings. Lobbies can be expanded and
large glass panels installed to light up and open up space for community
facilities and services on the first floors. For both low and mid-rise
buildings, volumes can be added, such as porches, balconies, patios, built
additions and extensions, and roof additions, so that the present stark
surface of the buildings can be substantially altered.
Streets and Circulation Systems
The Carr,Lynch plan calls for a "single connecting circulation system."
In reviewing their site plan, we find massive horizontal stretches of
street surfaces without any cross-streets breaking vertically through the
site. Cross-streets and intersections are not used as interfaces between
different parts of the site, since the intention is to make formidable any
penetration of the site by unwanted intruders. The streets are thus more
accessible to vehicles because of their length and are in effect hostile
to pedestrian traffic and activities. Even though independent pedestrian
paths are provided, they are not located in the appropriate places.
A closer look at the pedestrian circulation system and at street use reveals
the following problems:
* The use of pedestrian pathways which are scattered through the site and
ill-defined open space.. Many of the pathways are located in the common
back yards, but they do not relate to any specific activities that take
place in the. yards except for the picnic areas.
* The pathways are not directionally related to centers of activities, e.g.
they do not lead to communities centers, nor do they provide an appropriate
means of access or a short cut to other parts of the site.
* The pathways are not planned in relation to the streets, intersections or
corners. They do not provide for the purposeful flow of pedestrian traffic
through the site.
* In rerouting existing streets dead spaces was created in the interiors of the
site. No adequate uses have been provided for that extra space.
* Pedestrian movement along the streets is in many instances artificially
constrained. In some places a pedestrian must travel the length of
four blocks before being able to make a turn.
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* There are no clear nor direct paths or streets to take to reach the beach,
the recreation center, the playing field, the day care center, or
Mt. Vernon Street.
* The circulation in effect denies appropriate street life activities common
to residential neighborhoods. Streets are well located and are an asset
when they serve as meeting places, when they provide visual access to
other parts of the site, and when they serve the function of efficient
and direct pedestrian movement to places.
* The continuous winding streets also contribute to the visual breakage and
lack of spatial orientation and identification in relation to other parts
of the site.
Proposal:
Streets at Columbia Point should be planned as urban streets to embody specific
functions: a place for residential social interaction, visual accessibility,
a focal point for limited activities and-for directed and -purposeful movement.
Corners and intersection and pedestrian paths should be used to enhance the
desired street life and connect different circulation systems and activities,
e.g. pedestrian path connections at an active corner of the site. Circulation
systems should also enhance such site attributes as landscaping, internal
vistas, and vistas toward the ocean. Variables such as the scale of the street,
size, length, texture, etc. should help to define the character of the street
as residential, active.and should define the nature of the traffic flow.
Street surfaces or clearly demarcated pedestrian paths should extend vertically
through the site and relate the various centers of activities. Further
exploration should be made into the effects of rerouting the existing streets
and, constrastingly, of increasing the numbers of streets through the site.
Specifically, Monticello Ave. should remain open for rear access to the mid-
rise buildings. At evaluation of the iste plan for Parcel 1A also concludes
that the use of streets for residential purposes and for pedestrian access to
the elderly buildings should be maintained. Consideration should be given to
keeping Monticello Ave. open on the wester part of the site for limited
vehicular access (possibly one-way) and for a pedestrian path.
Use of Open Space
The recommendation for a "continuous and ample flow of open space" will result
in serious problems in maintenance, security surveillance, control and efficient
use of space. The plan contains rehabilitated and new construction units along
the street edges with vast common green space located in the middle. In some
areas the open space spans 280 feet between buildings. The use of the open space
is not very well defined either as private space or semi-public space.
The following are some of the anticipated problems that will result from the
proposed site plan:
* The uncontrolled flow of open space will create vast visual and physical
wastelands behind the residential buildings, instead of the pleasant
image of large open spaces that was intended,
503
-53-
* The undefined use of the space will result in improper uses, such as
active recreational uses behind buildings, teenagers hanging out, etc.
* The location of open space almost totally enclosed by buildings (even
with the occasional attempt at visual penetration) will cause problems
of personal safety and security. These spaces provide insurmountable
opportunities for personal attacks and assaults.
* Undifferentiated uses for the open space will also create problems of
surveillance and territoriality, since the publicness or privat.eness of
the green spaces in relation to immediate residents, neighbors, and
the larger community or public is not defined..
Proposal:
More open space for recreation and leisure than in the present CarrLynch
plan must be provided at Columbia Point. This necessitates selective
demolition in certain areas, but, more importantly, structuring and
defining the use of open space in terms -of specific activities (e.g. active
and passive use, recreation needs according to age and population groups).
Limits and definitions of types of activity will more likely determine the
success of the use of the open space than an absolute increase in the
amount of open space.
A hierarchical classification of open space from private back yards, to tot lots,
playgrounds, sitting areas, playing fields, to semi-public or public beaches
that are appropriate for the site is a superior method of planning and siting
usable open space to the the anonymous allocation of large plots of green
space as in the CarrLyn h plan.
Careful consideration should be given to the location of recreational needs such
as the following:
* Some recreational activities should be centrally located in the interior of the
site and adjoining the units, since small children will not venture out the the
large playing fields.
* Some uses should be specified with structural elements. For example, playgrounds
and garden areas can help maintain the location of a particular activity.
* Locating recreational and open space facilities close to community services
or in visible areas will increase the amount of resident control over the use
of the space.
* The location of the day care center and the play areas have high accessibility
and visibility. Sitting areas, patios, and gardens should be in greater
abundance near the elderly buildings.
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Mixed-use and Community Facilities
Even without the overriding problems of management a'nd maintenance or inadequate
funding, Columbia Point from its earliest days was doomed to fail because-of
its isolation as a multi-bedroom facility with nothing else but housing, schools,
and poor people to characterize it as a community.- Even low-income communities
in other parts of Boston had substantially more resources, a more diverse
living environment, and more geographic access to employment opportunities.
Columbia Point became a warehouse for the ppor as they were socially and physically
isolated from the larger community.
The redevelopment of Columbia Point as a homogeneous, monotonous housing site
will result in another bedroom community, except that it may be mixed-income.
An analysis of the needs of the residents, or how they use space as individuals, as
households, and collectively, and how household functions blend into community
functions should bring us closer to creating a socially as well as physically
supportive environment.
Proposal:
* A simple aggregation of units at Columbia Point results in sub-communities or
sub-neighborhoods within the total Columbia Point site. This aggregation
provides another method of structuring the focal points for activities,
for community facilities, and for mixed uses to take place.
* An analysis of subygroups within the site (large family, smal-1 family,
adult, elderly) is another means for allocating services and recreation
facilities and placing them strategically across the site. For example,
an elderly center should be located on the first floor of building 20 to serve
all three elderly buildings in Phase IA. Building 2 or 21 may serve as a
center for the units and buildings immediately surrounding.
Community Development
Redevelopment provides community and economic development opportunities for the
residents to acquire skill and training in certain enterprises and alos provides
necessary services to the site.,
Proposal:
* Explore community development opportunities through the different entities
such as community sponsored businesses, community joint sponsorship,
sub-contracting, franchising, etc. Projected facilities and businesses which
could be supported on site are neighborhood food stores, food coop, sub-shop,
fast food, laundromat, cleaners, hair dresser/barber, and others. Opportunities
are also possible for light industry and assembly enterprises.
* Explore funding sources such as EDA, SBA, CDFC, and CDAC
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- Management and Maintenance
Management and maintenance practices are the prime determinants of the
condition of the housing stock. The CarrLynch plan proposes. the unconditional
transfer of management responsibilities to a private management firm without
considering certain other options which might result in substantial improvements.
Proposal:
* Explore the possibilities of non-profit sponsored management
* Explore the possibilities of an innovative program of decentralized management
and maintenance with full tenant involvement in decision-making and
-opportunities for tenant employment.
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DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
Task Force Phase
(P) - post-rehab
(R) - base units
II
unit count
retained
Bldg. 2 (P);36
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
Bldg. 21 16 (P);24
6 3-6 BR
10 1-2 BR
Bldg. 10 12 (P);18
4 3-6 BR
8 1-2 BR
Bldg. 5
Bldg.
12 (P);18
4 3-6 BR
8 1-2 BR
56 (P);56
56 1-2 BR
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
Bldg. 13 80 (P); 84 (R)
Bldg. 22 24 (P); 36
9 3-6 BR
15 1-2 BR
(R)
Bldg. 18 16 (P); 24 (R)
$32,900/unit
$36,600/unit
$37,600/unit
$37,600/unit
$28,000/unit
$28,000/unit
$32,900/unit
$37,600/unit
A. Rehab units Phase IIA
104 family units
136 elderly/adult
B. New construction:50 family units
40 3 - 6 BR
10 1-2 BR
C. Demolition $1.55/cu. ft.
Bldg. 11 217,000
Bldg. 25 93,000
Bldg. 7 145,000
$66,000/unit 3,300,000
total demo.
455,000
D. Total II A Construction & Demolition $ 11,523,400
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Family
or Adult/
Elderly
IIA
A/E
$789,000
878,400
451,200
451,200
1,568,000
2,240,000
789,000
601,600
PHASE II A & 'C, BHA SITE
-2-
*7~~
*1-
Bldg. 19 16
14
2
Bldg. 14 16
14
2
Bldg. 15' 16
14
2
Bldg. 16 16
14
2
(P);24 (R)
3-6 BR
1-2 B
(P);24 (R)
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
(P);24 (R)
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
(P);24(R)
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
£32,900/unit
$32,900/unit
$32,900/unit
S32,900/unit
Bldg. 23 24 (P);36 (R)
9 3-6 BR
15 1-2 BR
Bldg. (P); 24 (R)
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
Bldg. 9 - 16 (P);24(R)
S32,900/unit
$34,350/unit
$34,350/unit
A. Rehab units Phase IIC
120 family
B. New construction:
22 3-6 BR
6 1-2 BR
28 family units . $66,000/unit
C. Total Phase IIC Construction
D. Total Task Force Phase II A & C construction
$ 5,841,800
$17,365,200
E. Total Task Force per unit cost
438 total units:
302 family units
$39,646/nit
$44,891/family unit
508
F 526,400
526,400
526,400
526,400
789,000
549,600
549,600
1,848,000
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Alternative Phase II
24 (P); 36 (R)
21 3-6 BR
3 1-2 BR
(P) ;36
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
(R)
(P); 24 (R)
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
S32,900/unit
S32,900/unit
$36,600/unit
Bldg. 5
Bldg. 8
Bldg.
Bldg. 17
Bldg. 18
Bldg.
80(P); 84
80 1-2 BR
(R)
.56 (P); 56 (R)
24 (P); 36 (R)
9 3-6 BR
15 1-2 BR
24 (P); 36 (R)
56 (P); 56 (R)
13 80 (P); 84
80 1-2 BR
(R)
F Bldg. 22 24 (P); 36 (R)
A. Rehab units Phase IIA
128 family
272 elderly
B. New construction: 30 units
24 3-6 BR
6 1-2 BR
C. Demolition
Bldg. 7 163,000
Bldg. 10 163,000
D. Total construction and demolition
$28,000/unit
$28,000/uni t
$36,699/unit
$36,600/unit
$28,000/unit
$28,000/unit
$36,600/unit
$66,000/unit
.2,240,000
1,568,000
- 878,400
878,400
1,568,000
2,240,000
878,400
1,980,000
326,000
14,720,800
IIIA
F Bldg. 2
Bldg.. 25
Bldg.
789,000
789,000
585,600
Bldg. 19
Bldg.. 14
Bldg. 15 16
14
2
Bldg. 16 16
14
2
Bldg. 6
Bldg.
(P); 24
1-2 BR
(P); 24
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
(P); 24
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
(P); 24
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
(P); 36
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
(P); 36
3-6 BR
1-2 BR
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
Bldg. 23 24 (P); 36 (R)
S32,900/uni t
S32,900/unit
$32,900/unit
$32,900/unit
$32,900/unit
$32,900/unit
$32,900/unit
A. Rehab units Phase II C
136 family
B. New construction Phase IIC" 28 units $66,000/unit 1,848,000
22 3-6 BR
6 1-2 BR
Total construction cost Phase IIC 6,320,600
D. Total Alternative construction cost, Phase II A & C $ 21,041,400
E. Total Alternative units, Phase II A & C
IIA 166 family
272 elderly
IIC 164 family
602 total units
F. Total per unit cost $34,952/each unit$40,683/family unit
510
IIC
526,400
526,400
526,400
526,400
789,000
789,000
789,000
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Comparison of large amd small family units:
Task Force
Total family: 302
.3-6 BR 205
1-2 BR 97
Total elderly: 136
Total units 438
Alternative
Total family: 330
3-6 BR 216
1-2 BR 114
Total elderly 272
Total units 602
Phase II A & C
Comparison of retention and demolition totals for Phase IA, Phase II A & C
Task Force
Total retention: 824
Phase II A& C 476
Phase IA 348
Alternative
Total retention:1,048
Phase II A& C 688
Phase IA 360
Total demolition:
Total demolition:
511
680
456
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A REVIEW OF BHA POLICY ON REHABILITATION AND DEMOLITION AT COLU1BIA POINT
Over the past several months the intensive work on site planning at Columbia Point
has been the cause of a careful review within the Planning, Development, and
Modernization Department of the BHA of policies toward rehabilitation and
demolition at existing developments. While this policy review has focused
primarily on Columbia Point, decisions taken at Columbia Point. clearly have
ramifications for many other developments, and, therefore, issues of
rehabilitation and demolition must be seen in a city-wide context.
There are many reasons why selective demolition ought to be supported at
Columbia Point and these reasons have often been listed in BHA reports and
funding applications. Particularly at Columbia Point where demolition and
construction of new townhouse units is a high priority of the tenant task
force, the BHA has attempted to be as. responsive as possible on this issue.
However, because of city-wide housing issues which are inextricably bound
up in decisions at Columbia Point, the BHA's basic policy is to be in support
of rehabilitation of units and not demolition wherever this is reasonable.
Within the context of sound site planning principles some demolition may be
supported, but the evidence for demolition on a building-by-building basis
must be compelling.
The following are basic reasons why the BHA adopts a strong pro-rehabilitation
policy. Unfortunately, not all.these reasons respond immediately to specific
tenant concerns at Columbia Point. They are, nonetheless, reasons of significant
importance to the BHA in its role as the main provider of subsidized housing
in the city of Boston.
1. Overwhelming citywide need for low and moderate income units for families of
all sizes and for elderly
While there may be an expressed desire at a development like Columbia Point to
demolish a substantial number of units in order to provide a certain kind of
ambience on the site that is perceived as desirable, the overwhelming need
for subsidized units of all types and sizes in Boston leads the BHA to be
able to support demolition only where careful site analysis indicates that no
alternative is really possible. Some specific-numbers, taken from an April 17,
1979 summary of the BHA waiting list, makes this point especially clear. The
waiting list contained the following needs by bedroom size:
Family developments plus Leased Housing
1 BR 1047 + 426 = 1473
2 BR 2197 + 676 = 2873
3 BR 1586 + 665 = 2251
4 BR 372 + 193 = 565
5 BR 76 + 43 = 110
6 BR 9 + 4 = 13
7285
512
Elderly developments plus Leased Housinq
1 BR 2746 + 106 = 2852
2 BR 432 + 169 = 601
Total elderly waiting 3453
Almost 60% of the family need for low and moderate income housing is for
one and two bedroom units. Such units can reasonably be provided either
in flats on any floor of existing low-rise buildings or on any floor of a
mid-rise building. When elderly needs are added in, the city-wide ,demand
for one and two bedroom units rises to almost 73% of the city-wide total.
Therefore, while the BHA wishes to be as responsive as possible to the need
for fully functioning large family units, it dare not provide such units
at-the insufficiently supported cost of existing one and two bedroom units.
So long as sound site planning principles are maintained for larger families,
one and two bedroom unit buildings should be maintained and rehabilitated
wherever possible.
2. Demolition as a precedent 'in the rehabilitation of developments
It is no secret that there are developments around Boston in an equal or
greater state of deterioration than Columbia Point. The total revitalization
of Columbia Point is but the first step in a mandatory city-wide program to
revitalize most of the older, predominantly family developments owned by the
BHA. In many developments' as at Columbia Point, residents have had to live with
deteriorated buildings'for years,and those buildings themselves b'ecome the
symbol for the myriad of problems that infect each development. The clearest
indication to many residents that, indeed, things are changing at a development
is to remove entirely that symbol of the way things use to be, the old building.
Demolition on such a psychological basis, however, while a valid and important
factor in resident satisfaction with a new community, ought not be allowed to
overshadow sound planning principles and the many opportunities to create
an outstanding community in existing, rehabilitated buildings, a community
which may be impaired by the shortcomings of new construction. The psychological
need for demolition should not be used as a pathway into rather uncreative
design work that is not able toTespond to the challenges and opportunities of
reuse. Especially when viewed in a city-wide context, the BHA must push for
this latter sort of design excellence in revitalizing its developments.
Massive demolition within the many developments around the city is beyond any
reasonable financial means. To allow such an option beyond prudent planning
requirements in any one development is to offer it as an opportunity in all
troubled developments.
3. Need for replacement units if housing stock is diminished
The BHA may well consider demolition and the reduction of overall units in
a particular development as an appropriate means to revitalize that development.
In addition to specific design failures, developments may in fact be too dense
and be well served by selective thinning. Indeed, in some of the more deteriorated
developments it can be argued that the "as built" number of units have not been
adequately functioning for low income people for years and that it is unfair
to count them as existing units. Nevertheless, BHA does have an obligation throughou
the city to maintain in superb condition as many units for low income people as
it can. The existing private sector subsidized housing programs (Sec. 8) etc.
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do not necessarily add low and moderate income units to the housing stock
on a long-term basis. Since initial Sec. 8 contracts run out in five years,
if demand for market rate housing is Stronger in ar area where a Sec. 8
development was originally established, that development may routinely by-
converted to market rate housing. It is only certain community-based subsidized
housing developments and public sector subsidized housing that has a strong
certainty of remaining available to low and -moderate income people throughout
its useful life. .Therefore, the BHA has a strong obligation, for whatever
reason units are removed because of a particular demolition program and a
particular development, to find equivalent replacement units for t.hose
demolished elsewhere in the city. This obligation of BHA results in a
primary dispostion toward rehabilitation and as little reduction in existing
units as is reasonable.
4. Overall responsibility for public sector subsidies
All the public sector resources for subsidized housing, whether through the
Sec. 8 program and other HUD subsidy and guarantee programs which are
utilized primarily by the private sector.or through standard public
housing monies, are woefully insufficient to meet the demand for subsidized
housing. That demand is expected to increase significantly in the near future
as more and more individuals are in the household formation age and as living
conditions become more extreme and expensive, especially in the Northeast.
While demolition and new construction in many development reuse programs might
be the ideal solution, the BHA and others trying to provide low and moderate
income housing must make the most responsible use of the extremely limited
financial subsidies for new low- and moderate-income housing (i.e. new or
rehabilitated). In many cases this means that the BHA is obligated to attempt
creative use of its existing units and existing subsidy programs in rehabilitated
buildings rather than encumbering the subsidy programs with the far more expensive
burden of new construction. While it might be pleasant to act as if one had
almost a blank check when it comes to- the rehabilitation of an existing
development (the argument would be made that one should spend substantial amounts
of funding on that one developmant so that at least one development will be
successful, although resources may in the process be denied to several others),
in fact everyone involved in producing subsidized housing has a responsibility
to be prudent in the use of subsidy programs so that they can be stretched as
far as reasonable to provide subsidized units. Again, extensive refinancing
should not be avoided to the extent that an attempted development rehabilitation
fails for lack of adequate financial support. The deployment of subsidies should
be carefully considered, however, so as to maximize their impact.
A.related point is that if one is attempting to revitalize a development
through private development resources, substantial. rehabilitation of existing
buildings is a significant key to the financial success of that rehabilitation
program. Developers are allowed to take five-year accelerated depreciation on
such rehabilitation projects. This write off aids immeasurably in the financial
feasibility of a redevelopment effort.
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5. The quality and stabili'ty of rehabilitated units
An important point not to be overlooked is that rehabilitation in existing
buildings often provides a much higher quality dwelling units for
substantially less money than new construction. The steel frame, concrete
slab construction and masonry walls that characterize many of the BHA
developments are.in fact prime constituents of a successful and hiah
quality rehabilitation. The sound deafening and energy retention characteristics
of these buildings,when properly rehabilitated, is far superior to the
stud and drywall of new construction. The long-term stability and
durability of such construction, especially when plaster walls are tompared
with current drywall construction, argue for retention of units when ever
a rehabilitated unit with appropriate design characteristics can be created.
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